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ABSTRACT 
 
Sarah Bauerle: Cronies, Capitalists, and Control: Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization, 
Capital Flows, and Banking Sector Reforms 
 (Under the direction of Layna Mosley) 
 
 
This dissertation argues policies toward foreign direct investment (FDI) are best 
understood as the product of domestic political coalitions led by local business elites that are 
conditioned on the local financing environment. Local firms support restrictive FDI policies 
when financial repression and loose global credit markets provide powerful industrial elites with 
access to ample credit on subsidized terms. When the domestic banking sector undergoes 
substantial reforms, local elites no longer have access to cheap credit through political 
connections. The need to obtain finance outweighs firms’ preferences to exclude foreign direct 
investors. Under such conditions, industrial elites will pressure governments to pursue liberal 
FDI policy environments. Using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research methods, I 
find substantial support for this theory. Banking sector reforms are associated with considerable 
decreases in foreign equity restrictions, even after controlling for a variety of alternative 
explanations of FDI policy liberalization. Financial reforms are also positively associated with 
moving from closed to partially open FDI policy states and with preventing policy backsliding 
once the investment climate fully liberalizes. Availability of alternative investment sources 
reduces the propensity to fully liberalize FDI policies. A comparative case study of investment 
policy maintenance and reform in Indonesia and Malaysia from 1965 to 2013 shows industrial 
elites in both countries were influential to the policymaking process and that these elites 
iv 
advocated restrictive policies under financial repression and openness after banking system 
reforms. These findings suggest elite interests, rather than the ways domestic political institutions 
mediate the interests of capital and labor, drive FDI policymaking and underscore how financial 
access influences firms’ interests. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION !
This dissertation argues policies toward foreign direct investment (FDI)1 are best 
understood as the product of domestic political coalitions that are conditioned on the local 
financing environment. Local capitalists, as profit-maximizing actors, work to protect their 
access to operating and investment finance as well as the rents they accrue through protectionist 
policies. When the domestic credit allocation process is dominated by the state, and when loose 
global credit markets provide substantial capital readily intermediated through local financial 
institutions, domestic industrial elites will be able to finance their activities without sacrificing 
equity and without opening local labor and product markets to foreign competitors. When the 
domestic banking sector undergoes substantial reforms, local elites no longer have access to 
subsidized credit through political connections. The need to obtain finance outweighs firms’ 
preferences to exclude foreign direct investors. Under such conditions, industrial elites will 
support increasingly liberal FDI policy environments. 
In many ways, this argument is a return to earlier frameworks for understanding 
regulation of direct investors. Scholarship on FDI in the 1960s through mid 1980s often placed 
the development financing needs of states as central to understanding government policies 
toward foreign investors. Writing on the cusp of the Latin American Debt crisis, Jeff Frieden 
marveled at less developed countries’ (LDCs) swift and unprecedented ability to attract massive 
foreign portfolio capital inflows (1981). The rapid growth of LDC commercial bank debt to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is generally defined as “an investment involving a long-term !
!2 
foreigners changed the nature of how development was financed. Rather than rely on 
multinational corporations to bring industrial development and integration into a global 
economic system, governments could support the development of indigenous firms owned by 
locals and financed by international capital channeled through state banks. Under these 
conditions, many developing countries set about limiting direct investment, often in response to 
domestic elite pressures for protection and buttressed by popular nationalistic opposition to 
foreign firms (Frieden 1981; Lipson 1985).2 Many scholars subsequently pointed to the ensuing 
debt crises that swept much of the developing world as the cause of liberalizing policies in the 
1980s and 1990s (Feenstra 1999; Lipsey 1999; Lipson 1985, 24). 
In comparison, recent research on FDI policy has been strangely ahistoric. Drawing on 
distributive models of economic conflict, researchers have extended models of trade openness to 
explain FDI liberalization.3 The central proposition of this research agenda is that democratic 
institutions lead to more open FDI regulatory environments since investment inflows benefit 
workers and disadvantage local capital. Yet, such accounts gloss over the broader historical 
context of policies toward foreign investment. Most countries were largely permissive of direct 
foreign investment through much of the 19th century until mid 20th century (Lipsey 1999; Scott !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The sense that policies toward FDI had substantially and permanently changed is perhaps best 
encapsulated by Lipson’s stark assessment: “the rules dealing with foreign investment have 
changed significantly and irreversibly. Regardless of the incentives for new foreign investment 
or the existing regulations, there are no real long-term guarantees. . . What has been lost, perhaps 
irretrievably, is a sense of certainty about the way investments will be treated in the future.” 
(Lipson 1985, 24) 
 
3 Others have emphasized policy diffusion as driving liberalization among countries competing 
for capital (Simmons, Elkins, and Guzman 2006). While there is evidence that policy innovations 
do tend to spread regionally, a diffusion theory is incomplete on two accounts. First, it is unclear 
if governments are responding to the policy innovations of competitors or if governments are 
simultaneously responding to similar structural changes that shift domestic coalitions’ 
willingness to support restrictiveness or liberalization. Second, if FDI policy innovations occur 
due to cross-border diffusion, what instigates the decision by leading state to liberalize? 
!3 
and Rooth 1999; Wilkins 1970). A democracy-driven explanation of FDI liberalization cannot 
explain why policies toward direct investment were largely permissive until the mid- 20th 
century. Nor can they explain why many advanced democracies increased FDI regulation in the 
post-war era.. 
Extant theories of FDI liberalization also tend to ignore policy developments toward FDI 
in advanced economies. This is problematic because advanced economies host the most FDI 
stock. While much of the analytic focus of FDI research has adopted, either explicitly or 
implicitly, a model of advanced economies as home states exporting FDI to developing host 
states, the majority of which through establishing new wholly owned subsidiaries, the reality of 
FDI flows is quite different. Most of the time, most FDI occurs between developed countries and 
is driven by cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (UNCTAD 2013). Cross border M&A 
is less prevalent in developing countries because these deals have smaller book values, local 
governments often block such acquisitions, and multinational firms are often wary of their legal 
protections regarding such deals. However, the relative importance of greenfield investment to 
the composition of FDI flows declines as the investment environment becomes more open. As 
local firms in developing countries amass increasingly large book values and become more 
desirable M&A targets, cross border deals will become increasingly important components of 
FDI activity (UNCTAD 2000). Indeed, we see that M&A activity in developing countries is 
currently larger than new greenfield equity investments (UNCTAD 2013, xx). Much of what is 
classified as greenfield FDI in developing countries is actually follow-on investment from 
retained earnings. Moreover, these retained earnings are often reserved in cash rather than put 
toward productive investment. Additionally, as developing countries increasingly become 
sources of FDI, the distinction between home and host countries, however tenuous in original 
!4 
construction, increasingly breaks down. The growing importance of state-owned enterprises and 
sovereign wealth funds as international direct investors has made developed economies 
increasingly wary of their own FDI inflows (Marchick and Slaughter 2008; UNCTAD 2006). As 
the sources and targets of FDI merge, it is important to return to thinking about the ways in 
which the politics of FDI in developed and developing countries are similar rather than assuming 
they are distinct.  
Another prominent argument for why FDI is more acceptable to localities today than it 
was in 1970 is that FDI to developing countries in particular has shifted from extractive and 
market-seeking investments to export-oriented manufacturing. Current characteristics of FDI are 
not as fundamentally distinct from historical forms of FDI as some analysts suggest. The 
majority of FDI in both developed and developing localities occurs in the service sector 
(UNCTAD 2013, 8). Manufacturing FDI certainly increased through the 1960s and 1970s, but it 
is not the modal form of FDI. Just-in-time multinational production chains have also led to a 
large increase in subcontracting, which allows local firms in developing countries in particular to 
partake in international production networks without taking on foreign equity partners. FDI in 
developing countries before the 1960s was also often characterized by export-oriented enclave 
production, though often of agricultural products, which generated foreign exchange, (Frieden 
1981; Lipson 1985). And, FDI began primarily as investments in service sectors, particularly 
infrastructure development such as railroads (Lipsey 1999). In other words, the types of activities 
in which FDI concentrates have changed much less than popular perceptions allow. 
A financing-based explanation of FDI policy has several advantages over theories that 
emphasize the redistributive politics of domestic institutions. But, doing so requires us to assume 
direct investment is largely substitutable for other kinds of cross-border capital flows. For some, 
!5 
this may be a herculean assumption. The study of FDI originated in the field of industrial 
organization, and subsequent research has often focused on the multinational firm’s choice 
between direct investment and some other form of international operation.4 Economists largely 
cleaved to this firm-level insight that direct investment is in some way superior to indirect 
investment for the technology transfer and organizational insight multinational investments 
convey as well as the high redeployment costs that make FDI less “footloose” than easily 
transferred portfolio investment. However, many of the advantages of FDI are not really 
“intangible” since local firms can and frequently do obtain technology and organizational 
innovations through licenses and management contracts. In a liberalized policy environment, the 
fixed nature of FDI is overstated since investors could sell localized assets, withdraw from 
operations, and repatriate earnings. At the firm level, there may be important distinctions 
between modes of investment. However, in the aggregate, FDI and other forms of foreign 
investment exhibit characteristics of substitutes. In studies across developed and developing 
countries as well as studies across long periods of time, FDI and other forms of foreign 
investment are consistently negatively correlated. More generally, a focus on what makes FDI 
special obscures the reality that FDI is fundamentally a flow of investment capital that finances 
domestic economic activity. 
In many ways, this research project is an initial attempt to seriously consider how 
financial regulation affects the strategies of economic actors in an economically interdependent 
global system. The global financial crisis led many IPE scholars to call for increased emphasis 
on the role of financial regulatory systems in explaining patterns of international investment 
flows and in explaining policy outcomes (Mosley and Singer 2009). This dissertation attempts to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See Hymer (1960) and Dunning and Rugman (1985) for an orientation. 
!6 
answer that call by combining insights from earlier work on FDI, mainly thinking about FDI as a 
source of international investment, and the literature on financial repression and reform to 
consider how local access to financing influences domestic firm strategies with respect to FDI. 
Theory 
The central argument of this dissertation is that changes in elites’ strategies toward 
foreign investment, rather than transformations in domestic political institutions, drive FDI 
policy liberalization. I argue higher levels of FDI liberalization occur when structural conditions 
at the global and local levels reduce domestic firms’ access to alternative sources of investment 
finance. As the availability of other sources of investment declines and the costs of such capital 
increases, powerful business elites will be more willing to open the local economy to foreign 
owners in order to gain greater access to foreign firms’ investment financing. If this is true, we 
should expect alternative financing constraints to be associated with FDI liberalization, while 
access to other forms of investment will impede reform. In Chapter 2, I develop expectations for 
how an easy global credit environment, the ability to attract portfolio and direct investment 
without further policy liberalization, and openness toward short-term capital flows all make local 
firms better poised to operate and grow without ceded managerial control to foreign firms. Thus, 
under such conditions, FDI policy liberalization is unlikely.  
However, dramatic changes to the way in which capital is intermediated domestically can 
shift elite’s strategies toward favoring more liberal FDI policy environments. In particular, I 
focus on how banking sector reforms, often pursued in response to external pressures and 
financial crises, can substantially disrupt elite access to and costs of credit. When governments 
exhibit high levels of control over the financial sector; through interest rate controls, directed 
credit requirements, and large state-owned banks; lending decisions are based on political 
!7 
calculus and therefore provide powerful firms with preferential access to subsidized credit. 
Under such conditions, business elite most likely to be able to effectively pressure governments 
for their preferred policies will be happy to restrict FDI. With access to subsidized credit, these 
firms will not view foreign direct equity necessary to fuel their growth. At the same time, the 
certain costs of FDI liberalization – mainly higher labor costs and demands for increased 
productivity – will outstrip the possible benefits of foreign firm entry since gains from linkages 
are firm specific and difficult to predict ex ante. However, when the banking sector undergoes 
substantial reform, the link between politically powerful firms and subsidized credit diminishes. 
Under tighter local financing constraints, large and powerful firms will be more willing to bear 
the costs associated with foreign entry in order to gain access to investment financing through 
foreign direct equity. 
Thus, this dissertation argues transformations in elite policy preferences, caused by 
disruptions to access to capital rather than changes in political institutions that shift political 
power toward labor, explain alterations in policies toward FDI. While access to cheap alternative 
sources of capital make elites less likely to support reform, policy developments that limit short-
term investment and debt financing will cause elites to re-evaluate the costs and benefits of 
openness. In particular, banking sector liberalization reorients powerful societal and state 
interests from restricting to encouraging foreign entry.  
My theory contributes to the literatures of FDI and macroeconomic reform sequencing in 
the following ways. First, I explain change in policy outcomes as primarily the result of shifting 
interests rather than changes in domestic political institutions. This contrasts sharply with 
arguments that regime type explains differences in policies toward FDI and complements 
arguments that institutions in transition are unable to act as binding constraints on politicians and 
!8 
are therefore improbable sources of major changes in policy outcomes (Pepinsky 2013b, 6). 
Second, I re-conceptualize FDI policies as adhering to discrete levels of openness. In doing so, I 
emphasize the possibility that FDI liberalization is subject to a partial reform equilibrium not 
unlike other policies of structural adjustment (Hellman 1998). Third, I place FDI liberalization 
within the context of other liberalizing reforms, particularly those that pertain to reforming other 
financial policies such as capital account openness and banking. I show how antecedent reforms 
in these areas reshape domestic interests over FDI openness. FDI openness is not merely a 
reflection of a general liberalizing trend, but reflects the formation of supporting coalitions as 
previous reforms shift policy preferences of politically powerful interest groups. 
Analysis 
 To test this theory, I employ a mixed-method approach. Two analytical chapters use large 
N statistical analysis to establish both the long-term relationship between banking sector reforms 
and FDI policy liberalization and how changes in the financing environment affect the 
propensity of switching between discreet categories of openness to FDI. The second two analytic 
chapters compare the historical development of FDI policy in Indonesia and Malaysia while 
identifying the political coalitions that supported FDI restriction and liberalization. Below, I 
briefly outline each chapter.  
Establishing Long-Term Relationship 
In Chapter 3, I assess the long-term relationship between banking reforms and changes in 
FDI openness using a dataset of up to 68 countries form 1973 to 2000. Using error correction 
techniques that isolate short-term and long-term dynamics, I demonstrate that banking sector 
reform is statistically significantly associated with subsequent increases in liberalization of 
foreign equity restrictions, that the effect of banking reform on FDI openness takes several years 
!9 
to develop, and that this relationship is robust to multiple alternative explanations such as regime 
type, IMF coercion, general trends toward economic liberalization, and international treaty 
obligations. These results provide macro-evidence consistent with my theory.  
Explaining Policy Switching 
In Chapter 4, I make use of Markov transition modeling techniques to more fully explore 
the conditions that make it more likely that governments will transition between three states of 
FDI policy: closed, intermediate, and liberal. In particular, I consider the conditions under which 
governments may become “stuck” in a partial reform equilibrium in which they welcome and 
perhaps even pursue FDI in certain industries but continue to maintain substantial restrictions 
such industry-specific equity restrictions, employment related performance requirements, 
technology transfer, and/or project-specific screening requirements. I find substantial support for 
the premise that openness to FDI depends on the ability of local firms to obtain financing from 
alternate sources. Global financing constraints, short-term capital account openness, and banking 
sector reforms that reduce access to state-subsidized loans all affect the propensity to liberalize. 
At the same time, the effect of these factors is often conditional on starting state. In particular, 
gaining alternative means of accessing international finance is associated with a reduced chance 
of fully liberalizing the FDI policy environment. A similar pattern of regulatory retrenchment 
emerges as well for the level of development and democracy of a host state. These findings are 
robust to multiple controls including accounting for regional and income peer policies, IMF 
lending, banking crises, and natural resource wealth. Despite these results, I find only modest 
support for the proposition that banking sector reforms can puncture partial reform equilibrium. 
Taken in conjunction with the result of Chapter 3, this may be indicative of a relationship 
!10 
between banking sector reforms and FDI liberalization that takes a relatively large time to play 
out. 
Tracing Elite Strategies, Lobbying, and Policy Outcomes 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I examine the evolution of FDI policy in Indonesia and Malaysia 
from 1965 to today.!I demonstrate how different banking sector policy developments through 
three distinct periods of these countries’ economic histories affected elite interests, and 
accordingly policy outcomes, over restrictiveness toward FDI. This chapter traces the 
development of banking and investment policy from 1965-1997 while the following focuses on 
policy reform in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Over the time period I cover, 
Malaysia has more consistently pursued banking sector deepening that has supported gradual 
liberalization of FDI policies with limited backsliding. In contrast, Indonesian governments have 
more often pursued policies designed to maintain substantial control over domestic credit 
allocation decisions, and therefore has less elite support for loosening restrictions on FDI. 
However, while the level of FDI openness in Indonesia has consistently shown protectionist bias, 
a period of rapid banking sector deregulation in the 1980s did lead to a period of limited 
liberalization. These policy developments, along with documentation of elite lobbying activities 
toward FDI policy at the time, provide further evidence that banking sector reform affects FDI 
policy changes. Subsequent state consolidation of the banking sector in Indonesia has led to 
reform stagnation and reversal, illustrating FDI policy can be subject to a partial reform 
equilibrium as well as increased protectionism even in a global environment of overwhelming 
economic integration. !
In Chapter 5,!I trace the process of financial crisis and the relationship between banking 
reforms and foreign direct investment liberalization in Indonesia and Malaysia from 1965 to 
!11 
1997 in order to look more closely at stated policy preferences of elite groups in different 
domestic credit environments. While regime management of inter-ethnic political cleavages 
initially led the Malaysian government to cautiously embrace high regulated foreign investors as 
a way of limiting the economic dominance of non-bumiputera capitalists, Indonesia’s tight 
alliance between the military, ruling party, and ethnic Chinese financiers provided the political 
logic for largely excluding foreign capital from direct investments in the local economy. The 
Indonesian government’s policy of banking deregulation in the 1980s in response to tight global 
credit conditions and elite interest in establishing private banks linked to powerful domestic 
conglomerates, however, created local elite support for limited FDI reforms such that by 1997 
Indonesia’s FDI policies were slightly less restrictive than were Malaysia’s.  
In Chapter 6, I demonstrate how divergent crisis response strategies to the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis led to substantial liberalization of credit allocation in Malaysia while Indonesia’s 
foreign bank-led financial sector restructuring did little to force fundamental changes in the way 
banks make debt financing decisions and insulated the state from needing to privatize its 
extensive state-owned banking system. As a result, Indonesian business interests have 
successfully blocked attempts to implement large-scale liberalization of FDI beyond the initial 
IMF-imposed policy changes in 1998-9. In contrast, the Malaysian business community has 
largely supported, and in many cases driven, more fundamental liberalization of FDI policy. 
These findings point to micro-level evidence to support the primary claim of this dissertation that 
financial sector liberalization shifts preferences of politically important business interests toward 
favoring opening to FDI. 
To be clear, this comparative case study is not meant as a definitive test of my theory, 
which is fundamentally based on a probabilistic conception of causality. Instead, these chapters 
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provide an opportunity to look more closely at the evolution of banking and investment policies 
and to probe my argument that the causal link between banking sector reforms and FDI 
liberalization is both shifting elite preferences and the diminished political power of domestic 
banking interests. 
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CHAPTER 2: A FINANCING OPPORTUNITY COST FRAMEWORK OF FDI 
REGULATION 
Introduction 
Today, most countries have relatively open policy environments toward FDI that include 
relaxed equity restrictions, guarantees of national treatment, legal protection through 
international treaties, and investment incentives (UNCTAD 2012, Elkins et al. 2006). The tenor 
of these policies stand in stark contrast to dominant opinions of FDI just thirty or forty years ago 
when most developing countries were largely statutorily closed to FDI and many advanced 
economies also placed targeted restrictions on domestic activities of multinational firms.5 The 
extent of anti-FDI rhetoric is best illustrated by the push by developing countries in the 1970’s to 
adopt a new international economic order (NIEO) that would establish states’ rights to 
expropriate and regulate transnational investments. While FDI was previously considered 
exploitative of development countries, today such investment flows are considered vital 
components of economic development and poverty reduction strategies.6 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Restrictions of FDI in the mid 20th century themselves represent a break from a long-standing 
norm in international law that afforded foreign investors extra protections beyond those available 
to domestic firms. See Lipson (1985) for a detailed history of foreign investor protection 
regimes. !
6 Dependencias argued FDI perpetuated underdevelopment by exploiting natural resources in the 
periphery, preventing the development of local industry, and repatriating profits to the core, 
which worsened the investment gap in developing countries. See Evans (1979) for a review. 
With the development of export platform FDI strategies and a growing intellectual focus on 
agglomeration effects, development economists in the 1990s emphasized the positive 
externalities associated with FDI inflows. The Asian Financial Crisis solidified this stance, as the 
experiences of countries in crises underscored the fragilities associated with securing portfolio 
investment from overseas while FDI remained robust to crisis and even displayed corrective 
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However, while very few countries still impose outright bans on FDI, the freedom to 
invest directly in foreign jurisdictions is far from complete. Limitations on foreign equity 
participation remain common, particularly for investments in natural resources and services that 
display non-competitive market structures (UNCTAD 2012, 79). Many states maintain screening 
authority over larger investment proposals, and require such projects to demonstrate their 
positive economic effects on employment, local business, and the national account in order to 
gain entry. Most governments have maintained the authority to block incoming FDI for national 
security concerns, and regulatory trends indicate countries are taking increasingly expansive 
views on what constitutes a threat to national security (UNCTAD 2012, 79-80). Thus, while 
most countries are at least nominally open to FDI, the degree of openness remains varied. 
In contrast to previous research that emphasizes democratization and the changing nature 
of FDI to explain patterns of increased FDI openness, I argue higher levels of FDI liberalization 
occur when structural conditions at the global and local levels reduce domestic firms’ access to 
alternative sources of investment finance. As the availability other sources of investment 
declines and the costs of such capital increases, powerful local business elites will be more 
willing to support policies that open the local economy to foreign owners. They will do so in 
order to gain greater access to foreign firms’ investment financing. If this is true, we should 
expect alternative financing constraints to be associated with FDI liberalization, while access to 
other forms of investment will impede reform.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
counter-cyclical tendencies (Prasad et al. 2003). Empirical evidence that FDI is associated with 
growth further bolstered arguments to liberalize FDI (Borensztein, De Gregori, and Lee 1998). 
However, skeptical interpretations of FDI remain (Görg and Greenaway 2004; Hausmann and 
Fernández-Arias 2000; Rodrik 2008). !
!15 
Dramatic changes to the way in which capital is intermediated domestically can shift elite 
lobbying strategies toward favoring more liberal FDI policy environments. Banking sector 
reforms, often pursued in response to external pressures and financial crises, can substantially 
disrupt elite access to and costs of credit. When governments exhibit high levels of control over 
the financial sector through interest rate controls, directed credit requirements, and large state-
owned banks; lending decisions are based on political calculus and therefore provide powerful 
firms with preferential access to subsidized credit. Under such conditions, business elites most 
likely to be able to effectively pressure governments for their preferred policies will be happy to 
restrict FDI. With access to subsidized credit, these firms will not view foreign direct equity 
necessary to fuel their growth. At the same time, the certain costs of FDI liberalization – mainly 
higher labor costs and demands for increased productivity – will outstrip the possible benefits of 
foreign firm entry since gains from affiliation and linkage are firm specific and difficult to 
predict ex ante. However, when the banking sector undergoes substantial reform, the link 
between politically powerful firms and subsidized credit diminishes. Under tighter local 
financing constraints, large and powerful firms will be more willing to bear the costs associated 
with foreign entry in order to gain access to investment financing through foreign direct equity. 
Thus, the central argument of this dissertation is that transformations in the way credit is 
intermediated in local financial markets disrupt elite access to capital and therefore create 
incentives for local industrial interests to support loosening restrictions on foreign equity 
ownership. While access to cheap alternative sources of capital make elites less likely to support 
reform, policy developments that limit short-term investment and debt financing will cause elites 
to re-evaluate the costs and benefits of openness. In particular, banking sector liberalization 
reorients powerful societal and state interests from restricting to encouraging foreign entry.  
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In the sections that follow, I first explain why extant explanations of FDI liberalization 
are insufficient. Next, I outline my theory and establish why foreign entry represents a threat to 
local firms. I then explore how global and local financing environments condition industrial 
elites’ willingness to oppose or support foreign entry. The sixth section addresses concerns about 
the distinctiveness of banking sector reforms from FDI policy liberalization. The next section 
summarizes the main expectations of the theory and crystalizes them into a series of testable 
hypotheses. The final section briefly discusses the research design strategies I employ in 
following chapters to test these hypotheses. 
FDI Policies, 1970-2000 
 The last quarter of the twentieth century saw a distinct trend toward decreased restrictions 
on foreign equity. Restrictions on FDI inflows have declined worldwide through the 1970s-
1990s as countries have largely abandoned central planning and indigenous development models 
in favor of economic liberalization and structural adjustment. Moves toward openness are not 
confined to developing countries. Many advanced European economies entered the period with 
specific restrictions on cross border mergers and acquisitions. For example, Sweden made all 
foreign acquisitions subject to government review in 1973 and also required foreign investors to 
source at least 50 percent of capital overseas (Blomström and Kokko 1997, 367). France had 
similar investment screening provisions that were only relaxed for non-EU originating FDI in 
1992 (Michalet 1997, 330). Japan also greatly restricted inward FDI for much of this period. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the average level of foreign equity openness, defined as the percentage of 
industries that restrict FDI to minority ownership, as well as the sample standard deviation for 
the time period 1973 through 2000.7 Over this time, FDI policies across developed and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 These data are from Pandya (2014) and are explained in further detail in Chapter Three. 
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developing countries experienced convergence toward a policy environment more statutorily 
open to direct investment by foreigners.  
Figure 2.1: FDI Policy Over Time 
 
Despite this macro-level convergence, variation continues to persist. Most countries 
pursue a complex of investment policies designed to attract certain types of FDI inflows, 
particularly manufacturing, while repelling foreign investment in other areas of the economy 
(Golub 2009; UNCTAD 2013). Since 2000, the percentage of yearly changes in national 
investment policies that are more restricting has steadily risen from 6 percent to 25 percent. 
Restrictive investment policy changes are not isolated to developing countries. In 2012, the 
largest share of restrictive policy changes occurred in developed countries (UNCTAD 2013, 93). 
Countries also vary in the extent to which they use centralized screening mechanisms to approve 
investment projects with foreign participation; such approval processes tend to have a chilling 
effect on cross border mergers and acquisitions (Taylor 2000; UNCTAD 2013, 98). Figure 2.2 
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shows how screening processes had progressively liberalized through the early 1990s, but 
experienced a reversal in the second half of the decade. Since 2000, many governments have 
further tightened investment approval requirements.8 UNCTAD estimates 30 percent of all cross 
border M&As withdrawn after announcement in 2010 were due to restrictive investment policies 
(UNCTAD 2013, 97). The total value of M&As withdrawn for regulatory reasons between 2008 
and 2012 approximated $265 billion, or about 10 percent of cross border deals concluded over 
the same time period (UNCTAD 2013, 8, 97). 
Figure 2.2: Investment Screening Liberalization Over Time 
 
 These stylized facts pose at least two questions: what explains a general trend toward 
increased FDI policy liberalization and what explains the remaining variation in levels of 
openness across countries? From a policy standpoint, restrictions on FDI are non-trivial since !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The U.S. congress expanded federal authority over proposed cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in the 1970s and 80s. See Kang (1997). 
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policy restrictiveness is statistically significantly and negatively correlated with FDI stocks 
(Kalinova, Palerm, and Thomsen 2010, 7) and policy liberalization is associated with increases 
in FDI inflows (Taylor 2000). Moreover, FDI that is established in joint venture with local firms 
are more likely to generate many of the positive spillovers frequently associated with FDI 
inflows (Abraham, Konings, and Slootmaekers 2007; Blomström and Sjöholm 1999; Dimelis 
and Louri 2002; Javorcik 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008; Smeets 2008). It follows that 
country that are able to craft FDI policies that restrict foreign firms from establishing wholly 
owned subsidiaries but are none-the-less able to attract substantial FDI flows will be able to 
successfully reapportion rents from multinationals to local firms. Therefore, FDI policies affect 
both the patterns of global FDI inflows and the distribution of gains from the activities of FDI-
making enterprises. 
 One prominent explanation of both a liberalizing trend and cross-country variation in FDI 
policy is democracy. Since FDI generates employment, workers should view such capital inflows 
positively. Survey data from developed and developing countries tends to support this intuition, 
though attitudes toward foreign investment during times of structural adjustment and 
privatization are less sanguine (EBRD 2005; Pandya 2010; PAIZ 2006; Rohrscheider and 
Whitefield 2004). As countries democratize, political institutions provide greater voice to 
workers who may use their newly acquired policy influence to demand governments relax 
barriers to entry for foreign firms. Figure 2.3 illustrates why a regime type explanation of FDI 
liberalization is unsatisfying.  
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Figure 2.3: FDI Openness and Regime Type 
 
FDI policy and democracy are positively correlated, but with a good deal of noise. Since 
democratic countries also tend to be advanced industrial economies, we may wonder if regime 
type and economic development are confounding variables. Figure 2.4 looks at relationship 
between FDI policy and democracy in developing countries. Note that the causal story that 
workers will demand increased openness should be most likely in developing countries where 
labor is abundant relative to capital. Contrary to a priori expectations, level of democracy has 
virtually no effect on level of openness for developing countries. Rather, the positive relationship 
between democracy and openness to FDI seems to be driven by the fact that advanced economies 
display more liberal investment policies than do developing and that advanced economies also 
tend to be democracies. 
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Figure 2.4: FDI Openness and Regime Type in Developing Countries 
 
Another prominent explanation of FDI liberalization is that countries open their 
economies to multinationals when balance of payment crises and international financial 
institutions (IFIs) force them to do so. However, the evidence suggests the relationship between 
crises, creditor pressures, and FDI policy reform is not so straightforward. Currency, debt, and 
banking crises exhibit no consistent pattern of association with FDI policies and periods of 
liberalization.9 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) very rarely attaches loan conditions to 
demands to liberalize foreign equity restriction or undertake any other economic reform directly 
related to inward FDI policy.10 IMF lending is basically uncorrelated with FDI openness, either !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 All three categories of crises are weakly but negatively associated with liberalizing FDI policies 
in the following year.  
 
10 Stone (2008) compiled perhaps the most comprehensive dataset of IMF loan conditions from 
1992 – 2002. Foreign equity restrictions were not even included in a separate category. Structural 
reforms coded as “others” were present in seven percent of all IMF loan programs during this 
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in terms of level of openness or in the timing of liberalizing changes.11 Other, more widely 
applied, conditions such as privatization and macroeconomic reforms may make foreign 
investors more interested in local economies (Pop-Eleches 2009). However, increased 
attractiveness from the perspective of multinationals is distinct from governments implementing 
more welcoming investment policies. 
Theory 
 If levels of and changes in regime type, as well as economic crisis and IMF 
conditionality, provide a poor explanation of FDI policy variation and change, then how might 
we improve our understanding of these developments? I argue FDI policy is primarily driven by 
political coalitions dominated by business elites. These elites prefer to restrict foreign ownership 
in order to protect their own rents, but their ability to do so depends on the capacity to finance 
investment and operational activities through other sources. When the domestic financial system 
is characterized by state control and direction of credit, the most politically influential firms will 
benefit from subsidized lending, either directly from state owned banks or due regulations that 
require private banks to direct credit toward favored industries and firms at below-market rates. 
Under these conditions, local firms can grow without substantial foreign equity participation and 
will therefore support restrictive policies toward FDI. When the domestic financial system is 
liberalized, powerful local firms will no longer have access to subsidized credit. In this context, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
time. Even if all of the conditions included in the “other” category related to FDI reform, it is 
clear that the IMF did not regularly tie lending to liberalizing inward FDI during this period.  
 
11 FDI Equity Openness and IMF programs have a correlation of 0.0281 while FDI Screening 
Openness and IMF program exhibit a correlation of 0.0323. Correlations between IMF programs 
and liberalizing changes are even lower.  !
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business elite will support FDI policy liberalization in order to benefit from the capital injections 
and technology transfer that accompanies cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
 Figure 2.5 illustrates the causal logic of my theory. State directed credit regimes suppress 
the need of local capital to finance economic expansion through foreign direct equity. A cheap 
credit environment encourages firms to support policies that allow them to retain majority 
control. Incumbents’ preference for the status quo locks in restrictive policy environments 
toward FDI. When governments pursue banking sector reforms, most often in response to 
balance of payment crises that make state-driven banking sector insolvent, this equilibrium is 
substantially disrupted. Reforms that remove state control and direction of the financial sector 
through privatizing state owned banks and eliminating state guidance of interest rates and 
directed credit requirements make domestic credit more expensive to those who had previously 
benefited from subsidies.12 As banking reforms also strengthen prudential regulations that 
emphasize risk-based lending portfolios, industries that had formerly profited from easy credit 
obtained from affiliated financial firms experience a further decline in access to below-market 
rates of credit. Under these new financing constraints, large firms will be more willing to support 
loosening restrictions over FDI in order to gain new and less expensive sources of capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Financial reforms make borrowing less expensive for those previously shut out of credit 
markets. However, these firms are small and medium enterprises that have less policy influence. 
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Figure 2.5: Banking Sector Reform and FDI Policy Change 
 
Importantly, while banking reforms might be induced by balance of payment crises, they 
are not the inevitable conclusion of such shocks. As such, crises do not necessarily lead to FDI 
liberalization; this relationship is mediated by governments’ crisis response strategies. This 
dissertation largely brackets the question of the conditions under which crisis leads to banking 
sector reforms and instead focuses on the implementation of banking sector reform as 
contributing toward a reorientation of business elites’ interests toward foreign equity investment. 
However, the extent to which governments respond to crisis through meaningful banking 
reforms is most likely related to the degree to which governments have the political support and 
economic capacity to weather temporary balance of payment crises. Governments in weaker 
economic and political positions will face greater pressures to reform. I generally treat the 
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decision to reform given crisis as more or less randomly generated, though of course this is a 
simplification.13 It may be that non-reformers are just better positioned to maintain the status 
quo. However, given my argument is one of change through punctuated equilibrium, the fact that 
incumbent interests in some states are more robust to shocks than are others does not 
fundamentally challenge a financing opportunity cost theory of FDI liberalization. 
 Below, I further develop the component parts of this theory. First, I establish industrial 
capital faces identifiable and universal costs but uncertain and firm-specific benefits to 
multinational entry. Next, I explore how the domestic financial system conditions large industrial 
firms’ policy preferences over FDI. I also provide historical context for the turn to financial 
repression in the mid 20th century and the formation of the political coalitions that supported 
these policies.  
To be clear, this is a theory that emphasizes the central role of business elite in 
determining FDI policy outcomes. I assume the politics over FDI liberalization are primarily 
elite driven and that industrial elites14 have a strong influence over government policies 
regarding foreign entry into their respective industrial sectors. Other actors may have some 
influence, such as financial capitalists and labor groups, but I focus on industrial elites because 
their strategies toward foreign investment are the most likely to directly relate to statutory limits 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 In chapters five and six I relax this assumption by considering the divergent crisis response 
strategies of the Malaysian and Indonesian governments during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
and the political and economic foundations of these differences. 
 
14 By industrial elites I mean business interests engaged in the real economy rather than the 
financial sector. Industrial elites include manufacturing interests but are not confined to that 
particular sector of the economy. 
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on foreign equity and screening requirements.15 However, I also discuss below how other 
societal groups will support or oppose the coalitions built by business elites.  
Incumbent Firms and the Threat of Multinational Entry 
FDI inflows entail certain, economy-wide costs to indigenous firms by placing upward 
pressure on wages. There is robust evidence that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than 
their domestic-owned counterparts.16 This is true in both developed and developing countries, 
and studies typically find a wage premium of around 10 to 30 percent.17 There is also ample 
evidence that these wage effects permeate the broader economy. Several studies have found 
evidence of positive wage spillovers from FDI in the United States. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) 
find foreign ownership has a positive effect on wages in domestically owned firms in non-
manufacturing sectors. Figlio and Blonigen (2000) uncover evidence of positive wage spillovers 
in South Carolina. There seem to be similar spillover effects in other developed economies; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15!Labor groups will support policies that create jobs and protect wages. Financial capital will 
support policies that allow them to obtain the largest spread between deposit and lending rates. 
Each of these groups has reason to view FDI favorably. So long as FDI creates employment and 
encourages wage bid up, labor will benefit from FDI. If foreign firms generate any increased 
demand for local financing, domestic financial firms will also benefit from new clientele. 
However, these groups will also face potential threats from FDI. Foreign firms have a more 
credible exit option that may reduce labor’s wage bargaining strength. Since multinationals have 
a greater capacity for self-finance and have access to multiple financial markets, foreign firm 
entry may reduce domestic banks’ rents associated with intermediating between global and local 
capital markets. These countervailing benefits and costs of FDI to labor and finance suggest such 
groups will have a difficult time generating overarching preferences over foreign entry and 
instead will focus on regulating FDI post-establishment.  !
16 See Lipsey (2004) for a comprehensive review. 
 
17 Some of this differential can be attributed to characteristics of the types of firms that engage in 
FDI. Direct investment is often concentrated in high-wage industries and tend to be employed by 
large firms that are comparatively more capital-intensive and therefore require more highly 
skilled labor. However, even after controlling for these characteristics, foreign firms’ wage 
premium persists. 
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evidence of wage “bid up” exists though the extent of these spillovers depends on skill levels and 
is often regionally contained.18 Empirical studies of wage spillovers in developing countries also 
find consistent evidence that FDI inflows lead to increased wages across the local economy. 
Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) demonstrate foreign-owned plant establishment in Mexico 
and Venezuela leads to industry-wide wage increases. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) show 
maquiladora activity in Mexico increases wages of skilled labor.  Lipsey and Sjöholm (2003) 
calculated wage spillovers with consideration for industry-specific and location-wide effects in 
Indonesia. They find significant spillovers to wages in domestic-owned firms and that these 
spillovers increase with skill level. In sum, the empirical record shows foreign firms pay wage 
premiums in local labor markets and contribute to broad-based wage increases.  
Foreign entry also creates wide-scale productivity pressures that erode incumbent firms’ 
rents. Firms that choose to engage in FDI are more highly productive than other firms in their 
home and host country (Helpman 2006). This productivity gap is more pronounced when 
multinationals locate in previously protected industries since rents accrued from protection 
reduce the propensity to invest in productivity-enhancing technology (Schwab and Werker 
2014). Multinational entry, by increasing competition in host country product and labor markets, 
also forces less efficient domestic firms to exit (Alfaro and Chen 2013).  For these reasons, 
inefficient domestic firms will view FDI as a threat to their survival. 
Indigenous firms are less certain about the potential benefits they may realize from 
foreign entry. A local firm is most likely to profit from FDI inflows when it joins a multinational 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See Driffield and Girma (2003) for U.K., Girma, Greenaway, and Wakelin (2001) find limited 
evidence of wage spillovers that depend on the productivity gap and import penetration. !
!28 
in a joint venture.19  Local participants benefit from capital injections, risk-sharing, procurement 
contracts with parents, and technology and knowledge spillovers (Blomström and Sjöholm 1999; 
Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005; UNCTAD 2003). Research on the effect of FDI on local firms 
consistently finds vertical integration through foreign-domestic equity partnerships that develop 
backward linkages with multinational parents are most likely to increase local firms’ productivity 
and profits of local firms (Blalock and Gertler 2009; Havranek and Irsova 2011; Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 2005).20 Conversely, competition effects disadvantage domestic enterprises when 
foreign investors establish wholly owned subsidiaries (Aitken and Harrison 1999; Djankov and 
Hoekman 2000; Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008; Konings 2001).21 Local firms may want to 
restrict FDI to minority shares in order to ensure FDI inflows will benefit them. However, such 
restrictions often reduce foreign firm willingness to engage in joint venture activity and impede 
technology transfer and industrial upgrading in the joint ventures foreign firms do establish 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Entry through mergers and acquisitions dominate FDI flows. While the composition of flows 
to developing countries tends to tilt toward greenfield investment, it is erroneous to conclude that 
most FDI in developing countries occurs through the establishment of wholly owned subsidiaries 
of foreign firms. A large percentage of these flows counted as greenfield investment actually 
come from retained earnings of already established enterprises. In 2010, for example, 40 percent 
of FDI income was retained and reinvested in host countries (UNCTAD 2011, 11). While the 
propensity to establish joint ventures varies across subsector and home country, the prevalence of 
shared ownership structures increased in the 1960s and 1970s (Lipson 1985, 128-129).  !
20 Another potential vertical spillover could occur from forward linkages, where domestic 
upstream firms purchase inputs from foreign affiliates. However, there is much greater evidence 
that productivity spillovers from FDI are more likely to occur through backward linkage than any 
other. See Havranek and Irsova (2011). !
21 The benefits of multinational entry through joint venture may also accrue to potential 
suppliers. Joint ventures tend to engage in more local sourcing than do wholly owned 
subsidiaries of foreign parents, mostly because local partners have existing networks of suppliers 
and therefore encourage foreign partners to integrate into local production networks rather than 
source from abroad (Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao. 2001; Desai, Foley, Hines 2004; FIAS 
2003; Kiyota, Matsuura, Urata, and Wei 2004; Toth and Semjen 1999; UNCTAD 2001). 
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(Moran 2005, Qui and Wang 2011). Therefore, reducing equity restrictions on foreign 
participation can lead to more extensive partnership agreements with domestic firms. Since FDI 
inflows benefit local firms that become partners with foreign firms but disadvantage domestic 
enterprises that do not, local firms will only want to liberalize FDI policy if they believe doing so 
will result in foreign firms creating local partnerships with them.  
The known costs and uncertain benefits of FDI liberalization create opposition to reform 
since industrial capital faces identifiable and universal costs but uncertain and firm-specific 
benefits to multinational entry.22 Foreign entry projects known costs through upward pressure on 
wages and increased competition in product markets that decrease producer surplus. The 
potential benefits to individual firms from foreign entry, however, are difficult to identify 
because firms do not know if they will secure lucrative partnerships with foreign firms. 
Therefore, industrial incumbents will view unrestricted FDI with caution, and instead prefer 
foreign entry be restricted entirely or limited to minority joint venture partnerships. This will be 
especially true of small and medium size firms who typically have higher labor costs, lower 
capital investments, lower productivity, and lower access to investment financing (Rajan and 
Zingales 2003). Such firms are most in danger of failing to remain competitive in a sector with 
foreign firms and also, due to their size, capacity constraints, and low productivity, are least 
likely to benefit from affiliation and lucrative procurement contracts (Brown 2002; Crespo and 
Fontoura 2006; Damijan, Rojec, Majcen, and Knell 2013; Helpman 2006). 
Strategies, Coalitions, and the Financing Environment 
 As established above, foreign entry is a threat to incumbents’ rents. At the same time, 
foreign firms hold resources incumbents often want including large pools of working capital, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 See Roland (2002; 2000) for the role of aggregate and individual uncertainty in raising ex ante 
political constraints to economic reforms more generally. 
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greater access to capital markets, advanced technology, and inroads to international procurement 
and sales markets. As profit-maximizing actors, incumbents must balance the threats and 
opportunities foreign entry represents when formulating policy positions. The calculus of threats 
and opportunities rests on access to and costs of finance from other sources.23 When powerful 
local firms have access to cheap investment finance, the benefits to foreign entry are offset by 
the costs. Without a substantial financing constraint, firms do not need to sacrifice controlling 
equity and associated rents for survival. With sufficient capital, firms can overcome technology 
gaps through licensing and other non-equity forms of multinational participation. When 
borrowing costs increase, the cost of excluding foreign equity participation also increases. As the 
cost of financing investment and operational costs through debt increases, local firms will be 
increasingly willing to relax restrictions on FDI inflows. Since government control and direction 
over the financial sector strongly influences the cost of domestic credit, it follows that domestic 
firms will establish influential anti-FDI coalitions when the state represses the financial system 
and will assemble equally powerful pro-FDI coalitions when the financial sector is not directed 
by the state.  
Financial Repression in Historical Context   
It is important to remember that strict regulation of foreign investment is a relatively 
novel phenomenon. International law has long protected foreign investors’ property rights, 
particularly with respect to expropriation and compensation (Lipson 1985). Right of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23!One potential objection to a financing opportunity cost theory of FDI policy is that direct 
investment is distinct from more liquid forms of investment and therefore is not a substitute for 
debt or portfolio investment. Empirically, FDI is negatively correlated with other types of 
international investment flows and this relationship is consistent through time and both in 
samples of developed and developing countries (Humanicki, Kelm, and Olszewski 2013; Lipsey 
1999; Smith and Valerrama 2009). While FDI might provide technological and managerial 
expertise, these benefits can also be acquired through non-equity participation deals including 
licensing and management contracting arrangements (UNCTAD 2011).  !
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establishment was hardly controversial through the 19th century when much of the world was 
under colonial rule and when patterns of cross border investment typically sent capital from 
developed Western Europe to the cash-poor periphery. Most of this investment was used for 
large-scale infrastructure projects such as railroads and to government bonds (Lipsey 1999).24 
Direct investment, though always the preferred method of cross border capital flows for the 
United States, did not become an important source of international investment until the end of 
the 19th century and did not dominant portfolio flows until the first World War (Dunning 1970; 
Lipsey et al. 1999).  
 By the 1920s, the general permissive stance toward inward FDI began to erode. As 
governments embraced varying degrees of statist intervention in domestic economic 
development, foreign firms were viewed as impediments to domestic capital accumulation 
(Frieden 1981, Lipson 1985, Moran 1978). The rise of state-led industrialization, which entailed 
national planning, state owned enterprise development, and state-driven finance created 
conditions conducive to powerful anti-FDI coalitions. State owned banks created the capacity for 
local economies to marshal development finance without direct participation of foreign firms. 
These banks quickly took over foreign owned companies. Governments increasingly declared 
that foreign investment could only be undertaken if firms could demonstrate how such projects 
would contribute to national development. In this new period of anti-FDI policy Mexico and 
Turkey led the way (Lipson 1985). Most starkly, Turkey’s first president, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, declared, “we are always prepared to provide the necessary security to foreign capital on 
the condition that its profits be regulated by law [emphasis added]” (quoted in Lipson 1985, 72). 
The era of FDI regulation had arrived. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Though see Lewis (1938) and Svedberg (1978) for arguments that direct investment figures for 
this time were much higher. 
!32 
 The political coalitions fostered by state-led development strategies ossified resistance to 
foreign control of locally operating firms. Local firms profited from high tariffs, and did not 
want market-oriented foreign entrants to eat away at their market share. Where labor was well 
organized, workers benefited from the high wages earned in protected industries. Managers at 
state-owned enterprises gained advantage from soft budget constraints that weakened 
competitive pressures and ensured the continued existence even of highly inefficient enterprises. 
State politico-bureaucrats who guided development policy benefited from their gatekeeper status. 
The 1960s saw an erosion of international investment norms that protected foreign firms. 
Expropriation of foreign investment peaked in the early 1970s when governments began to target 
specific industries and firms. During this time, 75 percent of all takeovers were of enterprises 
that were wholly owned by foreigners. Only 4 percent of nationalizations during this time were 
of firms in which foreign investors held only a minority stake (Lipson 1985).  
 What allowed governments to continue their anti-FDI stance, and what maintained 
powerful political coalitions in support of such restrictive policies were policies directed at the 
banking sector that gave governments control over credit allocation either directly through state-
owned banks or indirectly through guiding the lending portfolios and terms of private banks. 
Financial repression in the mid 20th century was far reaching. Many states had large state 
development banking systems. Those that did not often retained great control over the financial 
sector by maintaining licensing restrictions that led to highly concentrated, wholly domestically 
owned banking sectors and high reserve requirements that channeled credit to favorite domestic 
industries, financed government spending, and generated seigniorage that was particularly 
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helpful at raising government revenue when tax collection systems were dysfunctional (Brooks 
and Kurtz 2012).25  
 Importantly, financial repression during this time was not limited to developing countries. 
Though banking sector policies were more liberal among advanced economies during this time, 
they were not entirely open. In 1973, the average level of banking sector liberalization in 
advanced economies was about what the average level of banking sector reform among 
developing countries is today (Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel 2008). Only the U.S., the U.K. 
and Germany had already completely reformed their financial sectors by 1973. Other advanced 
economies enthusiastically embraced state-led capitalism and pursued policies designed to 
restrict multinational entry.  Many European countries promulgated investment screening 
mechanisms mid century in order to minimize foreign acquisitions (Blomström and Kokko 1997; 
Michalet 1997; Safarian 1999). While most accounts of domestic and international politics 
surrounding FDI place the bulk of analysis on developing host states and developed home 
economies, the majority of FDI occurs among developed countries and that these countries also 
have a history of regulating foreign direct entry.26 A theory that emphasizes the financing 
opportunity costs to FDI regulation has the distinct advantage of providing a united explanation 
for liberalization of entry restrictions in both developed and developing countries.   
Anti-FDI Coalitions under Financial Repression 
In a previous section I outlined the reasons why industrial capital prefers to limit foreign 
firms’ ability to invest directly in local markets. Foreign entry pushes up wage costs, forces local 
firms to sacrifice rents for increasing in productivity, and is generally disruptive to existing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 McKinnon (1973) first developed the concept of financial repression. !
26 Seminal analyses of FDI policy regimes include Vernon (1971), Evans (1979), and Lipson 
(1985).  
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market structures. Therefore, domestic firms will support restrictive policies toward FDI so long 
as their access to operations and investment financing is sufficient.27 Under the terms of financial 
repression, large and politically important firms can easily finance operation and expansion 
through subsidized debt. They will support policies that restrict foreign entry outright or to 
minority joint ventures. This allows them to maintain ownership and control as well as protects 
rents. While repressed financial systems ration credit, the losers of financial repression – small, 
weakly organized firms – are poorly situated to pressure governments to reform (Rajan and 
Zingales 2003). Moreover, such firms are the least likely to benefit from FDI liberalization since 
foreign entry typically increases drop out rates among small and inefficient firms (Alfaro and 
Chen 2013). Because financial repression channels cheap credit to politically powerful firms, 
such systems also tend to consolidate industries into large and closely held industrial-financial 
conglomerates. Conglomeration intensifies market-distortions in credit markets as the financial 
arm of these groups loan to connected corporations at below market rates (Akerlof and Romer 
1993; La Porta et al 2000). The rise of powerful conglomerates thus further entrenches local 
firms’ capacity to use domestically intermediated sources of finance.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!27!The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation is in looking at the overall level of 
country openness to FDI. However, a theory of preferences over FDI that emphasizes financing 
constraints can also explain variation in openness across sectors and firms. First, we may expect 
firms that employ more capital-intensive production strategies to face larger financing 
constraints and less concern over labor costs. Thus, such firms are likely to be more amenable to 
liberal FDI policy. Second, conglomerates will be less likely to support FDI liberalization since 
they are able to use their financing arm to obtain cheap credit. The ability to do this will diminish 
greatly as local governments enact prudential regulatory reforms, which means such firms will 
be more apt to shift from a restrictive to open policy stance post banking sector reforms. Third, 
firms who have previous experience as suppliers to foreign firms will be likely to reap the 
benefits of openness and therefore more willing to pursue liberalization of entry restrictions. 
Finally, the extent to which industry-specific restrictions on FDI are enacted should be a function 
of how concentrated and how much political power these industries wield. Future work could 
directly test these sectorally-specific expectations, though data limitations may render large N 
statistical inference particularly challenging.!
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Local capital can build large anti-FDI coalitions under conditions of financial repression. 
Where labor is well organized, capitalists can buy off union support for restrictions on FDI 
through sharing rents (Teichman 1995; 2001). Directed credit to labor-intensive industries 
creates an alliance between firms and the state since these investments create jobs and economic 
growth that help maintain popular support for the ruling government. Politico-bureaucrats benefit 
from expanded jurisdiction, power, and control over investment project proposals. This allows 
them to use their influence over credit allocation to develop patronage networks to construct 
ruling coalitions, reward supporters, and punish detractors (Bueno de Mesquito et al. 2003; 
Haggard, Lee and Maxfield 1993; Hutchcroft 1998; Pepinsky 2013b). Public and private banking 
interests benefit from restricting foreign firm entry since multinationals impinge on local banks’ 
privileged position of mediating between international capital and local borrowers. In sum, FDI 
openness threatens the material and political profits of many influential domestic actors while the 
benefits of openness to other groups are too small to encourage mobilization efforts for reform. 
Pro-FDI Coalitions under Financial Reform 
As explained above, under conditions of financial repression, governments will place 
onerous restrictions on FDI by either banning foreign equity outright or by limiting FDI to joint 
ventures with local firms, usually as minority partners, and by maintaining screening 
requirements. When governments pursuing banking sector reforms, often in response to financial 
crisis, the coalitions supporting such policies can weaken significantly.  
Banking sector reforms, by eliminating subsidized credit schemes, encourage incumbent 
firms to consolidate and increase productivity. Successful firms, therefore, are better poised to 
have increasingly international orientations. These firms are likely to develop their own ability to 
invest abroad and therefore will support further openness to FDI to encourage reciprocity. They 
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also are most poised to benefit from FDI inflows as they have the capacity and productivity that 
make them attractive partners, acquisition targets, and sources of inputs. The high cost of credit 
encourages them to seek FDI as a less costly financing option. Because they are highly 
productive, these firms are also less likely to become uncompetitive in markets that include 
foreign investors.  
Banking sector reforms also erode the power of other societal groups that might continue 
to support FDI restrictions. First, banking reform decreases the political power of domestic 
financial interests who may prefer to continue to restrict FDI as a means of maintaining their 
privileged position intermediating between foreign investors and local firms.  Banking sector 
reforms entail privatizing state owned banks and severing the close connections between 
government bureaucrats and bankers. This makes the financial sector a weaker political actor less 
capable of successfully lobbying for protective policies. Second, such reforms soften 
governments’ antipathy for FDI as financial repression is no longer a viable strategy for 
industrial expansion. When the government liberalizes banking, it no longer retains the ability to 
control credit allocation for political purposes. Therefore, it cannot rely on cheaply obtained 
credit to finance development projects and needs to cultivate new sources of investment to drive 
economic growth. Thus, banking sector reforms erode the power of societal groups that are most 
opposed to FDI openness and creates new capital interests that are more internationally focuses. 
As the banking sector liberalizes, therefore, states will be more likely to pursue greater openness 
to FDI to accommodate these new interests.  
System Dynamics – The Role of the Global Credit Environment 
Since the strength of an anti-FDI coalition will be strongest when alternative sources of 
finance are relatively abundant and inexpensive, the amount of funds available for intermediation 
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through the domestic financial system should also affect the propensity to liberalize FDI policy. 
When the domestic banking sector is so small that it cannot generate enough low-cost credit for 
the state, governments may decide the benefits of regulated FDI outweigh complete restriction. 
African experiences with FDI follow this pattern, with many governments pursuing partial 
openness to foreign investment early in their post-colonial histories (UNCTAD 2005). When 
domestic banks can easily access international sources of credit, they can channel large volumes 
of investment debt finance to local firms. Loosening of capital controls on portfolio flows, 
therefore, may mute pressures for FDI openness since local firms will have increased access to 
debt finance as domestic banks use foreign investment flows to expand loan portfolios. 
Furthermore, when global credit conditions are loose, local elite will be better able to generate 
investment financing through international debt markets and therefore will be less likely to press 
for FDI openness.  
The dynamics above point to the possibility that some success at attracting foreign 
investment may function reduce elites’ financing constraints and therefore prevent further FDI 
liberalization. These expectations run counter to claims that liberalization of capital flows are 
complementary (Haggard and Maxfield 1996) and claims that FDI inflows give foreign firms a 
foothold in which they can pressure the government to enact further liberalization (Desbordes 
and Vauday 2007; Hewko 2003; Lewis 2005; Malesky 2009). To be able to attract any 
substantial amounts of foreign capital, however, the investment policy environment must be at 
least partially open. In other words, we should expect the capacity to attract substantial capital 
flows to be associated with partial reform. 
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Is Banking Sector Reform Distinct from FDI Liberalization? 
The theory sketched above attributes major changes in FDI policies as the consequence 
of antecedent banking sector reforms. To establish that correlation between banking sector and 
FDI reforms are causal, we must eliminate several alternative explanations for why these 
particular reforms co-vary. First, such reforms may be caused by broader reorientations toward 
open markets. Because neoliberal adjustments toward the market often occur through clusters of 
policy reforms, casual observers have often claimed FDI liberalization is merely a reflection of a 
general ideological shift from structuralism to free-markets. It is important, therefore, to establish 
that banking sector reforms and FDI liberalization are not just part of larger reform packages. 
From the perspective of policy elites, technocratic reports on reform sequencing tend to associate 
FDI liberalization with real sector reforms such as tariff reductions and banking sector reforms 
with policies toward portfolio investment (Johnston, Darbar and Echeverria 1997). In other 
words, technocrats themselves tended not to see policies toward FDI and banking as 
complementary in any particular way. Another potential problem with the theory has to do with 
the causes of banking sector reform. If banking sector reform precedes FDI liberalization, why 
would forward-looking financial interests consent to reforms in the banking sector, knowing that 
such reforms would most likely create more support for additional reforms that would further 
weaken them? In short, the timing of banking sector reforms is well explained as crisis 
response.28 Abiad and Mody (2005) find balance of payment crises significantly raise the 
probability of such reforms, though banking crises make financial sector reform more difficult. 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) offer an alternative mechanism, suggesting financial and industrial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 This dynamic is similar to explanations that emphasize short-term capital account 
liberalization as responses to balance of payment weaknesses. See Haggard and Maxfield (1996). !
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interests are more likely to support financial reform under conditions of high global liquidity and 
low tariffs. Such an argument has a more difficult time isolating banking reforms from FDI 
liberalization, but the empirical support for this theory is relatively weak.29 Pepinsky (2013b) 
finds the primary drivers of banking sector reform in both Indonesia and Mexico were external, 
respectively the Asian financial crisis and NAFTA negotiations. 
Thus, the explanation for banking sector reform that is most clearly supported by 
empirical analysis is that such reforms are often policy responses to external pressures. These 
findings lend support for the claim that banking sector and FDI liberalization are separate 
reforms. Nevertheless, the research designs employed in both my large N statistical analysis and 
qualitative case comparison use a variety of techniques to ensure I clearly identify investment 
policy reforms separately from banking sector reforms. 
Summarizing Hypotheses 
 To summarize, the theory I present in this dissertation is that FDI policy changes as 
transformations in domestic credit conditions shift elite incentives for attracting or restricting 
foreign equity investment. Elites’ policy preferences depend on access to and cost of alternative 
sources of investment. When domestic capital allocation processes, particularly related to 
financial repression, provide politically powerful industrial firms access to subsidized credit, 
elites will align in an anti-FDI coalition. These preferences for continued restrictions will be 
further entrenched when short-term capital account openness increases the domestic stock of 
available capital while also placing financial capital in a privileged position of intermediary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Rajan and Zingales’ (2003) theory suggests the effect of openness on financial sector 
development is conditional on industrialization. Statistically significant results disappear in 
models that correctly model this interaction, mainly those that include a coefficient estimate for 
each component of the interaction variable plus an interaction term. !
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between international and local capital markets. These anti-FDI coalitions, however, can break 
down when banking sector reform, often pursued in the wake of financial crisis, change the way 
that domestic capital is allocated and break down channels through which politically connected 
firms can obtain subsidized access to capital. This will lead business elites to advocate for more 
open policies toward FDI.  
 This broad theory leads to a number of implications: 
Hypothesis 1 Industrial elites will support greater openness to FDI when domestic credit 
allocation is market-driven.  
 
Hypothesis 2 Industrial elites will support restrictions over FDI when domestic credit allocation 
is dominated by the state. 
 
Hypothesis 3 Industrial elites will be more willing to support restrictive FDI policy when the 
global credit environment is loose. 
 
Hypothesis 4 Industrial elites will support partial reform of FDI restrictions when they have 
access to other forms of international capital such as portfolio capital. 
 
Testing 
 My theory hypothesizes business elite support for FDI openness and restriction will 
depend on domestic credit allocation environment. However, data availability and measurement 
issues render it difficult to quantify elite support for policies in a large N context. Therefore, to 
test my theory I assume elites are generally successful in their lobbying efforts and therefore 
policy outcomes can be used as a proxy for elite support. The strength of this approach is that I 
can broadly test my theory using data on FDI policy across a large set of countries from the early 
1970s through 2000. The weakness of this approach is that it is an indirect test of my central 
hypotheses. To strengthen the link between elite support and policy outcomes, I complement 
large N statistical analysis in chapters 3 and 4 with comparative case studies of Malaysia and 
Indonesia in chapters 5 and 6. In these chapters, I am able to more carefully consider the 
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relationship between the lobbying efforts and stated policy preferences of business elites and 
actual policy outcomes.  
The analytic chapters proceed as follows. In Chapter 3, I use error correction statistical 
models to infer the long-term relationship between banking sector reforms and the level of 
openness toward FDI. In doing so, I establish a dynamic, long-term relationship between these 
two sets of reforms. In Chapter 4, I shift analytical focus from a continuous conception of FDI 
policy openness and use Markov transition models to explore how antecedent financial reforms 
affect the probability of switching between closed, intermediate, and fully open FDI policy 
environments. This approach emphasizes the substantive importance of discrete categories of 
investment regulations, and investigates the conditions under which FDI regulations may become 
stuck in partial reform. In chapters 5 and 6, I trace the process of investment and financial sector 
regulation and reform in Indonesia and Malaysia from 1965 to 2013. These chapters allow me to 
use archival resources to uncover the lobbying activities over FDI of elite groups as domestic 
credit environments underwent dramatic changes. These chapters, therefore, move beyond 
testing policy outcomes to also exploring elite strategies toward FDI regulation. Especially since 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, I find evidence that elites in repressed financial systems are 
likely to oppose further liberalizing FDI reforms while elites in reformed financial systems are 
more likely to advocate for investment regulatory reform.  
Taken together, these chapters provide evidence that banking sector reforms are 
statistically associated with FDI liberalization and that elites’ strategies toward FDI policy 
become increasingly liberal as domestic credit allocation becomes more market-driven. There is 
also substantial evidence that investment regulations are subject to partial reform equilibria. 
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Chapter 4 finds even banking sector reform may not always be powerful enough to disrupt 
coalitions favoring dualism.  
Such findings also suggest, contrary to typical treatments of the topic, states continue to 
place substantial limitations on FDI inflows. While the policy environment toward direct 
investment has become more open since policies of substantial closure in the 1970s, claims that 
most countries have entirely eliminated restrictions on investment are erroneous. Governments 
continue to use regulatory bodies to encourage politically desirable investment while preventing 
other types of investment. The findings in chapter four in particular suggest scholars and policy 
makers may want to revise the way they talk about patterns of FDI regulation and incentives. 
While governments may compete over tax incentives for certain kinds of investment projects,30 
they clearly are not reaching for any available investment dollar.   
This project contributes to our understanding of FDI policy reform primarily by 
emphasizing how financial sector reforms alter the costs and benefits of FDI to domestic firms. 
This is important because doing so demonstrates how particular sequences of liberalization shift 
domestic firms’ strategies about how to operate in an increasingly financially integrated global 
economy. My findings have broad implications for how we can explain changes in policies 
toward economic openness over time. In particular, the findings I present here challenge 
explanations of financial openness that place causal significance on the role of democratic 
institutions in giving political power to labor groups. I find instead that investment policy 
follows the preferred policies of economic and political elites, and that the preferences of these 
groups change as global and domestic conditions change the way that capital is allocated 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 See Thomas (2007) for an assessment of the global scope of investment incentives. 
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domestically. In other words, investment policy changes when elites want it to, not when mass 
groups force policy change through institutional mechanisms. 
!44 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE LONG-TERM EFFECT OF BANKING SECTOR REFORM ON FDI 
POLICY 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outline a theory of FDI liberalization that emphasizes the 
importance of access to and costs of alternative sources of investment. Most centrally, banking 
sector reforms that disrupt subsidized and directed credit schemes while also strengthening 
prudential regulations that limit concentrated lending substantially change the nature of domestic 
credit allocation and therefore will shift economic elites’ policy preferences toward increased 
openness to FDI. In this chapter, I test the relationship between banking reforms and changes in 
FDI openness using a dataset of up to 68 countries form 1973 to 2000. Using error correction 
techniques that isolate short-term and long-term dynamics, I demonstrate that banking sector 
reform is statistically significantly associated with subsequent increases in liberalization of 
foreign equity restrictions, that the effect of banking reform on FDI openness takes several years 
to develop, and that this relationship is robust to multiple alternative explanations such as regime 
type, IMF coercion, general trends toward economic liberalization, and international treaty 
obligations. These results provide macro level evidence consistent with my theory.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The second section briefly revisits the 
theoretical predictions generated in Chapter 2, paying particular attention to expectations 
regarding banking sector reform. The third section details the error correction modeling strategy 
and outlines measurement of outcome and explanatory variables. The fourth section presents and 
interprets results of the statistical analysis, and the fifth section concludes. 
!45 
Theory 
Throughout this dissertation, I argue FDI liberalization is driven by changes in elite 
preferences over openness to foreign direct equity ownership in the local economy. As the 
availability other sources of investment decline and the costs of such capital increases, powerful 
business elites will be more willing to open the local economy to foreign owners. They will do so 
in order to spur capital formation and therefore economic growth generally, which will provide a 
macro-environment more conducive to firm growth. Additionally, they will support increased 
openness to gain greater access to foreign firms’ investment financing. Thus, decreased state 
control over the banking sector as well as declining availability of cheap credit from abroad will 
increase elites’ appetite for FDI while access to foreign capital through portfolio investment, 
inexpensive global credit environments, and subsidized loans from state owned banks will 
encourage elites to pressure governments to limit FDI.  
My argument stands in sharp contrast to the most prominent explanations of FDI 
liberalization in recent years, which emphasize the role of political institutions that privilege 
labor groups (Pandya 2014, Pinto 2013). While FDI liberalization and democratization have 
followed broadly similar trajectories in the last quarter of the 20th century, FDI liberalization has 
often preceded rather than followed shifts to free and fair elections. Additionally, democratic 
institutions are often poor constraints on political agents power during times of transition 
(Pepinsky 2013a), which suggests newly democratized countries will not have strong enough 
institutions to force elites to enact policies that benefit labor at the peril of capitalists. Moreover, 
since popular opinion toward FDI is often negative during the depths structural adjustment 
(Bauerle Danzman and Stoyan 2014, Doronbantu 2010, Rohrscheider and Whitefield 2004, Sinn 
1997), we might expect democratization to make FDI reform less likely. 
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FDI is a type of investment flow, and therefore changes to policies regulating these flows 
should be understood within the context of other features of the investment environment. In this 
chapter, I focus specifically on how changes to the domestic banking sector shift the costs of and 
patterns of access to investment in local economies. When governments exhibit high levels of 
control over the financial sector through interest rate controls, directed credit requirements, and 
large state-owned banks; lending decisions are based on political calculus and therefore provide 
powerful firms with preferential access to subsidized credit. Under such conditions, business 
elite most likely to be able to effectively pressure governments for their preferred policies will be 
happy to restrict FDI. With access to subsidized credit, these firms will not view foreign direct 
equity necessary to fuel growth. At the same time, the certain costs of FDI liberalization – 
mainly higher labor costs and demands for increased productivity – will outstrip the possible 
benefits of foreign firm entry since gains from linkages are firm specific and difficult to predict 
ex ante. However, when the banking sector undergoes substantial reform, the link between 
politically powerful firms and subsidized credit diminishes. Under tighter local financing 
constraints, large and powerful firms will be more willing to bear the costs associated with 
foreign entry in order to gain access to investment financing through foreign direct equity. Thus, 
banking sector reforms will be positively associated with FDI liberalization. Since elites’ 
strategic realignment toward pressuring governments to liberalize should take time, banking 
sector reforms should affect long-term levels of FDI regulation, but should be less associated 
with short-term changes in FDI openness.  
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Data, Methods, and Empirical Strategy 
To test the above theory, I employ a dataset of up to 68 countries from 1973-2000. This 
time period includes most of the movements toward FDI openness in the developing world. I 
describe the methodology below. 
FDI Openness 
 
Policies toward FDI are multifaceted and encompass a diverse set of rules regarding 
equity restrictions, screening requirements, licensing laws, and legal provisions regarding profit 
repatriation, export balancing requirements, nationalization, and legal recourse for aggrieved 
firms. The complexity of FDI policy has been a contributing factor to the under study of this 
topic, as measurement remains a challenge to researchers. I focus specifically on two measures 
of FDI openness: equity restrictions and screening requirements. This choice is partially one of 
practicality; data for these FDI rules are more widely available than more comprehensive indices 
of FDI openness, which are available for limited time frames or cover single regions.31 
However, there are several theoretical reasons why it may be most appropriate to test this 
particular theory on variables that measure government control directly over foreign equity entry. 
First, equity restrictions are part of the long-term capital account position. Because I place FDI 
liberalization within the analytical context of capital account openness more generally, it is 
appropriate to focus on entry restrictions because these policies are most analogous to measures !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31  There exist at least six indices of FDI openness. The Heritage Foundation Index of investment 
freedom begins in 1995, which is after much of the movement toward FDI liberalization. The 
Frazer Institute has some measures extending back to 1970 on a five year basis, but in early years 
concentrates mainly on advanced industrial economies. Furthermore, its coding scheme conflates 
FDI policy with locational attractiveness. Hardin and Holmes (2002, 1997) develop a 
methodology for a comprehensive index of investment policy in APEC countries. Golub (2003) 
and Dorobantu (2010) use variations of these coding decisions to measure investment policy in 
OECD and transition economies respectively. UNCTAD (2012) counts the number of FDI 
regulatory changes since 1992, but does not measure the relative importance of these changes. 
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on restrictions on flows of short-term investment. Second, equity restrictions are the cornerstone 
of a government’s policy stance toward FDI. Even if a government has an expansive network of 
international treaties designed to provide legal protections to foreign investors, equity restrictions 
can prevent MNEs from entering specific industries either at all or as fully owned foreign 
subsidiaries. Thus, the importance of any other FDI policy depends on whether foreign firms are 
allowed to enter a given industry and, if so, to what extent. Finally, when governments retain 
screening authority over FDI entrance, they are able to discriminate against projects that may 
potentially harm domestic industrial constituents. Screening can create investment environments 
in which economies are statutorily open to FDI but foreign firms remain largely excluded from 
participation. 
I use Pandya’s measure of equity restrictions and screening requirements, which covers 
94 countries between 1970 and 2000 (2014). The equity restriction index was constructed by first 
identifying the number of all manufacturing and service industries that limit foreign firms to a 
minority share or ban foreign ownership outright in each country year. Then, the number of 
limiting industries were summed and divided by the number of industries at the ISIC two digit 
level for which there was any domestic employment in the given country year. The screening 
index follows the same methodology by counting the number of industries for which FDI 
requires government approval. This weighting system corrects for the possibility that some 
industries simply do not exist in particular countries. Because this measure likely over counts 
service sector industries and does not include the primary sector, it potentially understates 
restrictions on foreign entry (Pandya 2014, 17). Furthermore, it does not weight for importance 
of individual sectors in terms of economic output or share of domestic employment. However, 
these coding decisions compress the distribution of equity restrictions, making it more difficult to 
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obtain statistically significant results, and thereby create a conservative test of my theory. To aid 
in interpretation and discussion, I recode both of these variables so that higher values indicate 
greater liberalization and lower scores indicate more restrictions. 
Banking Sector Liberalization 
My primary hypothesis is that banking sector liberalization will induce loosening of 
foreign equity restrictions. To measure Banking Sector Reform, I use modified version of Abiad 
et al.’s index (2008). This measure has broad temporal and cross-sectional coverage, including 
103 countries from 1973-2005. This index compiles qualitative judgments over liberalization in 
five aspects of banking sector policy: credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements, 
interest rate controls, state ownership in the banking sector, prudential regulations and 
supervision of the banking sector, and securities market policies.32 
Controls 
I include a variety of other variables to account for alternative explanations of FDI 
liberalization. First, I control for a variety of factors that influence the cost and benefit of 
opening. Countries with fixed exchange rates (Fixed XR) may find liberalization costly as 
increased capital flows may require costly interventions into foreign exchange markets to 
maintain a peg.33 Conversely, a fixed exchange rate may make a country a more attractive target 
for MNEs by decreasing uncertainty over the future value of any fixed investment. Additionally, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 The original index also includes judgments over restrictions on the short-term capital account 
and foreign equity participation in the banking sector. I remove these measures from the index 
because 1) I prefer to use a more widely accepted measure for capital account openness 
(discussed further below) and 2) foreign equity restrictions in the banking sector are also 
included in Equity Liberalization. All results are robust to the full index, available upon request. !
33 This measure is from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). !
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fixed exchange rates may induce balance of payment crises and therefore lead to structural 
reforms. Therefore, the relationship between fixed exchange rates and FDI policy is most likely 
complex and consequently I have no expectation about the direction of any effect. Countries with 
high levels of domestic liquidity (M2/GDP) may find FDI less necessary for development, and 
therefore less beneficial.34 Short-term capital account openness (KA Open) may signal a 
generally economically liberal stance, making FDI liberalization more likely.35 However, I argue 
access to international portfolio investment decreases domestic firms’ demand for access to 
finance through FDI while strengthening the political position of the most ardent anti-FDI actors. 
Therefore, I expect KA Open to be negatively associated with FDI liberalization. Access to 
domestic lending (Domestic Credit) may operate similarly as the availability of domestic finance 
will decrease the benefits of FDI openness.36 The level and trajectory of development (GDP Per 
Capita) may influence the extent to which liberalizing FDI policy will actual result in MNE 
activity.37 Because I employ an error correction modeling strategy, I also include a differenced 
GDP Per Capita, which measures economic growth. 
The extant literature on FDI policy formation emphasizes the causal role of regime type. 
Following convention, I measure regime type using Polity2 from the Polity IV measure of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 To correct for skew, this variable is log transformed. Source: World Development Indicators. !
35 Source: Brune and Guisinger (forthcoming). This measures is an additive index of the 
presence of controls in twelve components of the capital account, as identified by the IMF’s 
AREAER Report. I modify this measure by subtracting two subcomponents related to 
restrictions on FDI inflows and outflows and removing a measure for controls over operations of 
banking and financial institutions. The resulting index can vary from 0 to 9 and is an 
improvement over more widely used measures such as Karcher and Steinberg (2013) and Chinn 
and Ito (2006), which combine short-term and long-term restrictions on the capital account. !
36 To correct for skew, this variable is log transformed. Source: WDI. !
37 To correct for skew, this variable is log transformed. Source: WDI. !
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democracy and autocracy.38 Polity2 combines two ten point scales of democracy and autocracy, 
resulting in a measure that ranges from negative ten to positive ten, with higher scores indicating 
a higher degree of democracy. In the reform sequencing literature, FDI policy is often assumed 
to follow real sector reforms (Johnston, Darbar and Echeverria 1997). Therefore, I include a 
measure of de facto trade openness ((Imports+Exports)/GDP) to control for FDI openness 
following trade liberalization. 
Another common explanation of the timing of economic liberalization is that financial 
crises provide a “window of opportunity” for reform either by providing political space for 
technocratic decision-making, by making political leaders realize their current growth models are 
no longer viable, or by pressure from international financial institutions that have increased 
power over states during economic crisis. Therefore, I include indicators for Banking Crisis, 
Currency Crisis, and Debt Crisis.39 Each measure indicates whether a particular crisis began in a 
particular country year. Currency and debt crises may induce liberalization, but since banking 
sector reforms are less likely in the aftermath of banking crises, I anticipate banking crises to 
either be unrelated to or negatively correlated with FDI liberalization. The literature on capital 
account openness more generally has emphasized the coercive role of the IMF in the 
implementation of neoliberal economic reforms. Therefore, I include an indicator variable Under 
IMF to account for countries subject to an IMF loan program.40 
Finally, because many policy liberalizations exhibit wave-like patterns of 
implementation, it may be the case that decisions to liberalize FDI follow mechanisms of policy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Source: Marshall, Gurr, and Jagger (2012). 
 
39 Source: World Bank Dataset on Financial Crisis. 
 
40 Source: Pandya (2014), originally from Dreher (2006). 
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diffusion across peer groups (Simmons and Elkins 2004). Accordingly, I control for the FDI 
policies for both regional and income peers by constructing variables that measure the average 
equity liberalization and screening liberalization score in each country year for a country’s 
regional41 (Regional Restrictions) and income peers42 (Income Restrictions). 
Case Selection and Data Coverage 
Conceptually, I expect my theory to apply broadly. However, my statistical analysis 
covers a limited number of countries due to issues of data availability. The most inclusive 
empirical models cover sixty-eight developing and advanced economies, while models with 
additional controls often restrict the sample further. I run a variety of robustness checks to be 
sure results are not driven by a particular sample. Table 3.1 provides a list of countries included 
in each of the main estimations. Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics. To aid in the 
interpretation of relative effects, I standardize all non-indicator variables in the models I estimate 
below. 
Table 3.1 Country Coverage, Main Models 
Algeria Denmark Indonesia New Zealand Sri Lanka 
Argentina Dominican Republic Israel Nicaragua Sweden 
Australia Ecuador Italy Nigeria Switzerland 
Austria Egypt Japan Norway Tanzania 
Belgium El Salvador Jordan Pakistan Thailand 
Bolivia Ethiopia Kazakhstan Paraguay Tunisia 
Brazil Finland Kenya Peru Turkey 
Cameroon France Madagascar Philippines Uganda 
Canada Germany Malaysia Portugal UK 
Chile Ghana Mexico Singapore Uruguay 
China Greece Morocco South Africa Uzbekistan 
Colombia Guatemala Mozambique South Korea Venezuela 
Cote d'Ivoire India Netherlands Spain Zimbabwe !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 I use UN subregional categories.  
 
42 I use World Bank income categories.!
! 
T
ab
le
 3
.2
 D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
is
tic
s 
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
O
bs
 
M
ea
n 
St
d.
 D
ev
. 
M
in
 
M
ax
 
So
ur
ce
 
FD
I E
qu
ity
 O
pe
nn
es
s  
22
55
 
0.
80
44
 
0.
36
73
 
0 
1 
Pa
nd
ya
 (2
01
4)
 
FD
I S
cr
ee
ni
ng
 O
pe
nn
es
s 
14
61
 
0.
66
62
 
0.
46
07
 
0 
1 
Pa
nd
ya
 (2
01
4)
 
B
an
ki
ng
 R
ef
or
m
 
15
64
 
6.
61
48
 
4.
39
17
 
0 
15
 
A
bi
ad
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
8)
 
Fi
xe
d 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 R
at
e 
23
40
 
0.
40
47
 
0.
49
09
 
0 
1 
Le
vy
-Y
ey
at
i a
nd
 S
tu
rz
en
eg
ge
r 
(2
00
5)
 
C
ap
ita
l A
cc
ou
nt
 O
pe
nn
es
s 
23
03
 
3.
01
43
3 
3.
05
78
 
0 
9 
B
ru
ne
 a
nd
 G
ui
si
ng
er
 (n
.d
.) 
Ln
 G
D
P/
PC
 ($
U
S)
 
21
77
 
8.
15
39
 
1.
62
39
 
4.
82
3 
11
.3
13
8 
W
or
ld
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t I
nd
ic
at
or
s 
ln
 T
ra
de
/G
D
P 
16
44
 
2.
23
98
 
1.
41
79
 
-4
.3
28
3 
4.
57
62
 
W
or
ld
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t I
nd
ic
at
or
s 
ln
 M
2/
G
D
P 
20
14
 
3.
06
01
7 
0.
64
17
 
1.
40
35
 
6.
42
8 
W
or
ld
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t I
nd
ic
at
or
s 
C
ur
re
nc
y 
C
ris
is
 
23
40
 
0.
04
74
 
0.
21
26
 
0 
1 
C
la
es
ee
ns
 a
nd
 K
os
e 
(2
01
3)
 
B
an
ki
ng
 C
ris
is
 
23
40
 
0.
02
74
 
0.
16
31
 
0 
1 
C
la
es
ee
ns
 a
nd
 K
os
e 
(2
01
3)
 
D
eb
t C
ris
is
 
23
40
 
0.
01
5 
0.
12
14
 
0 
1 
C
la
es
ee
ns
 a
nd
 K
os
e 
(2
01
3)
 
Po
lit
y 
22
58
 
1.
27
59
 
7.
82
12
 
-1
0 
10
 
M
ar
sh
al
l, 
G
ur
r,a
nd
 Ja
gg
er
s 
(2
01
2)
 
IM
F 
Pr
og
ra
m
 
22
79
 
0.
30
54
 
0.
46
67
 
0 
1 
Pa
nd
ya
 (2
01
4)
 
B
IT
s 
15
95
 
2.
90
85
 
3.
44
62
 
0 
15
 
B
üt
he
 a
nd
 M
iln
er
 (2
00
8)
 
R
eg
io
n 
Eq
ui
ty
 O
pe
nn
es
s 
23
40
 
0.
08
2 
0.
17
6 
0.
33
16
 
0.
99
72
 
A
ut
ho
r C
al
cu
la
tio
n 
In
co
m
e 
FD
I O
pe
nn
es
s 
23
40
 
0.
80
2 
0.
10
57
 
0.
53
64
 
0.
93
81
 
A
ut
ho
r C
al
cu
la
tio
n 
R
eg
io
n 
Sc
re
en
in
g 
O
pe
ne
ss
 
23
35
 
0.
71
19
 
0.
17
67
 
0.
31
92
 
1 
A
ut
ho
r C
al
cu
la
tio
n 
In
co
m
e 
Sc
re
en
in
g 
O
pe
nn
es
s 
23
40
 
0.
67
61
 
0.
07
88
 
0.
58
38
 
0.
80
6 
A
ut
ho
r C
al
cu
la
tio
n 
 
53 !
! !
54 
Modeling Technique 
My theory argues banking sector reform creates a policy environment more conducive to 
FDI liberalization. Because interest realignment takes time to transfer into policy change, the 
causal process should display temporal lags rather than instantaneous change. Moreover, 
modeling the precise timing of reform is particularly important in this case because doing so 
helps attenuate concerns that reforms of FDI and financial sector policies may be linked through 
common reform packages rather than through a truly causal process. I choose to employ a single 
equation error correction model to estimate these dynamics. Such models are useful for several 
reasons. First, SECMs are particularly suited for integrated time series; diagnostics confirm both 
measures of FDI openness as well as banking sector reform conform to a first order integration. 
Second, unlike estimation models that include each explanatory variable lagged by a 
predetermined amount, SECMs remain agnostic to the length of time it takes for the effect of 
explanatory variables to fully transfer into outcomes of interest. SECMs estimate three 
qualitatively important quantities of interest - the average instantaneous change in Y as a result of 
x, the average long-term effect of x on Y, and the rate at which the long term effects of x change 
Y. Third, SECMs are accommodating of many problems typical with running dynamic models. 
These models can handle both integrated and stationary explanatory variables within the same 
equation (Engle and Granger 1987; Keele and DeBoef 2008), and they also are robust to weak 
endogeneity (DeBoef 2001). 
Results and Interpretation 
Table 3.3 reports the main results for Equity Restrictions. Recall that all non-indicator 
variables are standardized to aid in interpreting relative effects. The primary finding of these 
empirical models is measures of financial sector reform are consistently statistically significantly 
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related to FDI liberalization, and these results are robust to both fixed and random effects 
modeling, multicollinearity concerns, and measurement choice.43 Because measures of trade, 
M2, and domestic credit are often unavailable for many country years in my dataset, I exclude 
these variables in models that include measures of diffusion. Inclusion of trade and money 
supply variables reduce my country year observations by almost half and also disproportionately 
drop developing countries from the sample. Post-estimation diagnostic assessment indicates a 
fixed effects model is the appropriate modeling choice.44  
Table 3.4 reports results of a similar set of models that substitute Screening Requirements 
for Equity Restrictions. Interestingly, banking sector reforms do not have consistently 
statistically significant effects on the liberalization of screening requirements. Moreover, the sign 
of the coefficient estimate for banking reforms in these models is negative. While data 
availability restrict the Screening models, these findings do suggest the political processes that 
lead to removal of screening requirements is different from the mechanisms that lead to 
decreased equity restrictions on direct foreign investors. This interpretation is further supported 
by fact that the screening policies of geographic and income peers seems to have a divergent 
rather than convergent effect on local regulatory changes. I discuss these findings further below. 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Results of random effects models are substantively similar to fixed effects models. Results are 
also robust to other common measures of short-term capital account openness. Results of these 
robustness checks are available upon request.  
 
44 A Hausman specification test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates of the 
random effects model do not systematically differ from the parameter estimates of the fixed 
effects model at p=0.000 (Hausman, 1976). 
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Table 3.3 Main Models – Equity Restrictions 
 !
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
LDV -0.4110 0.0298*** -0.4146 0.0218*** -0.4186 0.0220***
Banking Sector Reform
Lag 0.1595 0.0576*** 0.0730 0.0324** 0.0575 0.0351*
Change 0.0354 0.1047 -0.0109 0.0683 -0.0337 0.0710
Capital Account Openness
Lag -0.1283 0.0484*** -0.0524 0.0307* -0.0607 0.0316*
Change -0.0779 0.0871 -0.0213 0.0574 -0.0286 0.0593
Fixed Exchange Rate
Lag -0.0837 0.0833 -0.0527 0.0469 -0.0607 0.0484
Change -0.0120 0.0673 0.0010 0.0409 -0.0108 0.0422
ln GDP/PC ($US)
Lag -0.0260 0.3009 -0.0386 0.1611 0.1085 0.1656
Change -1.5198 1.0318 -0.8225 0.6947 -0.8055 0.7177
ln Trade/GDP
Lag 0.3220 0.1503**
Change 0.5905 0.4195
ln M2
Lag -0.0277 0.0767
Change 0.1056 0.1162
Currency Crisis
Lag -0.3850 0.1532** -0.1056 0.0984 -0.1088 0.1018
Change -0.2124 0.1004** -0.0904 0.0667 -0.0945 0.0690
Banking Crisis
Lag -0.1475 0.1812 -0.0827 0.1096 -0.0380 0.1132
Change -0.0423 0.1235 -0.0048 0.0724 0.0093 0.0748
Debt Crisis
Lag -0.3719 0.2328 -0.2125 0.1593 -0.1573 0.1645
Change -0.2575 0.1562* -0.2428 0.1101** -0.1947 0.1137*
Under IMF
Lag -0.0379 0.0733 -0.0122 0.0454 -0.0081 0.0470
Change 0.0350 0.0799 0.0012 0.0495 -0.0012 0.0511
Polity
Lag -0.0247 0.0550 -0.0626 0.0354 -0.0370 0.0358
Change 0.0359 0.1054 -0.0283 0.0641 -0.0357 0.0662
ln Domestic Credit/GDP
Lag -0.0613 0.0861
Change -0.0537 0.1352
Regional Mean Policy
Lag 0.2293 0.0332***
Change 0.5094 0.0412***
Income Peers Policy
Lag 0.1497 0.0291***
Change 0.2727 0.0351***
Constant -0.0094 0.0740 0.0616 0.0383 0.0771 0.0410*
R2
N
n
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; two-tailed tests. Analysis covers 1973-2000, subject to data availability
746 1386 1386
57 66 66
0.1442 0.1789 0.1593
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Equity Restrictions FE Equity Restrictions FE Equity Restrictions FE
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Table 3.4 Main Models – Screening Requirement!
 
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
LDV -0.2783 0.0313*** -0.2661 0.0217*** -0.2689 0.0218***
Banking Sector Reform
Lag -0.1016 0.0693 -0.0594 0.0348* -0.0511 0.0375
Change -0.0733 0.1173 0.0237 0.0725 0.0142 0.0762
Capital Account Openness
Lag 0.0091 0.0502 0.0217 0.0324 0.0119 0.0332
Change -0.0656 0.0971 -0.1115 0.0589* -0.1225 0.0611
Fixed Exchange Rate
Lag 0.1163 0.0910 0.0243 0.0469 0.0546 0.0486
Change 0.0990 0.0730 0.0268 0.0413 0.0460 0.0428
ln GDP/PC ($US)
Lag -0.3495 0.3371 -0.0365 0.1730 -0.0150 0.1796
Change -0.0910 1.1589 -0.1132 0.7318 -0.1735 0.7591
ln Trade/GDP
Lag -0.985 0.1735
Change 0.3870 0.4948
ln M2
Lag -0.1113 0.1101
Change 0.0102 0.1416
Currency Crisis
Lag -0.0966 0.1763 0.0354 0.1065 0.0645 0.1106
Change -0.0372 0.1142 -0.0108 0.0725 0.0071 0.0753
Banking Crisis
Lag -0.3506 0.1935* -0.1279 0.1135 -0.1359 0.1178
Change -0.2037 0.1313 -0.0735 0.0753 -0.0752 0.0782
Debt Crisis
Lag -0.1016 0.2802 -0.1924 0.1749 -0.1535 0.1817
Change -0.1029 0.1925 -0.1182 0.1193 -0.1138 0.1239
Under IMF
Lag -0.0251 0.0798 0.0005 0.0472 -0.0179 0.0490
Change 0.0405 0.0832 0.0449 0.0504 0.0265 0.0523
Polity
Lag 0.0029 0.0651 0.0022 0.0361 0.0124 0.0376
Change -0.1985 0.1090* -0.0137 0.0643 -0.0061 0.0667
ln Domestic Credit/GDP
Lag 0.1574 0.1182
Change -0.0775 0.1675
Regional Mean Policy
Lag -0.1423 0.0288***
Change -0.5470 0.0416***
Income Peers Policy
Lag -0.1411 0.0275***
Change -0.4399 0.0524***
Constant 0.1329 0.0970 0.0076 0.0508 0.0075 0.0523
R2
N
n
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; two-tailed tests. Analysis covers 1973-2000, subject to data availability
612 1147 1147
0.0477 0.1992 0.1516
48 55 55
Screening FE Screening FE Screening FE
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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Interpreting SECMs requires separating the short-term effects of explanatory variables 
from the long-term effects, which transfer into the data through a equilibrating process. The 
intuition behind error correction models is if two or more time series are cointegrated, they 
should share a stochastic trend that moderates toward an equilibrium relationship. First, note that 
for all models, the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable is negative and 
statistically significant. This finding provides evidence that an error correction model is indeed 
appropriate for the data; the differenced level of FDI openness is stationary and trends back 
toward an equilibrium value. Interpreting the short-term effects of the explanatory variables is 
straightforward; the coefficient estimate of the differenced value of an explanatory variable 
represents the average instantaneous change in FDI openness. Interpretation of long-term effects 
requires dividing the coefficient estimate for the lagged explanatory variable by the coefficient 
estimate for the lagged dependent variable. Since all variables have been standardized, the 
resulting coefficient estimate represents the average total effect of a standard deviation change in 
the explanatory variable; the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable provides an 
indication for how quickly the total long term effect transfers into the data.  
What becomes immediately clear is financial reform has no immediate effect on FDI 
liberalization, but instead influences openness to foreign investment through a longer temporal 
process. This finding establishes that the correlation between FDI and financial sector 
liberalization is not driven by contemporaneous reforms in both policy areas. The substantive 
long-term effect of financial sector reform on liberalization of equity restrictions is quite large. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the average predicted long-term effect of banking reforms on FDI 
liberalization for Model 2. Overall, Model 2 predicts a standard deviation change in banking 
sector liberalization leads to an average increase in FDI openness equal to 36.68 per cent of its 
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standard deviation. Model 3 predicts an effect of similar magnitude. Model 1 predicts a larger 
effect, but is also estimated on a smaller sample. Figure 3.1 illustrates the temporal dimension of 
this predicted change in FDI openness; most of the effects of banking reform transfer into the 
data within five years.  
Figure 3.1 Long-Term Effects of Banking Reform on FDI Policy 
 
A few other explanatory variables are consistently significantly associated with 
liberalization of equity restrictions. In Model 1, trade openness is positive and statistically 
significant association with decreases in equity restrictions, but not with liberalization of 
screening requirements. It bears mention that trade openness has the largest substantive effect on 
changes in equity restrictions, which corroborates Kobrin (2005) who argues FDI liberalization 
follows the logic of economic opportunity costs of closure. However, other economic variables 
such as level of development and economic growth are not statistically significant. 
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Perhaps most interestingly, short-term capital account openness is consistently 
statistically significantly negatively associated with equity restriction liberalization and displays 
predicted substantive effects around the same magnitude as banking sector liberalization. This 
finding quite clearly shows that the decision to pursue short-term capital account liberalization is 
quite distinct from decisions to liberalize long term flows and is also consistent with the above 
theory that emphasizes different interest coalitions with respect to each policy area. The above 
theory emphasizes the importance of access to and costs of alternative investment in explaining 
patterns of FDI liberalization, and specifically argues FDI reform is more likely when access to 
domestic credit sources is limited. Domestic credit as a percentage of GDP is not a statistically 
significant predictor of FDI openness, but this variable suffers from a large amount of 
missingness, which may be driving that result. 
There is also evidence that economic crises have long-term negative effects on FDI 
liberalization. Debt crisis, and to a lesser extent, currency crisis is statistically significantly 
related to decreased FDI openness for measures of equity restrictions but not for screening 
requirements. These variables exhibit statistically significant short-term effects, though these 
predicted effects are not as large as those for financial reform. Banking crisis is not consistently 
associated with changes in FDI policy This finding is unsurprising within the theoretical 
framework sketched above because banking sector reform, which significantly drives 
movements toward FDI liberalization, is less likely in the wake of banking crises (Abiad and 
Mody 2005). Contrary to arguments that loan conditionality forced FDI liberalization, there is no 
evidence that being under an IMF program drives FDI policy reform. 
These models also provide an important correction to two most prominent theories of 
liberalization. First, democracy is not consistently statistically significantly associated with 
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reform. In most models, the coefficient estimate is negative and even reaches significance in 
Model 4. The sign for democracy is particularly interesting because it contradicts previous 
findings that democracy drives FDI openness (Pandya 2014; Dorobantu 2010). In a large cross-
sectional analysis, it is not clear of this negative association is due to democracies blocking 
reform or because countries typically open to FDI before they transition to democracy. 
Regardless, the results do call in to question theories of FDI reform that emphasize democratic 
transition.  
Another typical theory of liberalization is that FDI policies diffuse across countries in 
competition for capital. The models presented here provide a partial confirmation of this 
expectation. For equity restrictions, FDI liberalization among geographically proximate and 
economically similar states has a large and statistically significant positive effect on a country’s 
subsequent propensity to liberalize. However, the coefficient estimates for models of screening 
requirements are statistically significant and negative. This finding is rather puzzling and further 
suggests the politics surrounding screening requirements are different from those that drive 
policies toward foreign equity ceilings. The negative relationship between screening 
liberalization and regime type in Model 4 indicates that screening requirements may be more 
associated with the way political power is organized domestically. Another possibility is that the 
politics surrounding the liberalization of screening requirements might play out at the 
bureaucratic level since rescinding screening authorization amounts to a dramatic decrease in 
power of whichever ministry administers investment project requests. 
Sensitivity Analysis and Alternative Explanations 
To provide further statistical support for my theory, I run a series of robustness checks. 
Table 3.4 reports results for models that use Equity Restrictions as the outcome variable and 
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include a regional diffusion measure. Similar robustness run on Screening Requirements, and 
models that include an income-based diffusion measure also do not change the central results of 
those models.  
First, one of the more surprising results of Models 1-6 is that level of democracy is either 
not associated or negatively associated with FDI liberalization. To ensure this finding does not 
rest on measurement choice, I use an indicator for democracy. Model 7 shows that an indicator 
of democracy further undermines claims that democratization leads to FDI liberalization – in this 
model, democracy has a statistically significant and negative effect on lifting equity restrictions. 
Second, it may be that countries are more likely to pursue FDI liberalization when they have a 
highly skilled labor force. Another alternative explanation for FDI liberalization is the 
proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) compelled developing countries to open their 
borders to FDI (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006). Model 8 includes a count of BITs, and 
again my results are robust to this alternative explanation.45 Figure 3.2 illustrates the average 
predicted change in FDI openness over time for Model 8. The curve is similar to Figure 3.1 
indicating the temporal dynamics of reform follow a similar trajectory.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Because BITs are typically considered to constrain developing countries rather than advanced 
industrial countries, the easiest test of the hypothesis that BITs increase FDI openness would 
only apply to developing countries. Therefore, Model 7 is restricted to the developing world. !
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Table 3.5 Results of Robustness Models 
 
 
 
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
LDV -0.4182 0.0217*** -0.4464 0.0282 0.5834 0.0229***
Banking Sector Reform
Lag 0.0684 0.0320** 0.1395 0.0488 0.1158 0.0322***
Change -0.0141 0.0681 -0.0790 0.0953
Capital Account Openness
Lag -0.0536 0.0306* -0.1102 0.0568* -0.0681 0.0308**
Change -0.0240 0.0573 -0.0368 0.0997
Fixed Exchange Rate
Lag -0.0580 0.0469 -0.0737 0.0683 -0.0664 0.0405
Change -0.0014 0.0408 -0.0170 0.0581
ln GDP/PC ($US)
Lag -0.0230 0.1609 0.0899 0.2186 0.2237 0.1638
Change -0.8067 0.6935 -1.0285 0.8867
Currency Crisis
Lag -0.1027 0.0983 -0.1414 0.1266 0.0108 0.0659
Change -0.0880 0.0667 -0.1105 0.0858
Banking Crisis
Lag -0.0815 0.1093 -0.2315 0.1387* -0.0400 0.0769
Change -0.0039 0.0722 -0.1109 0.0907
Debt Crisis
Lag -0.2427 0.1598 -0.2032 0.1889 0.0292 0.1103
Change -0.2568 0.1100** -0.2434 0.1301*
Under IMF
Lag -0.0217 0.0454 -0.0262 0.0569 0.0094 0.0417
Change -0.0055 0.0494 -0.0076 0.0622
Democracy
Lag 0.1796 0.0614*** -0.1046 0.0442** 0.0073 0.0350
Change -0.0396 0.0998 -0.0364 0.0768
BITs
Lag -0.0922 0.1116
Change 0.0470 0.1086
Regional Mean Policy
Lag 0.2428 0.0332*** 0.2911 0.0456*** 0.0598 0.0314*
Change 0.5154 0.0411*** -0.540.608970 0.0575***
Constant 0.1466 0.0514*** 0.1005 0.1097 0.0117 0.0353
R2
N
n
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; two-tailed tests. Analysis covers 1973-2000, subject to data availability
1386 874 1386
0.1737 0.1859 0.6399
66 46 66
Democracy BITs TSCS
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
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Additionally, it is worth noting that the substantive effects are larger in the restricted sample; a 
one standard deviation change in banking reform is associated with a increase in FDI openness 
equal to about 75% of a standard deviation change in the outcome variable. Finally, to ensure 
that my results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, Model 9 uses a standard time 
series cross sectional estimation with all explanatory variables lagged one period and with fixed 
effects. Again, my main results remain robust.46 
Figure 3.2 Effect of Banking Reform on FDI Policy, Developing Countries 
 
It may be that liberalizing reforms may generate additional liberalizing forms more 
generally. If this is true, the causal mechanism linking banking reforms with FDI liberalization 
may be growing ideational propensities toward economic liberalism rather than anything 
particular to how changes in credit allocation processes may shift elite preferences. Therefore, I 
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46 All results are also robust to random effects. 
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run a series of error correction, pooled time series, and granger causality models to probe the 
statistical relationship between trade liberalization, measured by applied tariff rates, and banking 
sector reforms. Across model outputs, there is no consistent statistical relationship between 
reforms in the banking sector and trade liberalization. In particular, error correction 
specifications reveal little evidence that banking sector reforms are systematically linked to tariff 
reforms in either direction. Jointly, these tests provide additional evidence that the statistical 
relationship between banking reforms and FDI liberalization are more than just an artifact of a 
virtuous circle of liberalizing reforms. 
Conclusion 
Over the past thirty years, states have generally opened their long-term capital account by 
loosening the restrictions on foreign equity ownership in a number of industries. Instead of 
converging on a particular level of openness, however, states retain a non-trivial degree of 
variation in their statutory position toward FDI. Previous research on the determinants of FDI 
liberalization has focused largely on variations in domestic political institutions to explain 
disparate levels of openness. Such analyses largely ignore the broader macroeconomic context in 
which governments make decisions about FDI policy, place great confidence in the constraining 
function of institutions within the context of institutional instability, leave little room for 
autonomous state preferences, and do not consider how domestic firms may face changing 
preferences over time. In contrast, I develop a theory that considers how banking sector reform 
over time induces changes in the political economy of FDI in developing countries. As 
governments liberalize the domestic financial sector, often in response to balance of payment 
crises, they lose their ability to use tools of financial repression to maintain regime support. 
When governments are no longer able to channel investments toward politically important 
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development projects, they must look to alternate sources of investment to fuel economic 
growth. At the same time, banking sector reform breaks down traditional coalitions that 
previously lobbied to maintain high restrictions on FDI while fostering new coalitions of 
industrial and financial interests that benefit from FDI inflows. 
As the results reported above show, there is robust support for the proposition that 
banking sector reform leads to FDI liberalization, at least in terms of equity restrictions. 
However, changes screening requirements are not consistently associated with banking sector 
reforms, nor measures of short-term capital account openness, IMF coercion, or political 
institutions. Several important implications emerge from these findings. First, they provide a 
useful corrective to theories of FDI policy orientation that emphasize democratic institutions. 
Once controlling for banking sector reform, level of democracy is not statistically significantly 
associated with FDI liberalization. Second, these findings reiterate the importance of considering 
ways in which global factors influence government policymaking while still retaining 
explanatory space for domestic level political struggles. Banking sector reform, often induced by 
external pressures, consequently changed preferences over FDI policy both at the societal level 
and within the state apparatus itself. Third, the theory these findings support places great 
emphasis on disentangling the causal logic that underlies decisions to liberalize different “types” 
of financial flows. In particular, the policy preferences of domestic actors over short-term and 
long-term capital account openness are not always united and sometimes countervail each other. 
These findings open up multiple directions for future research. First, while the statistical 
analysis here provides evidence of the temporal sequencing of banking sector reform and FDI 
liberalization, it cannot directly uncover the precise causal mechanisms that lead from banking 
sector liberalization to decrease domestic ownership requirements. Comparative case study can 
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further augment support for this theory by tracing the processes through which FDI policy is 
created, maintained, and amended. Second, my theory of reform suggests access to external 
short-term investment may create a partial FDI reform equilibrium. Therefore, analysis 
techniques such as Markov transitions modeling may be useful in more closely examining 
reform pathways and stumbling blocks as well as the ways in which other financial reforms 
interact with FDI policy. Third, the results of the models presented here suggest liberalization of 
equity restrictions and screening requirements follow different pathways and that the 
mechanisms commonly thought to induce greater openness to FDI do not apply to the lifting of 
screening requirements. Future research should explore this finding more fully. 
Similarly, while this chapter focused on equity restrictions and screening requirements, 
which are central to governments’ long-term capital account position, policies toward FDI are 
multifaceted. It would be helpful to think about how a theory that takes the temporal sequencing 
of reform seriously may augment understanding of the political determinants of other facets of 
FDI policy. For example, when do governments enact new FDI incentive policies? To what 
extent do the creation of special economic zones speed up or stall FDI liberalization? Finally, 
these findings place great emphasis on how domestic firms’ strategies with respect to foreign 
investment changed as global conditions changed. Future research might consider more fully the 
conditions under which the distinction between domestic and multinational firms breaks down. 
As foreign firms enter host markets and develop both arms-length and intra-firm relationships 
with domestic incumbents, how do the policy preference orientations of incumbents change and 
how do firms adapt their lobbing strategies in the context of a breakdown in distinction between 
domestic and foreign firms? 
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CHAPTER 4: POLICY, FLOWS, AND PARTIAL REFORM – A MARKOV MODEL 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I demonstrate that banking sector reform is statistically 
significantly associated with subsequent increases in FDI liberalization, that the effect of banking 
reform on FDI openness takes several years to develop, and that this relationship is robust to 
multiple alternative explanations such as regime type, IMF coercion, general trends toward 
economic liberalization, and international treaty obligations. However, the modeling techniques 
used in Chapter 3 assume FDI openness is a continuous and linear concept. In other words, 
moving from complete closure to five percent openness represents the same qualitative change as 
moving from 45 percent openness to 50 percent openness or 95 percent openness to a completely 
liberalized FDI policy environment. However, it may be the case that FDI openness is best 
understood as conforming to a finite set of qualitative distinct policy environments. In particular, 
it may be useful to distinguish among governments that largely prevent foreign firms access to 
direct investment from those that welcome FDI, subject to certain conditions, and from 
governments that allow FDI without meaningful restrictions.  
In this chapter, I make use of Markov transition modeling techniques to more fully 
explore the conditions that make governments more likely to transition between three states of 
FDI policy: closure, partial openness, and liberalism. In particular, I consider the conditions 
under which governments may become “stuck” in a partial reform equilibrium in which they 
welcome and perhaps even pursue FDI in certain industries but continue to maintain substantial 
restrictions such industry-specific equity restrictions, employment related performance 
!69 
requirements, technology transfer, and/or project-specific screening requirements. For example, 
China’s 1986 Law on Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprises for the first time allowed some foreign 
firms to establish wholly owned subsidiaries in China. However, the government retained vast 
authority to place equity restrictions on specific sectors and individual projects and continues to 
subject all proposed FDI projects to centralized review (U.S. State Department 2013). 
Restrictions on FDI are not limited to countries with state-dominated economies. Mexico, despite 
NAFTA, continues to restrict FDI in several important sectors either in part or in whole. For 
example, FDI continues to be limited to a minority share (49 percent) in fixed 
telecommunications (U.S. Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs 2009). 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The second section briefly revisits the 
theoretical predictions generated in Chapter 2, paying particular attention to expectations 
regarding partial reform. The third section introduces the theoretical justification for and 
mechanics of developing a three category measure of FDI regulation as well as provides a 
descriptive analysis of this measure over time. The fourth section details the Markov modeling 
strategy and outlines measurement of explanatory variables. The fifth section presents and 
interprets results of the statistical analysis, and the sixth section concludes. 
Theory 
 To review my theory, FDI liberalization is driven by changes in elites’ policy preferences 
over openness to foreign direct equity ownership in the local economy. As the availability of 
other sources of investment decline and the costs of such capital increases, powerful business 
elites will be more willing to open the local economy to foreign owners. They will do so in order 
to spur capital formation and therefore economic growth generally, and also to gain greater 
access to foreign firms’ investment financing. Thus, decreased state control over the banking 
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sector as well as declining availability of cheap credit from abroad will increase elites’ appetite 
for FDI while access to foreign capital through portfolio investment, inexpensive global credit 
environments, and subsidized loans from state owned banks will encourage elites to pressure 
governments to limit FDI.  
This argument stands in constrast with the most prominent explanations of FDI 
liberalization in recent years, which emphasize the role of political institutions that privilege 
labor groups (Pandya 2014, Pinto 2013). Since FDI liberalization often precedes or co-occurs 
with democratization, it is difficult to show robust causal sequencing between democracy and 
liberalization. Additionally, since democracy institutions are often poor constraints on political 
agents power during times of transition (Pepinsky 2013a) and since popular opinion toward FDI 
is often negative during the depths structural adjustment (Bauerle Danzman and Stoyan 2014, 
Doronbantu 2010, Rohrscheider and Whitefield 2004, Sinn 1997), we may expect the 
relationship between democracy and FDI regulation to be complex.  
My theory also differs in important ways from arguments that emphasize the role of the 
IMF as either a coercive agent of change or a convenient source of political cover for local 
governments who otherwise could not withstand popular dissent against neoliberal reforms. IMF 
programs themselves cannot explain FDI liberalization, especially since structural adjustment 
programs only rarely explicitly include the lifting of foreign equity restrictions as conditions for 
future loan disbursements (Stone 2008, 601). Neither can financial crisis directly cause 
relaxation of FDI restrictions since dismantling legal restrictions against FDI do not solve 
immediate balance of payment problems.47 Instead, I argue specific policy responses to financial 
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47 Crises can lead to “firesale” FDI in which foreign firms acquire local firms, taking advantage 
of rapid local currency depreciations, which lower the relative price of acquisitions (Krugman 
2000). However, these sales are usually not large enough to sufficiently ameliorate balance of 
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crisis, such as banking sector reforms, can overtime lead to FDI liberalization because such 
policies change the availability and cost of alternative sources of investment capital and therefore 
shift elites’ attitudes toward openness. 
The primary argument is that FDI liberalization will be more likely to occur when access 
to and the costs of alternative means of financing investment are constraining to local business 
elites. The most fundamental domestic structural condition that affects the local financing 
environment is the financial regulatory environment. When governments exhibit high levels of 
control over the financial sector; through interest rate controls, directed credit requirements, and 
large state-owned banks; lending decisions are based on political calculus and therefore provide 
powerful firms with preferential access to subsidized credit. Under such conditions, the business 
elite most likely to be able to effectively pressure governments for their preferred policies will be 
happy to restrict FDI. With access to subsidized credit, these firms will not view foreign direct 
equity necessary to fuel growth. At the same time, the certain costs of FDI liberalization – 
mainly higher labor costs and demands for increased productivity – will outstrip the possible 
benefits of foreign firm entry since gains from linkages are firm specific and difficult to predict 
ex ante. However, when the banking sector undergoes substantial reform, the link between 
politically powerful firms and subsidized credit diminishes. Under tighter local financing 
constraints, large and powerful firms will be more willing to bear the costs associated with 
foreign entry in order to gain access to investment financing through foreign direct equity. This 
lead to the first hypothesis:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
payment difficulties and such rapid sales usually occur without changing investment laws. My 
interest is not understanding the conditions under which governments might temporarily allow 
foreign firms to acquire substantial equity in distressed companies; but when governments will 
undergo substantial policy changes that reduce their own ability to manage the conditions under 
which foreign firms are able to enter.  
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Hypothesis 1 Banking sector reforms will be positively associated with FDI liberalization. 
If economic elites drive FDI regulation, and their access to alternative sources of finance 
conditions their willingness to pursue openness, we may also expect measures that capture the 
overall supply of alternative sources of capital to affect the propensity to liberalize FDI policy. 
First, the global credit environment may affect elites’ strategies toward FDI. When global credit 
conditions are loose, local elite will be better able to generate investment financing through 
international debt markets and therefore will be less likely to press for FDI openness. 
Conversely, when global credit is tight, domestic firms will be more likely to look toward 
foreign investors. Since a tight global credit environment constrains investment finance 
regardless of the level of FDI policy openness, we would not expect the global credit 
environment to be subject to a partial equilibrium: 
Hypothesis 2 Tight global credit markets will be positively associated with FDI liberalization. 
 In addition to global credit conditions, the local economy’s ability to attract investment 
may reduce elites’ financing constraints and therefore prevent FDI liberalization. Two primary 
sources of foreign capital include portfolio and direct investment; note this expectation is that 
countries that already attract a good deal of investment – direct or otherwise – are unlikely to 
pursue further reform. This expectation runs counter to claims that liberalization of capital flows 
are complementary (Haggard and Maxfield 1996) and claims that FDI inflows give foreign firms 
a foothold in which they can pressure the government to enact further liberalization (Desbordes 
and Vauday 2007)). To be able to attract any substantial amounts of foreign capital, however, the 
investment policy environment must be at least partially open. In other words, we should expect 
the capacity to attract substantial capital flows to be associated with partial reform: 
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Hypothesis 3 Portfolio Investment inflows will be positively associated with partial FDI 
liberalization. 
Hypothesis 4 FDI inflows will be positively associated with partial FDI liberalization. 
Along with actual inflows of foreign investment, a policy environment that welcomes 
short-term capital inflows should also mute pressures for FDI policy reform since portfolio 
investment opportunities can substitute for direct investment. With open policies toward 
portfolio flows, local banks can use access to international capital markets to intermediate the 
lender-borrower relationship. Again, we might expect this effect to be non-linear. Short-term 
capital account openness can provide the financial infrastructure necessary to complement an 
intermediate FDI policy environment in which foreign firms are selectively provided local entry, 
often in joint ventures with domestic firms. Therefore, we may expect short-term capital account 
openness to be positively associated with moves from closed to partial openness and negatively 
associated with policy changes from partial to full openness: 
Hypothesis 5 Short-term capital account openness will be positively associated with partial FDI 
liberalization and negatively associated with full FDI liberalization. 
Measuring FDI Policy 
 In this section, I explain my motivation for using a trichotomous measure of FDI policy, 
my method for doing so, and present descriptive information about my outcome variable.  
 Most measures of FDI policy employ an index strategy in which laws regarding foreign 
entry and establishment, operations and repatriation, dispute settlement, and investment 
promotion are coded generally at the industry level and then are averaged into one observation 
for each country year that is typically scaled [0,1]. These measures implicitly assume FDI policy 
environments are best conceptualized as continuous – changes along the scale represent uniform 
!74 
movements toward liberalization or restriction. In some cases, it may be useful to distinguish 
between policy environments in such fine grained detail, particularly if researchers expect FDI 
policy innovations to be implemented gradually or if the primary area of interest is long term 
effects of variables of interest on levels of openness to FDI.48  
If, however, researchers wish to explain direct changes in FDI policy that constitute 
meaningful change in the underlying policy environment such that foreign investors are likely to 
base locational decisions in part on innovations in the local policy environment, it is less likely 
that continuous measures of FDI restrictions are particularly useful. Moreover, FDI policy 
change is “lumpy.” FDI regulatory policy is most frequently set by company or investment laws 
that cover the majority of economic activity.49  And while industry-specific investment policy 
changes on the margins may reflect lobbying victories of narrow privileged groups, these small 
changes do little to alter more fundamental features of the legal environment toward foreign 
investors. For example, Kobrin finds close to one third of all changes to FDI policy in 
developing countries from 1992-2001 were related to specific investment incentives (2005, 83). 
However, among the policy categories least likely to undergo liberalization during the same time 
period were industry-wide ownership limits and approval screening processes (Kobrin 2005, 83). 
Accordingly, theoretically meaningful changes in FDI policy may display threshold effects that 
distinguish between a closed, open, or “managed” investment environment. Small changes in an 
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48 These detailed measures may also be helpful in a disaggregated context to consider the 
determinants of industry-level differences in FDI restrictions. I refrain from such analysis due to 
the difficulty of obtaining these data in disaggregated form and the lack of available data on 
industry-level political leverage in a time series cross-sectional context.  
 
49 Sometimes natural resources, banking, and/or infrastructure is subject to additional laws, but 
most agricultural, secondary, and tertiary sector activities are covered by a single law. 
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index of FDI regulations, therefore, may provide less information about substantive changes in 
the overall orientation of investment policy. 
 Measuring FDI policy on a more compressed ordinal scale involves making choices 
about what these categories should be. Early discussions of FDI policy tended to treat regulatory 
environments as dichotomous – either governments prohibited foreign entry or allowed foreign 
firms to invest locally to some degree. However, this simple distinction between nominal 
openness or full closure obscured the fact that many countries that began to incorporate FDI into 
their development strategies did so by carefully managing access. The emergence of partially 
open policy environments that encouraged FDI into specific industries and individual projects 
while maintaining high levels of investment restrictions generally became evident as economic 
development entities such as UNCTAD, ASEAN, and the investment bureau of OECD began to 
produce periodic investment policy reports (ASEAN 1999). Distinguishing between “closed,” 
“intermediate,” and “open” legal environments not only reflects emergent qualitative differences 
among countries’ investment policies but also is theoretically relevant. An intermediate category 
allows us to consider the conditions under which governments will mediate between the 
availability of a particular source of investment in a globalized financial system and domestic 
political concerns that might render full liberalization infeasible or undesirable. And unlike 
portfolio flows, restrictions on FDI remain viable since firm licensing requirements are difficult 
to thwart. 
 Partial FDI openness entails relaxation of restrictions on foreign entry while maintaining 
the state’s legal authority to set limits on entry, thereby requiring foreign firms to enter joint 
ventures with local entities, and/or submit individual investment proposals to a centralized 
screening procedure through which governments can reject FDI deemed to not advance the 
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economic development goals of the state. Retention of these legal limitations on FDI entry also 
makes subsequent changes, both liberalizing and restricting, to investment policy easier. For 
example, maintenance of positive or negative lists that detail the industries that (dis)allow 
specific levels of foreign equity can be changed frequently by executive or ministerial order. 
Investors have routinely identified such lists as contributing to policy uncertainty since frequent 
changes to foreign equity allowances can force divestures and make medium and long-term 
planning difficult for foreign firms.50 
 To distinguish between these three states of FDI policy, I modify Sonal Pandya’s 
measures of equity restrictions and screening requirements on foreign firms (2014). This dataset 
is the most comprehensive measure of laws regarding entry treatment of direct foreign investors 
currently available, covering up to 91 countries from 1970 to 2000. Other available measures 
either have more limited temporal or cross-sectional coverage. For instance, the dataset with the 
next best coverage is the OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index covers 43 to 58 countries in 1997, 
2003, 2006, 2010-2013.51 Moreover, by focusing on the legal barriers to entry, this measure 
provides a more direct assessment of the policy environment that is specific to foreign firms who 
wish to invest directly. Other indices also include measures for policies regarding land ownership 
by foreigners, access to dispute settlement mechanisms, limitations on hiring non-native 
managers, and the ability to repatriate profits. While such laws affect foreign firms’ operational !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Indonesia’s expansive and unstable negative list through the 2000s is indicative of the risks 
foreign investors face in dualist policy environments. A series of increasingly complex negative 
lists, particularly the 2007 negative list that increased coverage from 83 to 338 sectors, created 
concerns that foreign investors could face divestiture requirements in the future if changes to the 
negative list lowered the legal equity limit on foreign ownership in relevant industries. See Teo, 
Laurel. “Indonesia’s New Investment Rules Add to Confusion,” The Business Times Singapore. 
13 July 2007. 
 
51 Available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm (last visited 25 March 2014). 
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considerations; they do not address the fundamental right of establishment, represent barriers that 
are more easily circumvented,52 and also are often protected through extra-territorial instruments 
such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs). At the same time, since the vast majority of BITs 
only provide national treatment post-establishment (UNCTAD 1999), regulating entry remains at 
the purview of the state. 
 Pandya’s Entry Restrictions measures the percentage of all non-extractive sector 
industries that limit foreign ownership to a minority share or ban foreign participation outright in 
a given country.53 Limiting foreign ownership to a minority position is important because doing 
so requires foreign firms to form partnerships with local firms in which the domestic participant 
holds all decision-making authority. Such restrictions are substantially burdensome to foreign 
entities, which relinquish managerial control and therefore must provide significant technology 
transfer for the privilege of local establishment. Based on this measure, I create three categories: 
Closed Equity, Intermediate Equity, and Open Equity. For a given year, a country is coded as 
Closed Equity if more than fifty percent of industries limit foreign ownership to a minority share 
or less. I code countries as Open Equity if no industries limit foreign ownership to a minority 
share. Intermediate Equity countries occupy the intermediate category. It is important to note that 
this coding scheme allows states coded as fully open to retain equity restrictions, so long as 
foreign investors are allowed a majority share of a joint venture.54 Figure 4.1 depicts the 
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52 For example, capital controls that may be designed to limit repatriation may be easily evaded 
through transfer pricing manipulation (Pandya 2014) 
 
53 Excluding equity limitations on extractive activities is appropriate since all most all countries 
have some amount of restriction on extraction, either through a royalty system or through 
requirements to establish joint ventures with state-owned enterprises.  
 
54 As with any discrete coding scheme, establishing cut-offs for policy environments involves 
making several choices. I also considered varying the cut-off between “intermediate” and 
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distribution of these categories in my sample by year. I report both the count of each country and 
the percentage of the sample in each category since the sample increases in size in later years. 
Descriptively, while the sample shows an increase in openness overtime, much of this change 
has been due to an expansion of the intermediate category. Table 4.2 is a transition matrix that 
shows the distribution of transitions to and from each policy category. 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of Equity Restriction Environment Type, 1970-2000 
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“open,” but ultimately decided the distinction between policy environments in which FDI is 
allowed majority ownership share across all industries versus policy environments in which 
some industries restrict FDI to less than a majority share is more meaningful than establishing a 
coding rule in which a policy environment could be coded as fully open so long as it met a 
minimum threshold of industry restrictions to minority share. This coding rule also ensures that a 
sufficient number of observations exist in each policy category and that the dataset has a 
sufficient number of transitions between each policy category to make statistical inference 
possible. However, there are many other justifiable ways to establish distinct policy groupings. 
An ideal solution would be to code countries as  “closed” if they limit FDI to minority shares, 
“intermediate” if they allow FDI to take majority shares but restrict full ownerships, and “open” 
if they allow foreign firms to establish wholly owned subsidiaries throughout all or most 
industries. Unfortunately, the underlying data necessary to create such a coding rule are not 
available at this time.  
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Table 4.1 Equity Policy Category Transitions – One Year Lag 
  Current Year 
Previous Year Closed Partial Openness Open 
Closed 334 43 16 
Partial Openness 43 972 49 
Open 14 52 718 
Total 391 1067 783 
 
Pandya’s Screening Requirements similarly measure the percentage of all non-extractive 
sector industries that require centralized government screening prior to foreign equity entry. This 
measure captures the extent to which governments retain informal restrictions on entry. 
Screening allows governments the authority to pick and choose among investment proposals they 
view as beneficial economically and politically while barring entry to projects that are unpopular 
among domestic constituents and, in particular, powerful local business interests. Governments 
may view equity restrictions and screening requirements as complementary or as substitutable; 
for instance, China notoriously has little explicit equity restrictions since 1987 but uses its 
intentionally vague screening requirements to allow maximum flexibility of the government in 
approving and rejecting investment projects (EIU 2010, 22; U.S. Bureau of Economic and 
Business Affairs 2013, 1). In Pandya’s dataset, Entry Restrictions and Screen Requirements 
exhibit little correlation with a coefficient of 0.13. To create three distinct categories of screening 
environment, I employ an identical coding rule as explained above to generate Full Screen, 
Intermediate Screen, and No Screen. It may also be possible that an intermediate category is less 
useful conceptually for screening than in is for equity restrictions. As I will show below, my 
estimation strategy directly tests whether these categories should be collapsed. 
Figure 4.2 depicts the distribution of these categories in my sample by year. I report both 
the count of each country and the percentage of the sample in each category since the sample 
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increases in size in later years. Descriptively, while the sample shows an increase in openness 
overtime, the most striking temporal trend is the emergence of an intermediate category. Because 
the sample is unbalanced, it is unclear the extent to which this trend is due to sample size 
increase. However, sample size stabilizes substantially in the mid to late 1980s and shows a 
marked increase in countries falling into the intermediate category in the mid 1990s, which 
corresponds with a string of emerging market financial crises, particularly in Asia. The timing of 
the expanded intermediate category also is associated with increased FDI sourced from 
developing countries. Table 4.3 provides the instance of switching between the three policy 
categories. 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of Screening Requirement Environment Type, 1970-2000 
 
Table 4.2 Screening Policy Category Transitions - One Year Lag 
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Method 
 By measuring FDI restrictions as three distinct categories, I can design an empirical 
strategy to infer how changes in multiple explanatory variables affect the propensity of countries 
to switch among categories. In doing so, I can more fully explore the extent to which FDI 
policies may be subject to a partial reform equilibrium in which government loosen restrictions 
but do not relinquish substantial control over access. This possibility could be an important 
correction to popular conceptions that governments have liberalized FDI full stop and that the 
majority of contemporary policy innovations regarding foreign investment are aimed at creating 
more competitive tax environments for potential investors.  Moreover, looking at policy 
switching allows me to consider how access to alternative sources of investment finance may 
limit the extent to which governments will fully liberalize FDI restrictions.   
Rather than employ a standard ordinal logit, I use a Markov model specification. The 
main innovation of these class of models is they allow the probability of a ! b differ from the 
probability of b ! a. The three-state model I employ estimates distinct transitions probabilities 
for closed to intermediate, intermediate to open, closed to open, and the reverse of each of these 
transitions. Markov transition models have been used extensively in health science, but are not 
widely used in political science contexts. One notable exception is within the literature on 
democratic transitions. I follow Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O’Halloran (2006) to 
adapt a Markov model to a three-category outcome variable.  
The essence of a Markov model is the conditions present in period t affect the 
probabilities of each possible type of transition in the subsequent time period. In this way, 
Markov models are at once analytically focused on change, while also flexible to the possibility 
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that variables of interest matter differently depending on what the starting state is. The general 
form of a Markov equation is: 
F [Pr(Yit = b |  Yit – 1 = a)] = θab + Xit βa, 
where a and b are possible states (in this case FDI policy types) and F (•) is a function on 
support [0,1], such as logit or probit link functions. Rather than estimating separate equations for 
each category, I can modify the equation above to accommodate a dependent variable with C 
ordered categories in which C=3 and are labeled 0, 1, . . . , C -1 and then use cumulative 
transition probabilities to interpret model output. The equations can be expressed in terms of Y* 
variables, where Y*a = 1 if Y ≤ a. Concretely, Yit = 0 indicates country i has a closed FDI 
environment at time t; Yit = 1 indicates an intermediate policy environment, and Yit = 2 indicates 
full FDI liberalism. This expression allows us to recover individual transition probabilities from 
the estimated cumulative probabilities by estimating the following equation: 
F [Pr (Yit = b |  Yit – 1 ≤ a)] = θab + Xit βa, 
where b = 0, 1, 2 and a = 0, 1. By substituting values of Y* for values of Y at t – 1 and interacting 
each of the independent variables with lagged values of Y*, this yields !![Pr !!" = !! !!"!!∗ ≤ !!!"!!∗ )] != !! + ! !!!! ∝!! !!"!!"∗ + !!!"(! + ! !!!! !!!!"!!"∗ ), 
for b = 0, 1, 2.  
The first two expressions on the right-hand side (!! and ∝!") represent, respectively, the 
coefficient estimates for the effect of each potential previous state on the probability of switching 
to or remaining in the current state (!! = !!!!!; !∝!" = !!" − !! !!! !). Thus, a statistically 
significant ∝ indicates categories are distinct. Likewise, ! = !!!!! and !! = !!! − !!!!!, so a 
statistically significant value of ! indicates the related explanatory variable’s effect on FDI 
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policy depends on the starting state and an insignificant value of ! suggests an explanatory 
variable’s affect on FDI policy is not conditioned on starting state. Thus, the model tests whether 
the categories of the dependent variable really are distinct, and it allows explanatory variables 
flexibility in that simultaneously some can be conditionally dependent on starting state and 
others can uniformly affect outcomes. 
One draw back of this model is that explanatory variables quickly consume degrees of 
freedom since the specification requires each variable on the right hand side to be interacted with 
indicators for Closed and Intermediate policies. Due to the profusion of interaction terms, I am 
limited in the number of right hand side variables I can include simultaneously. Accordingly, I 
run and report multiple models to fully explore the affect of a number of explanatory variables 
and controls. Table 4.1 reports descriptive data. 
Main Explanatory Variables ! Recall from the above the primary argument is that FDI policy reform is more likely 
when domestic business elites face increasing financing constraints. Therefore, easy access to 
credit and inward investment flows should be negatively associated with liberalization. I 
operationalize this argument as follows. 
First, banking sector policies are fundamental to domestic capital allocation decisions. 
Governments have historically used heavy state control and regulation to influence decisions 
about which industries and specific firms obtain debt financing. Whether through direct 
management control over state-owned banks or using directed credit requirements, regulations in 
the banking sector have typically distorted credit markets to provide subsidized financing to 
politically important industry groups and firm. Therefore, hypothesis 1 anticipates banking sector 
reform will be positively associated with FDI liberalization because such reforms will limit 
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politically powerful firms’ access to subsidized financing options. I measure banking sector 
reform using a modified version of Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel’s (2008) Financial Reform 
Dataset.  This measure codes a panel of 91 countries from 1973-2005 on seven dimensions of 
reform: credit controls and excessive reserve requirements (defined as over 20 percent), interest 
rate controls, banking entry barriers, state ownership, capital account restrictions, prudential 
regulations, and securities market policy. To isolate Banking Sector Reform (0,15) from financial 
reforms that overlap with short and long term capital account liberalization, I eliminate banking 
entry barriers and capital account restrictions from the modified index. Higher values indicate 
reform while low values signify countries with highly repressed banking systems. It is also 
important to note the prudential regulation dimension is coded such that more substantial and 
effective risk-based regulations are coded as positive; while many regulations on banking 
activities serve to influence specific lending decisions and are therefore distorting, prudential 
regulations shift credit allocation decisions from those based on political and relational 
considerations to those based on market risk-based assessments of creditworthiness. 
Access to alternative financing also depends on the supply of international capital. The 
global financial cycle, which closely follows U.S. monetary policy, drives global liquidity (Rey 
2013).  To test hypothesis 2, which expects tight global lending conditions will lead to 
movements toward FDI liberalization, I measure global availability of credit with US Fed Funds. 
Since higher interest rates restrict credit, I expect US Fed Funds to be positively associated with 
FDI liberalization. Another way to measure global availability of investment funds is through 
patterns of balance of payments. Global imbalances matter for the supply of global investment 
because trade deficits require net capital inflows. When a few large countries55 have persistently 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!55!For the time period in this analysis, the U.S.!!
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large current account deficits, this requires these same countries to absorb the majority of net 
investment flows, which reduces the ability of international capital flows to other economies, at 
least on a net basis. I measure the structure of global balance of payment inequality through 
Current Account Gini, which uses a gini index to measure the degree to which current account 
deficits are concentrated in a few economies.56 I expect high current account inequality will 
increase pressures for FDI reform by reducing the pool of investment flows available to countries 
without these large current account deficits.57 Inward investment flows should also mute pressure 
to liberalize by lessening the financing constraint. Therefore, I expect Portfolio Inflows and FDI 
Inflows in the previous period to both be negatively associated with switching to a fully open 
regulatory environment (hypotheses 3 and 4). 
 Government policies that affect financing availability should also be related to the 
propensity to liberalize FDI policy. Short-term capital account openness allows domestic firms to 
access foreign sources of investment either through debt or short-term equity instruments. 
Therefore, contrary to conventional arguments that short and long-term capital account 
liberalization are complementary, my theory expects that short-term capital account openness 
will reduce the propensity to fully liberalize FDI policy (hypothesis 5). In particular, I expect 
short-term capital account openness to reduce transitions from intermediate to fully liberal FDI 
policy environments since portfolio inflows allow domestic firms to access foreign sources of 
capital investment without requiring them to cede control over their own firms or forcing 
domestic capital to compete in labor and product markets with comparatively more productive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 This measure is from Oatley (2014). 
 
57 By “large,” I mean relative to global imbalances. Small countries can have current account 
deficits that are large relative to their own economies, but insignificant to global patterns of trade 
and investment flows because their economies are dwarfed by the activities in the largest 
countries.  
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multinationals. I measure short-term capital account openness (SKA Open) by modifying Brune 
and Guisinger’s (forthcoming) index that sums policy openness across twelve dimensions of 
current and capital account transactions as reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). To ensure this measure does not conflate 
openness to portfolio and direct investment, I subtract out measures of controls on inward and 
outward FDI. To isolate capital account openness from banking sector reform, I also extract the 
subcomponent of the index that measures credit controls.  
 Table 4.3 summarizes my expectations: 
Table 4.3 Expected Relationships 
Hypothesis Variable Closed -> Partial Partial -> Open Open -> Open 
1 Banking Reform + + + 
2 US Fed Funds + + + 
2 Current Account Gini + + + 
3 Portfolio Inflows + - ~ 
4 FDI Inflows + - ~ 
5 SKA Open + - ~ 
 
Alternative Explanations and Controls  
In addition to my main explanatory variables described above, I also control for a variety 
of factors that have either been well established to affect FDI policymaking or are frequently 
forwarded as alternative explanations. First, I control for Democracy using the widely used 
Polity scale;58 this is the same measure Pandya (2014) uses to argue democratization brings FDI 
liberalization. I also control for IMF Coercion by included a dummy variable for IMF program 
participation.59 In some models I include indicators for Banking crises.60 A growing literature on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Source: Marshall et al. (2012) 
 
59 Source: World Development Indicators 
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policy diffusion suggests governments are more likely to pursue liberalization in a variety of 
policy areas when their peers do as well. Accordingly, I include measures for the average level of 
FDI policy for each countries’ Regional and Income peers.61 
Several economic factors may also matter for FDI policy. We know that countries with 
large internal markets and higher levels of development are less likely to pursue liberalization. 
Accordingly, I control for Level of Development as proxied by GDP per capita62. Other possible 
national account measures may be related to FDI policy changes such as GDP and GDP Growth, 
however, GDP and GDP per capita are highly correlated (.83) and therefore inclusion of both 
measures would be distorting. Additionally, the temporal dimension of my modeling technique 
makes inclusion of growth redundant since this information is already included in the analysis 
through lagged variables. Countries which have substantial natural resource wealth may have 
reduced external financing needs and therefore be less likely to pursue an open FDI policy 
environment. Because broad measures of natural resource wealth typically display substantial 
missingness, I ran several models using an indicator of OPEC membership. However, it is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Abiad and Mody (2005) argue capital flows liberalization is strongly predicated on financial 
crisis. They find evidence that currency and debt crises spur liberalization while banking crises 
are associated with periods of retrenchment. I run a series of diagnostic tests that indicate only 
banking crisis and not debt or currency crisis is statistically associated with FDI policy 
environment transitions, and therefore omit indicators for debt and currency crises. These finding 
are different from the relationship I uncover in the previous chapter, and therefore suggest other 
types of financial crisis may have a long-term relationship with FDI policy, but do not seem to 
drive transitions in the short-term. 
 
61 Regional and income groups come from U.N. !
62 To provide as much coverage as possible, I use GDP in current local currency and then control 
for inflation with the GDP deflator. I then divide by population and take a log transformation to 
correct for skew. While this method does not correct for exchange rate changes, it provides 
substantially more observations than does GDP in constant US dollars. Source: World 
Development Indicators 
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important to note that resource extraction is often capital and technologically intensive. Resource 
wealth may increase openness in service sectors related to extraction. Especially since my 
measure of FDI openness does not include data on the extractive sector, the link between 
resources and FDI policy may be rather tenuous. Due to the fact that the OPEC measure is 
largely subsumed by the regional diffusion measure, I omit the OPEC measure from models 
reported here. Inclusion does not fundamentally change the substantive interpretation of the main 
variables of interest, but does create some separation problems in the data that inflate coefficient 
estimates.  
Ideally, I would also like to control for two other economic variables that may impact 
FDI policy: trade flows and human capital. Unfortunately, broadly used measures of these 
concepts display a great deal of missingness through the earlier part of my time series, especially 
for poorer countries.63 Therefore, I cannot include these data in this analysis. Table 4.4 provides 
descriptive information about my variables.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Constraining the sample to countries with observations of exports as a percent of GDP and 
tertiary enrollment as reported in the World Development Indicators constrain my sample to 
roughly 300 observations.  
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Results 
As mentioned above, the profusion of interaction terms in Markov analyses limit the 
number of variables I can estimate simultaneously. Therefore, I estimate and interpret multiple 
models, paying attention not just to marginal effects but also overall model fit. In all models I lag 
all explanatory variables by one year to introduce temporal dynamics. Following Epstein et al. 
(2006), I begin by interacting all lagged explanatory variables with lagged indicators for Closed 
FDI Policy and Intermediate FDI Policy, which allow the substantive effect of each variable to 
be conditioned on starting state. For example, if the interaction between Banking Reform and 
Closed FDI Policy is statistically significant, banking reform has a statistically distinct effect on 
the level of FDI openness if a state had a closed FDI policy environment in the previous period 
than if the state had a dualist or liberal policy environment. If Banking Reform * Intermediate is 
statistically significant, Banking Reform has a different effect when FDI policy was fully liberal 
at t-1 then when FDI policy was either closed or intermediate. Accordingly, if both Banking 
Reform * Closed and Banking Reform * Intermediate are significant, banking reform has a 
different effect for all starting points of FDI policy. From the fully saturated models, I eliminate 
statistically insignificant interactions and report the results of each constrained model.  
Table 4.5 reports the results of models in which FDI policy states are measured through 
Equity Restrictions and Table 4.6 reports the results of models in which FDI policy states are 
measured with Screening Requirements. To more easily interpret estimated effects, Tables 4.7 
and 4.8 provide the estimated effects and statistical significance of relevant variables for each 
model. For each interacted term that reached statistical significance, I summed the interaction’s 
coefficient estimate with the coefficient estimate for the un-interacted variable. Statistically 
significant terms for both the Y0 and Y1 interactions mean that the effect of a given variable is 
!91 
statistically different for each starting state. A non-significant term for an interaction signifies the 
effect of a given variable at that starting state is the same as the effect in the intermediate starting 
state. 
The results of these models indicate mixed support for my hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 
predicts banking reforms fundamentally alter the process through which domestic credit is 
allocated and therefore will result in FDI liberalization because elites will view foreign firm 
entry as necessary to increase access to operations and investment financing. I find qualified 
support for this central argument. With respect to Equity Restrictions, Banking Reform is 
positively associated with liberal FDI policy when starting from a closed or open investment 
policy environment. However, there is no effect on FDI policy when starting from an 
intermediate environment. With respect to Screening Requirements, governments with 
intermediate policies are less likely to liberalize in the wake of banking reform. These findings 
are contrary to the robust findings in the previous chapter that banking reform has a long-term 
positive effect on FDI policy liberalization. One potential reason for this discrepancy is that the 
Markov model, by focusing on the propensity to switch over a short time period, is unable to 
capture the effect of processes that have long temporal lags.  
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able 4.6 R
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The global financial environment does seem to matter for FDI policy reform.  High 
interest rates in the U.S., which indicate global financing constraints, are not statistically 
associated with Equity Restrictions. However, they are associated with decreased chance of 
liberalizing screening requirements when starting from closed policy environments. High U.S. 
interest rates are also associated with an increased chance of policy backsliding with respect to 
investment screening, while intermediate policy environments are more likely to liberalize their 
screening policies when U.S. interest rates are high. Global imbalances are also statistically 
significantly associated with patterns of policy reform. Governments are more likely to liberalize 
from a closed policy environment when the global balance of payments is characterized by large, 
concentrated current account deficits. Conversely, large global imbalances are negatively 
associated with liberalization from an intermediate starting state and are associated with policy 
backsliding from an open policy environment. This pattern holds for both equity restrictions and 
screening requirements. 
As a whole, these findings provide some support for hypothesis 2, which predicts periods 
of global financing constraints are associated with liberalization. Importantly, however, there are 
differences in propensity to liberalize (or remain liberal), which vary by starting policy state. 
Global financing constraints display consistent association with liberalization from closed policy 
environments. However, when the previous period was characterized by an intermediate policy, 
global financing constraints seem to be negatively associated with liberalization. Given that 
intermediate policy frameworks give governments the ability to pursue export-oriented industrial 
strategies, one interpretation of this finding is that when global imbalances are high, countries 
with intermediate FDI policies are likely experiencing economic buoyancy and therefore have 
less of a financing constraint. 
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Table 4.7 Summary of Equity Restrictions Results 
 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 predict a history of attracting capital inflows will reduce pressures to 
liberalize FDI policy. In general, the models reported show previous portfolio and FDI flows are 
not associated with changes in FDI policy environment. The one exception is that portfolio flows 
are positively associated with liberalization of equity restrictions in countries starting from a 
closed policy environment. The overall lack of statistically significant findings, either positive or 
negative, is rather surprising given the often assumed role of global markets in pressuring 
governments to enact neoliberal policy reforms.  
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Bank Reform Fed Funds CA Gini Port Flows FDI Inflows KO Open Combined
C 0.093* 1.005***
I -0.027
O 0.111***
C
I
O
C 1.836*** 8.899**
I
O
C 0.446*** 0.945*
I
O
C
I
O
C 0.043** -0.995**
I -0.178***
O 0.083***
C
I
O
C 0.046*** 0.068*** 0.086*** 0.059***
I -0.035* -0.071*** -0.040 -0.049**
O 0.029*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.061***
C 0.517* 0.0654** 1.069** 9.053***
I
O
C -0.89*** -2.149*** -0.939** -0.825*** -16.107**
I
O
Bank Reform -0.021
0.278
0.010
0.629*
-1.326***-1.283***
0.003 -0.023
-1.123*
0.016
-1.011**
-0.029
1.116***
0.013
0.013
-1.010** -0.254
-0.086** -0.015
0.010
-1.016**
Note: Coefficient estimates computed from relevant direct and interactive effects. C=Closed; D=Intermediate; O=Open.             
* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; two-tailed tests
Fed Funds
Global Imbalances
Porfolio Inflows
FDI Inflows
Portfolio Flow Openness
Development
Democracy
Bank Crisis
Regional Diffusion 1.009*** 1.013** -1.790**
-0.015
0.004
1.423*
-0.202
-1.278
0.161
0.051
-0.489
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Table 4.8 Summary of Screening Requirements Results 
 
Hypothesis 5 predicts short-term capital account openness will reduce pressures for 
liberalization. Model results support this hypothesis. For both Equity Restriction and Screening 
Requirements, short-term capital account openness is positively associated with liberalization at 
closed and liberal starting states. However, when governments had intermediate FDI policies in 
the previous period, short-term capital account openness decreased the probability of 
liberalizing. These findings, consistent across measures of FDI policy openness, support the 
contention that access to alternate investment sources reduces politically influential business 
elites’ willingness to liberalize foreign firm access to local labor and product markets. 
To attempt to consider the relative importance of the many variables of interest I include 
throughout the Markov Models, I also report models that combine all main explanatory 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
Bank Reform Fed Funds CA Gini Port Flows FDI Inflows KO Open Combined
C 0.098** 0.056***
I -0.087** -0.128**
O 0.011* 0.029***
C -0.032**
I 0.162**
O -0.031**
C 0.296*** 0.256*
I -2.712*** -2.356**
O -0.010** 0.106*
C
I
O
C
I
O
C 0.059**
I -0.130**
O 0.059**
C 0.257*** 0.128*** 0.157*** 0.263*** 0.144*** 0.139***
I -0.030 -0.166** -0.247*** -0.150* -0.177** -0.251***
O 0.182** 0.004** 0.018*** 0.078** 0.010** 0.013***
C 0.021*** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.015***
I -0.094*** -0.140*** -0.106*** -0.090***
O 0.016*** .008*** -0.003*** 0.012***
C -1.316** -1.380*
I
O
C 4.607*** 3.868*** 3.458*** 3.488*** 4.108*** 3.253*** 4.566***
I
O
Bank Reform
-0.041
-0.041**
Fed Funds
Global Imbalances
Porfolio Inflows
Democracy -0.030 -0.016
Regional Diffusion 0.112
0.072
0.323 -0.316 -0.051
FDI Inflows 0.018
Portfolio Flow Openness -0.015
Development
-0.126
Note: Coefficient estimates computed from relevant direct and interactive effects. C=Closed; I=Intermediate; O=Open.             
* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; two-tailed tests
-1.082 -0.375
Economic Peer Diffusion -0.334 0.032 -0.312 -0.494 -0.311
0.391
-0.376
!101 
variables. The results of these models emphasize the continued significance of banking sector 
reform, which remains most robust to the inclusion of other measures of the global and local 
financing environment. 
Some evaluation of estimated effects of alternative explanations for reform are also 
warranted. IMF programs never reach statistically significance in any model, providing robust 
support for the premise that the IMF is not an agent of change with respect to FDI policy. 
Regime type reaches significance in most models that do not include a measure for banking 
sector reform. The pattern of significance is mostly consistent, with democracy positively 
associated with liberal FDI policy when starting from closed and open environments and 
negatively associated with liberal FDI policy when starting from an intermediate state. However, 
the significance of democracy is not robust to banking sector reform. Especially given the 
consistent importance of a variety of measures of global and domestic financing constraints, it 
may be appropriate to interpret the relationship between democracy and FDI as either correlation 
without causation or as an indication that causal process that links democracy with FDI policy is 
more related to increased ability of capitalists to pressure governments rather than increased 
accountability to labor groups. 
A substantial and growing literature points to the role of spatial and/or peer-group 
diffusion in explaining the patterns and timing of economic and political liberalization (Simmons 
et al. 2008). Recent analysis of FDI liberalization has also pointed to the role of regional and 
economic peers’ regulatory environments in propelling policy change (Vadlamannati and Cooray 
2012). Accordingly, I control for diffusion effects in all models. Across almost all models of 
Equity Restrictions, regional diffusion obtains statistical significance. Having liberal regional 
peers increases the likelihood of having an open FDI policy environment for countries starting 
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from a state of policy intermediacy or openness. However, countries that have closed policies 
toward FDI are less likely to liberalize in response to regional liberalization. Liberalizing equity 
restrictions is not related to policy innovations of income peers, however screening requirement 
elimination is. Unlike with regional peers, countries that were previously closed are more likely 
to liberalize in response to reform by economic peers. Economic peer policies show no evidence 
of diffusing when a country’s starting state is either intermediate or open. 
Overall, the results of these models provide evidence that mostly supports the main thrust 
of my theory – FDI policy reform occurs when elites’ access to alternative financing sources is 
constrained. Additionally, these results show that intermediate policy environments are quite 
difficult to disrupt. Intermediate policies characterized by regulation, once in force, tend to 
persist. Especially given my findings in Chapter 3, I expected to find more robust evidence that 
Banking Sector reform pushes countries beyond a partial FDI reform equilibrium that access to 
substantial and subsidized credit supports. At best, the results from Markov analysis display 
mixed support for this premise. However, the results do provide stronger evidence that high 
values of variables designed to measure access to alternative sources of finance create barriers to 
full FDI liberalization. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I explored the drivers of substantively meaningful shifts in policies 
toward FDI. While chapter three conceptualized the FDI policy environment as a continuous 
measure, here I consider the possibility that FDI policy might display important threshold 
effects. Rather than focusing on incremental changes in regulation of foreign firms, I consider 
the conditions under which governments may pursue large changes in the policy environment 
foreign firms face. To do so, I make use of Markov transition modeling techniques to more fully 
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explore the conditions make it more likely that governments will transition between three states 
of FDI policy: closure, intermediacy, and liberalism. This technique emphasizes the possibility 
that the regulatory environment toward FDI may be subject to an equilibrium of partial reform. 
Indeed, descriptively, the majority of observations in my dataset fall into an intermediate 
category in which governments use regulatory power actively pursue “beneficial” FDI while 
restricting entry into protected sectors and using screening processes to prevent politically 
unpopular foreign investment projects. I find substantial support for the premise that openness to 
FDI depends on the ability of local firms to obtain financing from alternate sources. Global 
financing constraints, short-term capital account openness, and banking sector reforms that 
reduce access to state-subsidized loans all affect the propensity to liberalize. At the same time, 
the effect of these factors is often conditional on starting state. In particular, gaining alternative 
means of accessing international finance is associated with a reduced chance of fully liberalizing 
the FDI policy environment. A similar pattern of regulatory retrenchment emerges as well for the 
level of development and democracy of a host state. These findings are robust to multiple 
controls including accounting for regional and income peer policies, IMF lending, banking 
crises, and natural resource wealth. Despite these results, I find only modest support for the 
proposition that banking sector reforms can puncture partial reform equilibrium. Taken in 
conjunction with the result of chapter three, this may be indicative of a relationship between 
banking sector reforms and FDI liberalization that takes a relatively large time to play out. 
More broadly, this chapter provides evidence that policies toward FDI often are only 
partially liberal, at least over the period covered in this dataset. This is an important corrective to 
a broad proposition that unfettered FDI is nearly universally embraced in a financial integrated 
world. Governments may be willing to open their economies to certain types of foreign investors, 
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but they generally do so while retaining some capacity to prevent less desirable investment. 
Moreover, the states that are most able to maintain policies of partial openness and regulation are 
those that have been broadly able to attract foreign capital; in other words, there may be limits to 
the extent that increased financial flows pressure governments to liberalize policies. This finding 
opens the door to many more questions regarding variation in the regulatory restrictions over 
FDI that persist. More precise data on FDI policy could allow researchers to explore the 
correlates of policy switching at the industrial-level. Additionally, similar methods could be used 
to explore how different types of FDI policy reforms related to each other – do policy 
innovations that are FDI promoting reinforce each other, or do some policy reforms reduce the 
propensity to liberalize other aspects of FDI policy.
! !
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CHAPTER 5: PARTIAL FDI POLICY OPENNESS - MALAYSIA & INDONESIA 1965-
1997 
 
“FOREIGN INVESTMENT SHOULD BE A SUPPLEMENT TO 
LOCAL INVESTMENT. THE INVESTMENT POLICY OF 
INDONESIA IS TO DECREASE THE NUMBER OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENTS [MADE ANNUALLY] IN 
INDONESIA.” 
 
Mohammad Zuhdi, chairman of the East  
Java Investment Coordinating Board (Indonesia) 
July 13, 1981 
 
“[WE IMPOSE CONDITIONS] WHEN YOU ARE COMPETING 
WITH LOCAL PRODUCERS OR LOCAL PRODUCTS. WE 
WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT WHILE WELCOMING 
FOREIGN INVESTORS, WE SET A TARGET ON WHERE 
EXACTLY THEY CAN COME IN.” 
 
Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz, Minister of  
International Trade and Industry (Malaysia) 
March 11, 1997 !
Introduction ! In chapters 3 and 4, I use large N statistical analyses to provide macro-level evidence that 
is broadly consistent with the proposition that FDI policy liberalization occurs when access to 
alternative financing is constrained. In particular, I identify banking sector reforms as a key 
mechanism that alters elite preferences toward FDI.!
In this and the following chapter, I trace the process of financial crisis and the 
relationship between banking reforms and foreign direct investment liberalization in Indonesia 
and Malaysia from 1965 to today in order to look more closely at stated policy preferences of 
elite groups in different domestic credit environments. I demonstrate how different banking 
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sector policy developments through three distinct periods of these countries’ economic histories 
affected elite strategies, and accordingly policy outcomes, over restrictiveness toward FDI. This 
chapter traces the development of banking and investment policy from 1965-1997 while the 
following focuses on policy reform in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Documentation of stated policy preferences of elite groups is more robust post 1997, and 
therefore my ability to specifically point to public statements and lobbying activities of relevant 
interest groups is greater in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, this chapter helps provide important context 
for the substantial divergence in investment policy in Malaysia and Indonesia following the 1997 
crisis.  
Over the time period I cover, Malaysia has more consistently pursued banking sector 
deepening that has supported gradual liberalization of FDI policies with limited backsliding. In 
contrast, Indonesian governments have more often pursued policies designed to maintain 
substantial control over domestic credit allocation decisions, and therefore has less elite support 
for loosening restrictions on FDI. However, while the level of FDI openness in Indonesia has 
consistently shown protectionist bias, a period of rapid banking sector deregulation in the 1980s 
did lead to a period of limited liberalization. These policy developments, along with 
documentation of elite policy preferences toward FDI policy at the time, provide further 
evidence that banking sector reform affects FDI policy changes. Subsequent state consolidation 
of the banking sector in Indonesia has led to reform stagnation and reversal, illustrating FDI 
policy can be subject to a partial reform equilibrium as well as increased protectionism even in a 
global environment of overwhelming economic integration.  
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I return briefly to my central 
theory to generate predictions about elite policy preferences and policy outcomes. Next, I discuss 
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the justification for my selection of cases. I then briefly outline the trajectory over banking and 
investment policy in both countries from 1965-2013. The bulk of the chapter traces the 
development of these policies in two time periods: 1965 to 1985 and 1985 to 1997. The chapter 
ends with a summary of the development of banking and investment policies in both countries 
through 1997. To be clear, this chapter and the chapter that follows are not meant to be definitive 
tests of my theory, which is fundamentally based on a probabilistic conception of causality. 
Instead, these chapters provide an opportunity to look more closely at the evolution of banking 
and investment policies and to probe my argument that the causal link between banking sector 
reforms and FDI liberalization is both shifting elite policy preferences and the diminished 
political power of domestic banking interests. 
Theory and Expectations ! FDI policy is more likely to be liberalized when the cost of and access to alternative 
investment sources sufficiently constrain domestic firms’ access to needed capital through debt 
financing. I argue banking sector reforms constitute a major structural shift in the way credit is 
allocated domestically, and that such reforms simultaneously encourage industrial capital to 
prefer more liberal policies toward inward FDI and diminish the political power of financial 
capital that prefers to maintain its privileged position of mediating between international and 
domestic capital markets. The general trend toward increased openness to FDI, I argue, is due to 
reforms in the banking sector that have eliminated credit and interest rate controls, reduced state 
ownership of the financial sector, and increased prudential regulations and supervision of banks 
such that credit allocation decisions must be made with respect to risk assessments rather than 
political and personal connections. These reforms in the banking sector, largely enacted in the 
wake of financial crises (Abiad and Mody 2005), have made it more difficult for politically 
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important firms to obtain subsidized credit, have imposed important development financing 
constraints on governments, and have diminished strong ties between a concentrated and often 
state-owned financial sector and politico-bureaucrats.  
 The large N analyses in previous chapters have established a relationship between 
banking sector reform and FDI liberalization that is consistent with my theory. These analyses, 
however, cannot speak to a causal mechanism. By tracing the development of policies toward 
banking and FDI in Indonesia and Malaysia, I seek to uncover elite strategies and lobbying 
activities related to investment policy as banking sector regulations change. In particular, if my 
theory is correct, we may expect to find the following. First, we should expect that countries with 
more liberal banking sectors, meaning banking sectors that operate through market mechanisms 
rather than government guidance, will also be more open to FDI. We should also find that 
periods of banking sector reforms within a country lead to increased regulatory openness to FDI. 
When looking at stated preferences and lobbying activities of domestic business groups, we 
should observe business groups in more repressed financial environments supporting 
protectionist policies toward foreign firms and see business groups operating in reformed 
financial systems embracing policies of FDI openness.  
 It may be helpful here to clarify a few points about what makes banking sector reforms 
distinct from FDI reforms. Financial repression involves limiting foreign entry into the domestic 
banking sector in order to protect local private and, quite often, state-owned banks. Therefore, a 
component of banking sector reforms entails lifting restrictions on foreign equity in domestic 
financial institutions. Why, then, is it appropriate to conceptualize banking sector reforms as 
distinct from broader FDI reforms? Why should we not consider differences between regulations 
regarding financial services versus other sectors as primarily a function of sectoral characteristic 
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that render some industries better able to successfully lobby for protection? First, the laws and 
agencies that administer financial sector regulations including foreign equity restrictions are 
separate from investment policies regarding other sectors of the economy. In both countries, 
regulatory authority over the financial system rests with the central bank and the finance 
ministry. Investment policy screening authorities have never had jurisdiction over foreign equity 
in financial institutions. Second, banking sector reforms have broader implications for how 
capital is allocated across all industries in a domestic economy. Financial sector development is 
considered key for both attracting FDI inflows (Campos and Kinoshita 2010) and for creating 
positive spillovers from foreign investment (Alfaro et al. 2004). These findings have generally 
been met with puzzlement since multinationals have deep pockets and access to home country 
financing and therefore should not be constrained by local credit. Since banking sector reforms 
can diminish cheap access to capital for politically connected firms, we should expect 
liberalizing changes to the banking sector to make it more difficult to develop without direct 
foreign investment.  
Case Selection 
Indonesia and Malaysia are ideal for compared comparison of my theory for several 
reasons. First, these countries have common political, macroeconomic, and policy characteristics 
that support a “most similar” case design. They are neighboring island nation-states with non-
contiguous territory. Both have a post-colonial history of hegemonic party autocracy with long-
tenured executives. Both have crafted development policies within the context of a dominant 
political cleavage between poorer indigenous groups and an ethnically Chinese capitalist class. 
Both also have substantial natural resource wealth in the form of crude oil and timber; such 
!110 
wealth has often been associated with more restrictive policies toward foreign investment.64 
These shared characteristics provide important controls for potentially relevant factors such as 
ethnically-patterned ownership of key sectors of the economy as well as the role of natural 
resources in cushioning external financing needs during commodity booms and balance of 
payment-induced foreign investment needs during periods of low global petroleum prices. Since 
Indonesia and Malaysia share these characteristics, the cause of any variations in FDI policy 
between them must not be driven by ethnic or natural resource factors. 
Figure 5.2 FDI Inflows and Stocks as Percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), 
1990-2012 
 
 
Source: UNTAD, 2013.  
 
Additionally, Indonesia and Malaysia’s economic, political, and geographic proximity 
allow me to control for a variety of shared external economic pressures. While Malaysia !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64!See, for example, Kobrin (1987) for an early discussion of how extractive industries face more 
intractable obsolescing bargaining dynamics vis-à-vis governments.!
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embarked on an export-oriented growth strategy earlier than did Indonesia, by the mid 1980s 
both countries had undergone partial FDI liberalization to selectively promote foreign investment 
in export-oriented activities. Figure 5.2 reports FDI inflows and stocks from the 1990 onward for 
both countries. Table 5.2 reports international investment inflows and economic growth in each 
country from 1980 to 2010. Indonesia’s negative flows in 1998-2002 indicate falling capital 
stock. 
It is important to recognize that many global factors have influenced the rise of 
development strategies that rely on integrated multinational production chains. Global 
macroeconomic conditions in the mid to late 1980s were particularly conducive to foreign 
financed export-oriented strategies in Southeast Asia. Japanese and Newly Industrializing 
Economies (NIEs) firms faced a complex of factors that encouraged offshoring. Appreciating 
home currencies, tariff barriers in the Organization for Economic Co-operation (OECD), and 
higher local wages made these firms relocate production. The 1985 Plaza accord in particular 
created a Japanese outward investment boon as the yen appreciated. Concurrently, NIEs 
graduated out of preferential market access to the OECD, which also incentivized assembly in 
countries that still qualified for tariff reductions.65 Due to export-platform production strategies, 
Malaysia and Indonesia were both attractive hosts because of their low wages and geographic 
proximity to the rest of the supply chain (ASEAN 1999).  
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude policies toward FDI in Malaysia and 
Indonesia dramatically liberalized over this time period. These countries selectively allowed 
specific multinationals entry into the domestic export manufacturing through joint ventures and 
with substantial performance requirements. At the same time, these countries’ banking sectors !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 These preferential systems included the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the 
Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA). 
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were dominated by state owned banks, excluded foreign banking firms, and were used by their 
respective governments to allocate credit preferentially to politically and developmentally 
important sectors and firms. These restrictions contributed to increased bank leverage and asset 
bubbles as loosening of short-term capital account restrictions allowed protected local banks to 
borrow internationally cheaply and lend domestically at large profits.  
In Chapter 6 we will see that, in both countries, political leaders made a conscious choice 
in the wake of financial crisis between protecting either the banking sector or the real sector from 
foreign ownership. Essentially, policymakers in a constrained financing environment faced a 
choice; would they encourage short-term inflows to allow banks to continue to finance domestic 
investment requirements, or would they protect local banks while loosening restrictions on 
foreign firms’ direct investments in the real sector?   This tradeoff is documented in first hand 
accounts of policymaking as well as reporting on interest group lobbying during and after the 
crisis. When governments chose to protect the banking sector, state technocrats as well as 
industry leaders pushed for increased liberalization of FDI in the real sector in order to spur 
domestic capital formation. When governments instead allowed foreign banks to inject capital 
into ailing banks, they had the financing capacity to retain state-owned banks. Credit allocation 
continued to be driven by political rather than market relationships, and this muted societal 
pressures for lifting restrictions on FDI into other sectors. 
Overview of Policy Periods 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of banking sector and FDI policy developments in 
Indonesia and Malaysia in three time periods: 1965-1985; 1985-1997; 1997-2013. In a post-
colonial context, Indonesia’s New Order regime fostered close ties between political and military 
bureaucrats and ethnic Chinese local capitalists. An open capital account combined with a state-
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dominated banking system allowed the regime to largely self-finance development without 
relying on FDI. In contrast, a set of political conditions that encouraged Malaysia’s dominant 
political party to pursue an expansive economic affirmative action problem required the 
government to pursue FDI as a means of limiting the economic power of ethnic Chinese 
Malaysians.  
Table 5.1 Indonesia and Malaysia Banking and FDI Policy Environments 1965-2013 
!! 1965-1985 1985-1997 1997-2013 
Indonesia ! Military - ethnic 
Chinese alignment 
! Banking deregulation ! State bank 
consolidation 
  
! Growth of state-
owned banks 
! Growth of banking 
conglomerates 
! IMF-imposed FDI 
liberalization 
  
! Highly restrictive FDI 
policy 
! Partial FDI 
liberalization 
! Subsequent FDI 
policy backtracking 
Malaysia ! Bumiputera-driven 
NEP 
! Prudential regulation ! Bank privatization 
and restructuring 
  
! Growth of state-
owned banks 
! Privatization-led 
Stock market boom 
! Prudential 
regulation 
!!
! Partial FDI 
liberalization 
! Little FDI policy 
change 
! Successive FDI 
liberalization 
 
Negative economic shocks in the 1980s led Malaysia to make relatively minor changes to 
banking regulation while also developing a relatively large domestic stock market to facilitate 
privatization of state-owned industry. As a result, Malaysia’s FDI policies during the 1980s are 
best described as maintaining a partial openness strategy of courting high-value manufacturing 
FDI while greatly restricting all other forms of direct investment by foreign entities. Indonesia’s 
response to its much more serious economic shocks in the 1980s was to pursue banking sector 
deregulation, which led to a massive increase in domestically-owned private banks and a 
decrease in the state’s control over credit allocation. As a result, the 1980s and early 1990s were 
characterized by elite-driven selective FDI liberalization, resulting in a more open but 
fundamentally dualist investment policy position by 1997. In other words, by 1997, Indonesia 
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and Malaysia had similar levels of FDI restrictions, but Indonesia’s path to limited FDI openness 
took longer than did Malaysia’s and was largely driven by shifting elite preferences over FDI in 
the wake of a major deregulation of the Indonesian banking sector. Figure 5.1 illustrates this 
convergence in FDI policies through the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Figure 5.1 Indonesia and Malaysia FDI Restrictiveness 1985-1997 
 
Source: OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index; OECD 2013, pg. 56 
 
Divergent crisis response strategies to the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to substantial 
liberalization of credit allocation in Malaysia while Indonesia’s foreign bank-led financial sector 
restructuring did little to force fundamental changes in the way banks make debt financing 
decisions and insulated the state from needing to privatize its extensive state-owned banking 
system. In fact, state-owned banks in Indonesia were able to consolidate in the aftermath of the 
crisis and subsequently increase their market dominance in domestic credit markets. As a result, 
Indonesian business interests have successfully blocked attempts to implement further large-
scale liberalization of FDI beyond the initial IMF-imposed policy changes in 1998-9. In contrast, 
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the Malaysian business community has largely supported, and in many cases driven, more 
fundamental liberalization of FDI policy. These findings point to micro-level evidence to support 
the central hypothesis of this dissertation that financial sector liberalization shifts preferences of 
politically important business interests toward favoring opening to FDI while limiting the 
influence of groups that are less likely to support openness. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will trace the co-evolution of banking and FDI policy 
from the 1960s to 1997. Studying this time period allows me to provide the context of the initial 
political and economic conditions that led Malaysia to embrace a limited role for FDI earlier than 
did Indonesia. It also allows me to use variations across time in banking sector developments in 
each country to assess the effects of banking policy on the timing of FDI policy change. The 
developments over this time period provide important context to the policy responses to the 1997 
crisis, which are analyzed in Chapter 6, while also highlighting important within-country 
variation over the direction and pace of banking sector and FDI policy reforms.   
Throughout this analysis, I focus primarily on the ways in which banking sector policy 
choices affected subsequent reforms of FDI policy. I draw upon a variety of sources including 
central bank reports, first-person accounts of crisis response, newspaper coverage of the politics 
of reform, reports from key lobbying groups and international economic institutions, as well as 
other studies of both banking sector and FDI policy reform. While the link between banking and 
FDI policy has rarely been directly assessed in previous research on these subjects, close analysis 
of the process of these reform policies reveals just how interrelated these two issue domains are 
to interest groups and policymakers. 
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Post-Colonial Adjustment and the Oil Boom: Banking and FDI policies 1965-1985 ! In this section, I trace the development of Malaysia and Indonesia’s banking and FDI 
policies in an era marked by high global liquidity, economic growth, and commodity prices. 
During this time, the fundamental aspects of both countries’ post-colonial political economy 
crystalized.  
Post Sukarno, Indonesia’s New Order regime guided the country through an investment 
policy designed to foster party loyalty while also placating ethnic Chinese businessmen who 
were an important lending source for the state. As a result, Indonesia adopted an open short-term 
capital account, a rather restrictive stance on FDI, and a banking system dominated by the state 
and its politicized credit allocation decisions. High oil prices at the end of the 1970s only 
increased corruption in state lending decisions, and set the stage for later needs to reorganize the 
banking sector.  
Malaysia’s hegemonic party regime established a post-colonial policy of racial economic 
affirmative action, which drove its industrial policy of guiding domestic control over the 
commanding heights of the economy. Using a combination of state- and domestically-owned 
banks and industrial firms, the government pursued a goal of dividing equity ownership into 
three roughly equal parts between ethnic Malaysians, ethic Chinese and Indian Malaysians, and 
foreign investors. As with Indonesia, the state became heavily involved in financial 
intermediation processes and promulgated laws designed to attract FDI under very strict 
guidelines to priority sectors and with the expectation of foreign divestment once sufficient 
technology transfer was complete. 
In both countries, this time period was marked by the political and economic emergence 
of a narrow set of elites who benefitted greatly from protection from foreign firms, especially 
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since their financing needs were easily met by subsidized credit programs. The growth of these 
protected groups meant anti-FDI elite became firmly entrenched in the political landscape of 
both countries during this time. 
Indonesia 
In the immediate aftermath of decolonization, Indonesia’s banking sector under 
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy government was highly dysfunctional and dependent on the state 
(Cook 2008). By 1965, series of post-colonial bank nationalizations, mergers, and state directives 
had created Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI), a massive banking institution that combined all state 
banks with the central bank (Bank Indonesia, BI) through which the regime controlled all aspects 
of domestic credit allocation. Sukarno’s government used its control over the banking sector to 
finance a wide range of expensive development projects, and this ultimately led to high levels of 
inflation. To combat the ill effects of inflation, BI propped up an overvalued rupiah through a 
complex web of multiple exchange rates. These policies led to a string of recurring balance of 
payment crises that fractured an already fragile coalition between the military and the 
Communist party, resulting in a military coup mounted by Soeharto that collapsed the Sukarno 
regime (Haggard and Maxfield 1996, Palmer 1978).  
When Soeharto’s New Order came to power, it quickly identified banking sector reform 
as essential to attracting and retaining short-term mobile investment (Rosser 2002). To support 
needed reforms, Soeharto quickly filled bureaucratic posts with neoliberal policy advisors who 
pushed for a tight monetary policy and capital account openness to stabilize the economy 
(Chwieroth 2010). The resulting policies were some of the most liberal for the time. Soeharto 
committed in 1966 to abandon the multiple exchange rate system and began to devalue the 
rupiah and liberalized foreign exchange markets. In 1968, the regime allowed bank deposits and 
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loans denominated in dollars (Arndt and Suwidhana 1982). In 1971, the regime made the 
currency fully convertible (Haggard and Maxfield 1996). 
With the banking sector stabilized, the New Order regime turned to a series of banking 
sector reform laws promulgated in 1967-68 designed to break up BNI into specialized state 
banks, restore a degree of independence to BI, and create a general banking law that would allow 
for private banks (Rosser 2002). These reforms also reopened Indonesia’s banking sector to 
foreign banks in a limited way. By 1969, 11 foreign banks had established operations in Jakarta. 
However, as the immediacy of the 1965 balance of payment crisis receded, political support for 
reform softened. Acting in response to domestic state and private banks who were concerned that 
foreign banks would undermine state control of credit allocation and drive domestic private 
banks out of business, the government instituted a set of policies that gave state banks access to 
increasingly generous credit terms and prevented any additional foreign bank from entry (Arndt 
1971).  
Soeharto’s military regime found natural allies in the ethnic Chinese capital class, who 
were eager to support the New Order regime since they were otherwise politically vulnerable. 
The ethnic Chinese had mobile assets, so capital account openness provided a signal to them that 
their investments were safe and they would be able to move funds overseas if economic 
conditions deteriorated (Haggard and Maxfield 1996). Capital account openness provided both 
the regime and the ethnic Chinese financiers access to abundant, cheap international capital. The 
financiers were able to use their privileged position to extract rents from the mismatch in interest 
rates on international capital and domestic interest rates. Meanwhile, state banks also benefited 
from access to cheap credit and funded politically driven development projects (Pepinsky 2009, 
Sharma 2001, Soesastro 1989). The regime was able to construct an expansive patronage 
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network by fostering tight links between public and domestic finance (MacIntrye, 1993). Public 
investment banks channeled easy credit to loyal regime supporters and private banks used their 
inexpensive sources of capital to partner with military leaders and private entrepreneurs in 
industrial expansion (MacIntrye 1993, Pepinsky 2009, Winters, 1996).  
This alliance was possible because the regime retained highly restrictive measures on 
foreign entry into the financial sector (Pepinsky 2013, 2009; Soesastro 1989). In addition to 
limits on ownership and branching of foreign bank subsidiaries, the regime placed highly 
restrictive limits on foreign ownership of stock exchange assets while providing preferential 
credit conditions to domestic banks. While the reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s eased 
some restrictions on foreign banks, foreign banks were not allowed to branch outside of Jakarta. 
This policy allowed state deposit banks to maintain monopoly control on deposit banking 
throughout most of the country, especially in rural areas where credit allocation decisions drove 
patron-client networks (Haggard and Maxfield 1996, Winters 1992, MacIntyre 1993).  
 Capital account openness paired with policies designed to retain the regime’s hold on 
investment allocation decisions provided politically connected firms with access to development 
financing without needing to find foreign equity partners. The state banks’ ability to channel 
investment into development projects meant it could industrialize indigenously. Popular support 
for indigenous, or pribumi, industrial ownership was particularly salient given inter-ethnic 
dynamics of the majority pribumi population, which was relatively rural and poor in comparison 
with the ethnic Chinese business class. The state managed these intergroup tensions through a 
vast preferential credit system that provided subsidized credit to state-owned enterprises and 
indigenous entrepreneurs while granting political-bureaucrats wide authority in granting loans 
for political purposes and often in exchange for bribes (Rosser 2002, 56). As the credit allocation 
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process became increasingly relationship-based, the ethnic Chinese capitalists with ties to 
political officials received preferential loans from state banks either directly (MacIntyre 1993, 
151) or through indigenous intermediaries, who profited handsomely from such arrangements.66 
Bad debts, which were estimated to top 30 percent of loans outstanding in the late 1970s, were 
easily written off given Indonesia’s petrodollar glut. 
Within the context of state-controlled credit allocation, the government promulgated the 
1967 Law on Foreign Investment, which complemented policies of capital account openness by 
establishing foreign firms’ ability to remit profits and dividends and to repatriate capital 
(Haggard and Maxfield 1996). However, while the law opened several sectors to foreign 
investment conditionally, it concurrently maintained a large list of restricted sectors as well as 
policies requiring divestiture over time and imposed restrictive licensing requirements 
(Rajenthran 2002, Tambunan 2011). The Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (Badan 
Koordinasi Peranman Modal or BKPM) was established in 1973 to administer the Foreign 
Investment Law, including investment screening, licensing and permits, and granting of 
incentives. Several sectors including natural resource extraction, manufacturing, and finance 
were also subject to sector specific laws and screening and the ministerial level (Rajenthran 
2002). The majority of FDI entering Indonesia through the 1970s was in the primary sector, 
concentrated in oil and natural gas extraction. Moreover, increased foreign exchange revenue in 
the 1970s from high world oil prices led to subsequent increased restrictions on FDI (OECD 
2010, Rajenthran 2002, Tambunan 2011). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 March 1981 
!122 
Malaysia 
Central to Malaysia’s policies over equity control of financial and industrial assets is the 
National Economic Plan (NEP), which was inspired by widespread riots in 1969 and announced 
in 1971. The NEP sought to counterbalance the relative poverty of indigenous groups 
(bumiputera) by mandating that foreign investors and ethnic Chinese and Indian capitalists 
transfer assets to bumiputera interests such that by 1991, bumiputera ownership over Malaysian 
capital assets would increase from 2.4 percent to 30 percent, foreign investment would decline 
from 60 percent to 30 percent, and ethnic Chinese and Indian interests could control the 
remainder. This affirmative action program thus sought to facilitate massive redistribution of 
assets to a large, politically important, and economically disadvantaged group. At the same time, 
the program was careful to provide assurances of non-expropriation to non-bumiputera 
Malaysians, who have traditionally been powerful local industrial and financial capitalists and 
important supporters of Malaysian’s long-standing ruling party.!
 The NEP had implications for equity restrictions both in the financial and real sectors. 
Through the formation of state-run banks and tight control over banking licenses, the share of 
bumiputera ownership of bank equity rose from essentially zero in 1965 to 77 percent of local 
banks by 1982 (Hara 1991).67 The Malaysian government formed Bank Bumiputra in 1966 to 
provide state-supported financial services for the bumiputera community. In quick succession, 
the financial sector saw state maneuvers designed to transform the equity structure of Malaysian 
banking. In 1966, citing prudential regulatory problems, the Malaysian central bank (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, BNM) took control over Malayan Bank, the largest and fastest growing local 
bank that also happened to be owned by ethnic Chinese investors.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Prior to independence in 1957, foreign banks had an even larger stake in the financial system, 
holding over 90 percent of bank assets in the country (Detragiache and Gupta 2004) 
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At the same time, the government of Malaysia pursued bank licensing and equity ceiling 
strategies to encourage the growth of bumiputera banks and limit foreign competition. The Bank 
of Nova Scotia received a license for a new bank branch in 1972, after which the government 
informally froze foreign bank licenses. Incumbent foreign banks were also prevented from 
expanding, as they were not granted new branch licenses. The Banking Act of 1973 gave the 
Malaysian Ministry of Finance the authority to withdrawal licenses of banks controlled by 
foreign countries. This led to the localization of foreign banks that were nationalized in their 
home countries, including Perwira Habib Bank (Pakistan), Banque de L’Indochine et de Suez 
(France), and three Indian banks that merged and localized into the United Asian Bank (Cook 
2008, 72). In addition, the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC), tasked with screening all 
potential foreign direct investment, categorized banking as a strategic sector and penalized banks 
that violated a 30 percent ceiling on foreign equity. In the spirit of the NEP, BNM encouraged 
incumbent foreign and locally owned banks to divest ownership to bumiputera interests in line 
with the 30 percent equity target. While no legislation mandated this restructuring, banks felt 
failure to do so would deteriorate their relationship with BNM (Cook 2008). 
As a result of these interventions, the equity structure of the Malaysian banking sector 
changed dramatically. In 1970, foreign banks accounted for 60 percent of outstanding deposits 
and loans. By the mid 1980s, foreign banks’ market share dropped to 25 percent. Over the same 
time, the number of foreign banks in Malaysia fell from 22 to 16. Throughout the first 15 years 
of the NEP, the banking sector experienced an extended period of consolidation that favored 
bumiputeras. In 1965, all locally-owned large banks in Malaysia were controlled by ethnic 
Chinese investors. In 1990, only one of Malyasia’s largest ten banks was predominately owned 
by ethnic Chinese investors (Searle 1999).  
!124 
It is important to note strict limitations on concentrated bank ownership that differentiates 
the Malaysian financial sector from others. The 1973 Banking Act, under Article 23B, capped 
limits on individuals to a maximum of 10 percent equity stake in a particular bank and corporate 
entities to a cap of 20 percent ownership. This means Malaysian banks have a diluted ownership 
structure that encourages consortia, and can facilitate the NEP’s goal of shared equity ownership 
between bumiputeras, non-bumiputera Malaysians, and foreign investors. However, the Minister 
of Finance retained authority to waive Article 23B restrictions and displayed a pattern of doing 
so when the result was equity consolidation of bumiputera interests at the expense of ethnic 
Chinese and Indian investors (Cook 2008). 
The NEP also guided policies toward foreign ownership in the real economy. The 
government formed the FIC in 1974, which was tasked with screening all incoming FDI to 
ensure the central objective of the NEP that bumiputeras, non-indigenous Malaysians, and 
foreigners hold 30, 40, and 30 percent of equity assets in Malaysia, respectively.68 The FIC was 
comprised of senior-level bureaucrats in the Economic Planning Unit and chaired by the Prime 
Minister and reviewed all proposed mergers and acquisitions by foreign interests. The FIC 
applied a standard set of guidelines to all proposed foreign investments that required approved 
projects to advance the equity goals of the NEP and to transfer technology and knowledge to 
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68 Some argue Malaysia has held a liberal stance toward FDI since colonial times (Narayanan 
1996). This claim is largely predicated on the governments’ willingness to promote some types 
of FDI, especially in the wake of the NEP. Indeed FDI became a more important source of fixed 
capital formation with the passage of the NEP since ethnic Chinese domestic entrepreneurs were 
largely disadvantaged by the ethnically-based redistribution scheme. However, FDI was always 
heavily regulated in Malaysia, as strict equity ceilings and centralized screening indicate. The 
Malaysian experience with FDI is a reminder that domestic capitalists can often benefit from 
foreign equity participation, especially if FDI enters through minority partnerships. Evans (1979) 
study of capital-government relations in Brazil makes a similar point by emphasizing the role of 
the state (and the financing capacity of the state) in forging alliances between local and foreign 
capital. 
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bumiputera interests. The FIC requirements reflected not just the NEP’s affirmative action 
policies but also the government’s commitment to an import-substituting industrialization 
strategy in the post-colonial era.  
 Indigenization of both the real and financial sectors involved heavy government 
involvement in economic guidance. In particular, the government used directed credit 
requirements and foreign firm financing restrictions to channel investment into preferred sectors 
and help develop local banks. In 1975, the government implemented a number of these programs 
including a requirement that 50 percent of all bank lending had to benefit bumiputera businesses; 
a requirement that was reduced to 20 percent in subsequent years (Ang 2009, 50). The same 
year, the government also passed policies that set minimum lending requirements to priority 
sectors including agriculture, manufacturing, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
These policies made it easier for the government to retain limits on foreign investment since they 
reduced the cost of debt financing to large and politically connected indigenous firms. Largely 
due to these programs, lending to the bumiputera community rose from 4 percent of total loans 
in 1968 to 28 percent in 1985 (Jesudason 1989). 
The success of the NEP in developing a large and prosperous “Bumiputera Commercial 
and Industrial Community” was in large part dependent on the development of state- and 
bumiputera-owned banks that would be willing to extend substantial capital to bumiputera 
industrial and commercial interests. To facilitate the maturation of an indigenous banking sector, 
the government required all foreign firms operating in Malaysia to obtain at least 50 percent of 
local finance needs from Malaysian banks. This requirement may have crowded out credit needs 
of local firms, but also allowed locally-owned to compete with foreign-controlled financial firms 
for the most lucrative clients while also helping indigenous firms grow technical and human 
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resource capacity to service the most sophisticated customers (Cook 2008, 72). 
Crisis, Deregulation, and Credit Booms: Banking and FDI policy 1985 -1997 
Through the 1970s, riding high on a global commodity price boom, both Indonesia and 
Malaysia consolidated economic policies designed to benefit politically important domestic 
constituents. In Indonesia, this manifested through the tight link between the military, 
bureaucrats, and ethnic Chinese capitalists in urban areas and the party and pribumi planter 
interests in rural settings. In Malaysia, the ruling party cultivated a rising bumiputera industrial 
class while carefully constructing industrial policy to allow ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs and 
foreign investors to contribute to fixed capital accumulation. In both countries, these strategies 
required state control over credit allocation decisions, mainly through large state banks, and strict 
limits on FDI. 
The global economic environment that funded such dirigiste economic strategies in the 
1970s changed drastically in the early 1980s with a U.S. instigated global recession that rippled 
throughout global credit and commodity markets. With mounting structural pressures, both 
Indonesia and Malaysia struggled to maintain political control over credit allocation. Each 
responded to their balance of payment fragilities and economic recessions by addressing 
weaknesses in their banking sectors and in their exclusionary FDI policies. However, while 
Indonesia pursued banking deregulation that ultimately shifted market power from the state to 
politically important domestic conglomerates, Malaysia responded with a series of prudential 
regulations designed to limit bank leverage and consolidate the increasingly unwieldy sector. It 
also raised revenue through a series of real-sector privatizations through public offerings that 
transferred wealth to the politically influential bumiputera class and also led to an equity market 
boom. 
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As a result of balance of payment pressures and crisis-induced banking reforms, both 
countries relaxed equity restrictions on export-oriented FDI projects, particularly those located in 
export processing and bonded zones. However, while Malaysia entered this time period with a 
more liberal FDI policy stance than Indonesia, the mid-1980s until the 1997 financial crisis 
marked a period of sustained opening of Indonesia’s investment climate such that it was slightly 
more open to FDI than was Malaysia on the eve of the Asian financial crisis.  
Indonesia’s liberalizing trend during this time was driven by shifting policy preferences 
of the country’s rapidly growing and politically connected conglomerates. Banking deregulation 
during this time period shifted credit allocation decision-making from state banks toward private 
domestic banks run by conglomerates owned by military officials and ethnic Chinese capitalists 
close to the Soeharto regime. Deregulation also limited the government’s ability to use directed 
credit schemes to generate economic growth. As a result, conglomerates and small pribumi 
industrialists lobbied for targeted relaxation of foreign equity restrictions. As a whole, the 
Indonesian government pursued a degree of liberalization in sub-sectors that conglomerates 
wanted opened to foreign investors and maintained a restrictive stance in areas of the economy in 
which conglomerates preferred continued protection while smaller indigenous firms preferred 
increased openness. 
Malaysia’s FDI policy during this same time period underwent far less change. This is 
unsurprising given it responded to banking sector weakness by reasserting state control over 
lending procedures and pursued, albeit with limited success, policies designed to consolidate the 
banking sector rather than expand the number of domestic operating banks. Thus, over this time 
period, the Malaysian government continued to view foreign capital as important in limiting the 
economic and political influence of the ethnic Chinese and Indian minorities. It also 
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implemented a new foreign investment law designed to attract FDI in high-skill, export-oriented 
manufacturing. However, by implementing relaxation of equity restrictions only in export 
processing zones, limiting foreign ownership even in export-generating activity to 80 percent, 
and refusing to open additional subsectors to FDI, Malaysia’s investment policy during this time 
is best described as status quo maintenance rather than as a period of substantial liberalization. 
Indonesia 
In the context of high oil prices, the Indonesian economy grew quite rapidly through the 
early 1980s (see Table 5.2). A series of balance of payment fragilities began to emerge 
intermittently in the late 1980s. When world oil prices began to drop, balance of payment 
pressures devolved into capital flight at the end of 1986 and again in 1987 (Haggard and 
Maxfield 1996). In responding to the crisis, technocrats and political elites focused on the need 
to liberalize the financial sector (Rosser 2002). Deregulation would change the credit allocation 
landscape in Indonesia considerably, and in ways that would benefit large conglomerates at the 
expense of small indigenous firms dependent on access to subsidized loans from state banks. 
Liberalization of banking licenses would allow conglomerates to establish new banks to provide 
easy financing to linked entities, while removal of credit ceilings and interest rate controls would 
allow these private banks to expand their loan portfolio and compete with state-owned banks for 
business. Local business interests, especially large conglomerates with close ties to the regime, 
were vocal proponents of such deregulatory policies.69 
With overwhelming support of politically connected conglomerates and the political 
bureaucrats tied to these large firms, the government pushed through a series of two deregulatory !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Tempo, 23 April 1988; Joseph P. Manguno, “Indonesia Loosens Credit, Interest Rates in 
Hopes of Boosting Domestic Investment,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 6 June 1983. 
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banking reforms in 1983 and 1988. The 1983 reforms removed credit ceilings and interest rate 
controls and substantially limited central bank lending through direct channels and liquidity 
credits (Rosser 2002, 61). The October 1988 reforms (Pakto 88) contained financial reforms that 
deregulated the domestic financial sector while simultaneously maintaining an environment 
highly restrictive of foreign banks. The measure abolished Bank Indonesia’s role in approving 
foreign loans, removed ceilings on funds they could raise overseas, and eliminated several 
ownership restrictions including stock market participation. (Haggard and Maxfield 1996, 
Pepinsky 2013, Soesastro 1989). Local business elites, including ethnically Chinese business 
owners largely supported these reforms because deregulation allowed large conglomerates to 
establish small private banks to serve as a primary source of cheap credit for their affiliated 
businesses (Rosser 2002). In response to the reforms, a manager of one large private domestic 
bank said, “This is the freest we’ve ever been.”70 Industry groups such as the Indonesian Private 
Bankers Association, Perbanas, were similarly jubilant at the news of reform.71 The number of 
small private banks ballooned under the new regulations, expanding from 111 in 1988 to 240 in 
1995 (Enoch et al. 2003). Under liberalization, financial sector growth averaged 12.1 percent for 
most of the decade (Cook 2008).  
Despite these reforms and a clear rhetorical commitment to increase financial openness, 
Pakto 88 retained the New Order regime’s largely exclusionary stance toward direct entry of 
foreign financial firms (Pepinsky 2009, Sharman 2001, Winters 1996, Soestra 1989). Even 
though the reforms allowed increased branching capabilities of foreign banks, licensing laws 
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71 Joseph P. Manguno, “Indonesia Loosens Credit, Interest Rates in Hopes of Boosting Domestic 
Investment,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 6 June 1983. 
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prohibited entry of new foreign banks so only foreign financial firms already operating in 
Indonesia benefited from this reform. The extent of closure is evident from ownership figures of 
banks in 1996. While 160 private domestic banks operated in Indonesia in 1996, only 34 joint 
ventures between domestic and foreign banks and 10 majority-owned foreign banks existed 
(Sharma 2001, 86). Table 5.3 further illustrates the differential effects of banking deregulation on 
the role of state, private local, and private foreign banks. Reforms shifted market share from state 
to private domestic banks while foreign banks remained largely marginalized. 
Table 5.3 Mobilization of Deposits by Bank Type (percentage) 
  1982 1988 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996 
State Banks 71 60 50 47 37 35 32 
Private Domestic Banks 14 30 40 43 53 55 59 
Foreign and Joint 
Venture Banks 
10 7 7 7 6 6 6 
Regional Development 
Banks 
5 3 3 3 4 4 3 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, various editions in Rosser 2002, pg. 63 
 
The enthusiasm local political and economic elites displayed over banking deregulation 
did not extend to regulatory reform. Bureaucrats and indigenous groups lobbied to maintain 
preferential credit programs while conglomerates fought to preserve their discretionary authority 
over raising funds overseas and lending to their affiliates without substantial regulatory oversight 
(Rosser 2002). Since no politically important societal group supported prudential regulatory 
reform, the late 1980s through the mid 1990s saw rapid expansion of credit as conglomerates run 
by ethnic Chinese used their privileged position to lend cheaply to their affiliates and the state 
perpetuated preferential credit schemes in priority sectors such as agriculture to mute inter-ethnic 
tension and underlying social unrest (Habir 1984, 130; Rosser 2002, 63).72  
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The New Order had always worked to balance their tight political and economic alliance 
with the ethnic Chinese business community with a need to address pribumi concerns, especially 
in rural areas. Banking deregulation threatened social cohesion because lifting credit controls 
effectively priced indigenous firms out of the lending market while benefiting larger ethnically 
Chinese businesses (Rosser 2002). Therefore, the government continued to provide preferential 
credit to high priority sectors such as agriculture, cooperatives, and manufacturing exports even 
as deregulatory pressures forced it to cut credit programs in trade manufacturing, construction, 
and services. To further offset pribumi concerns, the government maintained its medium-term 
investment program (KIB), which was available only to indigenous Indonesian and had been 
implemented in 1974 in response to violent ethnic riots (Cook 2008, Habir 1984).  
However, continued downward pressure on oil prices limited the government’s ability to 
continue such programs. In 1990, it further limited preferential credit to agriculture, subsidized 
food distribution, cooperatives, and medium-term investment credit. To offset these cuts, the 
government required private banks to direct 20 percent or more of their loan portfolios to small 
pribumi commercial interests (Rosser 2002, 65). Even with pressure from declining revenue and 
technocrats in BI, senior government officials and the conglomerates whose continued support 
the New Order regime relied upon were able to maintain access to a more limited preferential 
credit program that facilitated the continuance of patrimonial ties (MacIntyre 1993, 159). In 
other words, the contraction of preferential credit squeezed pribumi interests from the benefits of 
the program but did not decrease the regime’s ability to control credit allocation processes to 
favor political allies.  
As with the politics of preferential credit programs, there was also near universal 
domestic opposition to prudential regulatory reforms. Technocrats in BI wanted to pair the 
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banking deregulations of 1983 and 1988 with a series of prudential requirements that would 
regulate lending limits, capital adequacy requirements, loan-to-deposit ceilings, and lending 
decision processes in state banks (Bihandi 1995, 179; Rosser 2002, 66; Wardhana 1994, 80). The 
de jure prudential requirements in these packages were very weak by international standards. 
Capital adequacy ratios were set below Basel I standards, legal lending limits were set high 
enough to allow banks to lend up to 50 percent of their portfolios to a combination of firms 
within a single conglomerate, and even these regulations were largely unenforceable due to long 
compliance periods and regulatory capacity problems associated with the rapid growth in the 
number of banks (Cole and Slade 1996, 91; Rosser 2002, 67; Symons and White 1989, 1974-5). 
State officials as well as conglomerates also strongly opposed regulatory clean up of state-owned 
banks because both groups benefitted from the patrimonial system of access to subsidized credit 
in exchange for political support and economic favors (Rosser 2002, 67-8).  
The rapid expansion of ethnic Chinese conglomerates during this period, enabled through 
largely under-regulated lending from affiliated private banks and amplified through increased 
public offerings on the burgeoning Jakarta stock exchange, led to increased societal tension as 
pribumi populations increasingly resented the economic fortunes of the large and non-indigenous 
domestic capitalist class.73 Banking deregulation had made credit more expensive, thereby 
benefiting the large firms with deep pockets while freezing smaller indigenous firms out of 
lending markets. Large firms were willing to pay the higher costs of credit in order to limit their 
competition from smaller firms, consistent with the theories of support for financial 
underdevelopment discussed in Chapter 2 (Rajan and Zingales 2003). This dynamic was 
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strengthened by continued limits on foreign bank branching, which meant large conglomerates 
with access to international capital intermediated through affiliated banks had important 
advantages in an otherwise limited financial system. Soeharto sought to dull the anti-
conglomerate rhetoric advanced by small and medium pribumi businesses that had pressed the 
government to limit lending to non-pribumi interests and to find ways to actively promote the 
development of indigenous firms.74 The easiest way to satisfy these concerns, and indeed the 
preference of the vocal pribumi business owners, was to provide these groups increased access to 
preferential credit through the state-owned banks and to extend several procurement contracts to 
indigenous firms (Robison 1996, 95).  
In this political climate, banking regulation expanded conglomerates’ access to finance, 
increased private domestic banks’ ability to rapidly expand their lending portfolios through 
borrowing internationally, and placed additional pressure on the government to combat inter-
ethnic tensions through extending preferential credit to pribumi firms. The inherent instability of 
such unchecked financial expansion quickly became clear through a series of near-bank collapses 
through the early 1990s. A stricter banking regulation passed in 1991, but included a lengthy 
compliance schedule and did not provide regulators with the capacity to adequately enforce 
lending limits (Rosser 2002, 74). The build up of over-leverage private domestic banks and 
unserviceable debts in state banks left the domestic financial sector increasingly vulnerable and 
set the stage for a severe banking crisis after the 1997 currency crisis. 
The decade preceding the crisis, then, consisted of substantial banking deregulation that 
shifted credit allocation power from the state to conglomerates. At the same time, the regime 
retained a more limited ability to provide targeted preferential credit to favored firms. Given the 
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central thesis of this dissertation, we should expect the loosening of state control over credit 
allocation would result in a period of policy opening toward FDI as firms would increasingly 
look to foreign sources of investment, at least in areas that were no longer supported by 
preferential credit arrangement. Indeed, Indonesian FDI policy during this time conforms to 
expectations.  
Table 5.4 highlights investment policy changes from 1986 to 1996. Indonesia began the 
1980s as much more closed to FDI than its geographic and economic neighbors in island 
Southeast Asia. By the eve of the 1997 financial crisis, it has closed the gap in FDI 
restrictiveness and had become slightly more open to foreign investment than Malaysia. 
However, the reforms to FDI policy made during this time are best described as moving the 
country from an unconditionally closed to a partially open investment environment. A series of 
laws and decrees opened the economy to FDI in export-generating activities, primarily as a way 
to generate foreign exchange at a time in which declining oil prices placed greater urgency on the 
regime to diversify exports (Rosser 2002, 128-9). It is important to note that some relaxation of 
restrictions on export-oriented firms preceded the 1988 banking reforms. However, the 1986 
loosening of restrictions on export-oriented FDI were minor compared with the 1989 switch 
from a positive to a negative list. This change, which occurred in the wake of the 1988 banking 
reforms, fundamentally altered FDI policy from a system in which foreign entry was only 
allowed if an industry was explicitly opened to a system in which foreign entry was only denied 
if the government enacted specific industry-level controls.  
Table 5.4 Investment Policy Changes 1986-1996 
1986 Relaxation of limits of foreign ownership for export-oriented firms 
  Several sectors previously closed to FDI are opened, including retail trade 
1987 Foreign investors allowed on stock exchange  
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1988 16-year ban on foreign bank entry removed 
  Joint ventures allowed to distribute their products locally 
1989 Switch from Positive to Negative List, with hundreds of sectors opened to foreign 
investment under certain conditions (e.g. export requirements, co-operation with 
SMEs) 
  Foreigners allowed to purchase 49% of shares of listed companies  
1994 Minimum capital requirement for foreign investment eliminated 
  Nine strategic sectors opened to 95% foreign ownership 
  Up to 100% foreign ownership permitted throughout Indonesia (80% previously) 
  Divestiture requirement reduced to only a token amount of local equity 
  Domestic partnership requirements relaxed 
1995 Ten sectors removed from Negative List, including motor vehicles 
Source: OECD 2010, 45 
Since Japan was the largest potential source of FDI at the time, most of the regulatory 
reforms were drafted in response to Japanese government and business officials who focused on 
minimum investment and divestment requirements as being the largest impediments to Japanese 
FDI, which was mainly done by small and medium export manufacturers.75 However, despite a 
clear commitment to fostering a more welcoming environment for manufacturing exporters, the 
regime maintained tight restrictions on investment in domestic-oriented industries and 
agriculture that still benefitted from Indonesia’s circumscribed directed credit program (Rosser 
2002, 134-42).  
Government-industrial relations over FDI policy reform reflected the shift in economic 
and political power engendered by banking deregulation. Domestic conglomerates supported 
these limited reforms because most foreign firms were required to enter joint ventures with local 
firms, which facilitated technology transfer from foreign companies to conglomerate affiliates 
(U.S State Department 1990). These conglomerates were in a stronger negotiating position due 
to their leadership gains in Indonesia’s main chamber of commerce, KADIN, which previously !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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had never confirmed non-indigenous businesspeople to the organization.76 Liberalization of SME 
FDI reflected the dual reality of a pribumi capital class that was severely weakened by a credit 
environment that favored large, ethnically Chinese conglomerates over small firms and by a 
subsequent need to finance SME business expansion through joint ventures rather than bank 
loans.77 Additionally, the government retained extensive screening of all FDI project proposals, 
and the conglomerates’ close political ties meant they could easily lobby investment board 
officials to block foreign projects that would disadvantage them. A prime example of the 
conglomerates’ power is the government’s decision to ban new foreign-funded projects in palm 
plantations in early 1997 at the urging of ethnic Chinese interests. Pribumi SME business owners 
protested the move, arguing the freeze of “all new foreign investment in palm plantations opens 
the possibility of monopolies” since only seven ethnic Chinese conglomerates held licenses for 
palm plantations after the ban was implemented.78  
Thus, FDI policy changes during the period prior to the 1997 crisis offered tentative 
openness to export-oriented projects, while maintaining heavy state control over individual 
projects and requiring foreign investors to substantially cooperate with local firms. These 
changes in FDI policy reflected the policy preferences of business elite; pribumi labor groups 
resented the continued economic success of ethnic-Chinese and foreign firms in the country and 
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78 Vice chairman of KADIN, Adiwarsita Adinegoro, quoted in “Indonesia Seeks to Limit 
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worker demonstrations and riots were a continual threat, especially in areas outside Jakarta.79,80 
In sectors in which conglomerates benefitted from FDI restrictions, especially agribusiness, the 
New Order regime was quick to erect barriers to foreign investment. The liberalization of FDI 
was carefully paired with new SME credit programs designed to decrease pribumi anger over the 
ethnic Chinese conglomerates’ outsized benefits from new FDI policies.81 Importantly, 
investment incentives for foreign companies were revoked in 1984 and only reinstated in 1996 
when stressed state-owned bank balance sheets severely reduced the ability of the government to 
extend preferential credit to priority sectors (OECD 2010). 
Malaysia 
Largely due to the success of the NEP in rapidly developing a burgeoning class of 
bumiputera business elites, the Malaysian government’s primary NEP policy goal in the 1980s 
was to divest its extensive holdings in banking and real sector interests to bumiputera owners. 
The realization of this objective was complicated by a recession and debt crisis in 1985-6. As a 
result of a global recession brought on by U.S. monetary contraction, export commodity prices 
collapsed in 1985. This put substantial pressure on the current account as export income fell by 
6.2 percent in 1986. Public debt, driven by state borrowing to fund expansion of heavy industry, 
rose from 44 percent of GDP in 1980 to 112 percent in 1986 (Athukorala 2010, 3; Doraisami 
2012, 7). More than half of this debt was denominated in foreign currency, which became 
problematic as the yen appreciated as a result of the 1985 Plaza accords. The government’s weak !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fiscal position left it unable to pursue counter-cyclical fiscal policies in response to weakening 
aggregate demand and GDP growth fell sharply into negative territory in 1986, as table 5.2 
indicates. Unemployment doubled to 8 percent in 1986 and the country experienced a banking 
crisis as non-performing loans accounted for 30 percent of all loan in 1987 and 1988.  
As would be the case in 1997, the Malaysian government decided to manage post-crisis 
adjustment without IMF assistance. IMF loans could lessen fiscal distress, but would come with 
conditionality requirements that would severely undercut the NEP. The dominant party, Barisan 
Nasional (BN), relied on the political support of Malaysia’s bumiputera majority and therefore 
was unwilling to pursue structural adjustment policies that would preclude continuance of 
economic redistribution policies (Narayanan 1996). However, the crisis weakened the 
government’s ability to underwrite development through fiscal expansion and required the state 
to look elsewhere to generate investment finance. This imperative led to policy changes in three 
key areas: banking, privatization, and FDI.  
The banking sector was substantially weakened due to high levels of non-performing 
loans and increased incidence of corporate bankruptcies. In response, the government moved to 
increase BNM regulatory banking oversight and facilitate local bank consolidation. They did this 
by temporarily imposing interest rate controls and passing a series of financial sector regulatory 
reforms. In immediate response to the crisis, the government imposed interest rate controls to 
limit excessive credit rationing during the crisis. Interest rates had been liberalized since 1978, 
but the central bank imposed direct controls from 1985 to 1987. In February 1987, BNM 
implemented a base lending rate method of control until 1991 (Yusof et al. 1994). After 1991, 
interest rates returned to being determined by competitive market rates. This policy liberalization 
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reflected a return to strong economic growth along with a surge in inward foreign capital flows 
and increasingly stringent banking regulations. 
Most important in these regulatory reforms was the October 1989 Banking and Financial 
Institution Act (BAFIA), which provides enhanced power for licensed institutions’ auditors 
while increasing BI’s authority to bail out ailing banks. Local bankers greeted the reforms 
warmly, especially after amendments dropped initial language that many believed gave BI 
sweeping authority in determining when a bank would be subject to takeover.82 BAFIA also 
limited private foreign borrowing to prevent the banking sector, which was benefitting from an 
increasingly liberal short-term capital account, from taking on too much short-term foreign debt. 
This would later help insulate Malaysia from the worst of the 1997 financial crisis; South Korea, 
Indonesia, and Thailand faced higher bank losses due to the extent to which banks were 
overleveraged to foreign creditors. However, as will be seen below, BAFIA limited foreign debt 
issuance but it did not limit capital-raising through equity markets. Thus, domestic 
intermediation of foreign capital in Malaysia in this period was done primarily through equity 
markets (Pepinsky 2012). 
As the banking crisis subsided, the government tried to facilitate local bank consolidation 
to enhance capitalization, simplify regulatory oversight, and further consolidate bank equity 
holdings in the hands of well-connected bumiputeras. The central bank had frozen issuance of 
new banking licenses in 1982, which meant that banks wishing to consolidate had to obtain 
permission from the Minister of Finance Answer Ibrahim. As a result, banking sector 
restructuring in the early 1990s mainly benefitted state- and bumiputera-owned firms. Table 5.5 
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documents all banking sector acquisitions from 1992 to 1994; only two of the seven mergers 
resulted in non-buiputera ownership. 
Table 5.5 Banking Acquisitions 1992-1994 
Acquired Bank Ethnicity Acquirer Ethnicity Year of Transfer 
D&C Chinese RHB Bumiputera 1990 
Bank Utama Bumiputera Cahya Mata 
Sarawak 
Bumiputera 1992 
Kong Ming Chinese EON State 
(Bumiputera) 
1992 
Security Pacific Chinese AMMB Bumiputera 1994 
MUI Chinese Hong Leong Chinese 1994 
UOB Kota 
Kinabalu, credit 
cooperatives 
Chinese, 
foreign 
Phileo-Allied Mixed 1994 
UMBC State 
(Bumiputera) 
Sime State 
(Bumiputera) 
1995 
Source: Various editions of Bank Negara Annual Reports and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
Annual Company Handbook in Cook 2008, 76. 
 
Through the rest of this period, the state remained committed to protecting its financial 
sector from foreign ownership. The U.S., China, and Australia specifically targeted Malaysia’s 
banking sector during the financial services negotiations of the Uruguay Round. The government 
of Malaysia, like Indonesia, strongly resisted these pressures by leveraging their leadership in the 
South East Asian Central Banks Research and Training Centre (SEACEN), the developing G-15, 
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to prevent 
meaningful liberalizing commitments. At the same time, the government implemented new 
regulations to prevent foreign banks from gaining advantages in the local market through 
technological advances. The growth of automated teller machines (ATMs) threatened to give 
foreign banks with superior technology systems an advantage vis-à-vis local banks. BNM 
defined off-site ATMs as separate branches, effectively preventing foreign banks from building 
out their ATM networks. BNM also issued directives preventing foreign banks from joining the 
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ATM interconnection network of local banks and from creating their own network. This ban 
remained in place until 2011 (OECD 2013, 216). 
In addition to its efforts to shore up the banking sector in the wake of the 1985-6 crisis, 
the government of Malaysia also pursued a privatization agenda in which state assets were 
divested primarily to UMNO-linked companies. The method of divestiture was mostly by issuing 
stock through on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). As a result of these offering, 
KLSE quickly grew into one of the largest stock exchanges in the world, relative to GDP with a 
market capitalization of $200 billion just before the 1997 crisis (Delhaise 1998). By early 1997, 
it was the third largest exchange in East Asia in 1997 behind Tokyo and Hong Kong (Cook 2008, 
75).  
The quick rise of KLSE is important to understanding the politics of investment policy 
for two main reasons. The first is that it facilitated rapid expansion in foreign portfolio 
investment, which accounted for 60 percent of trading volume and 25 percent of ownership in 
1997 (Cook 2008, 75). The increase in portfolio investment meant short term foreign investment 
quickly became an important source of inward investment, accounting for 43.3 percent of total 
inflows in 1995 and up from 13.2 percent just the previous year (Athukorala 1998). This inflow 
of foreign investment provided local banks with an inexpensive and seemingly limitless supply 
of capital to increase lending capacity.  
Banks were particularly willing to leverage themselves in this way due to a two-tiered 
regulatory system introduced in December 1994 in which more highly capitalized banks could 
provide foreign exchange accounts of unlimited size. The purpose of this policy was to 
encourage consolidation, but banks were able to increase market capitalization to gain tier one 
status without relinquishing managerial control by offering new shares and then borrowing from 
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foreign sources to buy these shares. As long as KLSE continued to climb in value, banks had the 
collateral necessary to borrow these funds. As a result, only one bank merger occurred between 
1994-1997 and credit surged. 
The 1985-6 crisis also led the government of Malaysia to modify its restrictive stance 
toward FDI in order to upgrade its exports from commodity-driven to higher-tech manufacturing. 
This change was largely due to the need to generate exports to offset persistent current account 
deficits made worse by a global recession and a concern that commodity markets were too 
volatile to count on for generating foreign exchange. FDI was needed to supplement domestic 
capital due to the government’s weak fiscal position, a banking sector unwilling and unable to 
lend sufficient amounts need for industrialization immediately following the crisis, and a need 
for technology transfer to rapidly switch from an export sector dominated by processing primary 
products like palm oil to one engaged in manufacturing higher-valued added products like 
electronics (Ang 2009, Athukorala 2010, Doraisami 2012). 
However, rather than pursuing full liberalization of its FDI regime, the government of 
Malaysia implemented a modified version of its partially open policy framework by 
incentivizing export-oriented FDI while maintaining high levels of restrictions in other sectors. 
The 1986 Promotion of Investment Act (PIA) is illustrative of this strategy. PIA permitted 
exporters and firms transferring high levels of technology and knowledge to retain higher levels 
of foreign equity than previously allowed. Firms exporting 80 percent or more of their goods 
were exempted from joint venture requirements. The government relaxed equity restriction in no 
other industry sub-sectors during this time and the FIC continued to screen all foreign equity 
acquisitions.  The government also retained screening authority over wholly-owned foreign 
affiliates in the export-oriented manufacturing sector through the Malaysian Industrial 
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Development Authority (MIDA), which issued manufacturing licenses and determined investor 
eligibility for investment incentives. Domestic business interests remained central to the 
development of investment rules throughout the period, lobbying for policies that would 
incentivize technology transfer to local firms while also allowing domestic industry to set the 
terms of joint ventures with foreign investors.83 And, while domestic firms welcomed high-skill 
manufacturing FDI, local business groups were concurrently able to push through more equity 
restrictions on market-oriented FDI such as in the distribution industry.84 
Thus, at the time of the 1997 financial crisis, the investment climate in Malaysia was 
characterized by extensive government guidance over credit allocation decisions and foreign 
investment activity. Interest rates were liberalized and prudential regulation prevented gross 
excesses in bank leverage, but a government-driven stock market boom further fueled by high 
levels of foreign investment inflows created a rapid expansion of credit on which well-connected 
firms were best poised to capitalize. Additionally, state-owned banks remained central to the 
banking sector as well as legacy bumiputera banks that had been formed in the 1970s to support 
the NEP. FDI was encouraged in export-oriented activities, but with extensive government 
oversight. FDI in other sub-sectors was severely circumscribed. As we will see in Chapter 6, this 
policy environment drastically changed in the wake of the 1997 crisis. As the government 
relinquished its control over the banking sector, important voices in commerce and industry 
lobbied for increased openness for FDI to help finance further economic expansion. Overtime, 
these voices triumphed over poorer bumiputera community members who viewed foreign firms 
with suspicion. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 “Industries Seek More Investment From Abroad,” The Nikkei Weekly, 26 September, 1992. 
 
84 Esther Tan, “Guidelines on Wholesale, Retail Trade Out Soon,” New Straits Times, 5 March 
1996. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I traced the co-evolution of banking sector and FDI policies in Indonesia 
and Malaysia from 1965 to the eve of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. While Malaysia had 
initially developed a more open, but fundamentally intermediate, stance toward foreign investors 
in order to limit the economic and political power of ethnic Chinese capitalists, Indonesia 
experienced a policy shift from a mostly closed to a conditionally open FDI climate through this 
time period. I show how banking sector deregulation in Indonesia in response to substantial 
balance of payment weakness shifted elite policy preferences toward conditional openness. As 
credit allocation decisions became increasingly driven by private banks rather than state-owned 
banks, and as state financing constraints limited the availability of preferential credit, industrial 
elite and state bureaucrats became increasingly willing to raise equity ceilings on foreign 
investors, especially in the manufacturing sector. At the same time, the state retained ultimate 
authority over foreign investment projects through its centralized screening capacity and showed 
its willingness to block investment projects that would threaten domestic industrial elites.  
Malaysia experienced status quo maintenance with respect to its FDI policies through the 
1970s and 1980s. This is unsurprising given the fact it did not experience substantial changes to 
its banking sector regulatory regime during this time period. Malaysian officials responded to 
banking sector weakness in the 1980s with increased prudential regulation, but these steps were 
mostly supported by domestic capital because the regulations provided the central bank with 
increased bail-out authority and limited the growth of foreign banks by requiring them to 
incorporate locally. These policy initiatives did little to change the fundamental nature of the 
domestic credit allocation process, and therefore did not generate substantial changes in elite 
preferences over FDI openness. However, the banking policies of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
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did help insulate the Malaysian banking sector from the very worst of the 1997 crisis. We will 
see in the next chapter how Malaysia’s ability to weather the crisis without IMF assistance 
actually facilitated major liberalizing changes in the banking and FDI policy spaces. 
The processes through which Indonesian and Malaysian banking and FDI policies did or 
did not change through the 30 year period prior to the Asian financial crisis provide us with 
important insight into how status quo and reformist pressures are created and sustained. A central 
argument of this dissertation is that FDI policy reform occurs when elites’ financing strategies 
shift their policy preferences over openness. This explanation of change is quite different from 
extant theories of FDI policy reform, which emphasize changes in political institutions that shift 
power from capital to labor. Indeed, these cases provide some insight into how elites’ stated 
preferences over FDI shift as global conditions and domestic credit allocation processes change. 
The next chapter illustrates this dynamic more starkly by examining how crisis policy responses 
modified elite preferences over foreign investment post 1997.
! !
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CHAPTER 6: CRISIS, REFORM & POLICY DIVERGENCE - MALAYSIA & 
INDONESIA 1997-2013 
 
“WE NEED TO USE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN A SMART 
WAY, LIKE CHINA HAS DONE. BUT INDONESIA HAS TO 
DECIDE WHICH AREA IT WANTS TO PROMOTE AND 
SPECIALIZE IN.” 
 
Yuri Sato, Economist for Indonesia  
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) 
November 7, 2009 
 
“[MALAYSIA SHOULD ADOPT] A TRULY LIBERALISED 
POSITION TO FOREIGN EQUITY AND OWNERSHIP NOT 
ONLY IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR BUT ALSO IN 
THE SERVICES SECTOR. . . . THIS IS NOT A TIME FOR 
FAINT-HEARTEDNESS BUT FOR MEETING THE 
IMMEDIATE CHALLENGES WITH PRAGMATISM, 
INNOVATION, AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE” 
 
Malaysian International Chamber of  
Commerce and Industry 
April 8, 2002 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I traced the co-evolution of banking sector and FDI policies in 
Indonesia and Malaysia from the late 1960s to the eve of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. While 
regime management of inter-ethnic political cleavages initially led the Malaysian government to 
cautiously embrace high regulated foreign investors as a way of limiting the economic 
dominance of non-bumiputera capitalists, Indonesia’s tight alliance between the military, ruling 
party, and ethnic Chinese financiers provided the political logic for largely excluding foreign 
capital from direct investments in the local economy. The Indonesian government’s policy of 
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banking deregulation in the 1980s in response to tight global credit conditions and elite interest 
in establishing private banks linked to powerful domestic conglomerates, however, created local 
elite support for limited FDI reforms such that by 1997 Indonesia’s FDI policies were slightly 
less restrictive than were Malaysia’s.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how divergent crisis response strategies to the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis led to substantial liberalization of credit allocation in Malaysia while Indonesia’s 
foreign bank-led financial sector restructuring did little to force fundamental changes in the way 
banks make debt financing decisions and insulated the state from needing to privatize its 
extensive state-owned banking system. As a result, Indonesian business interests have 
successfully blocked attempts to implement large-scale liberalization of FDI beyond the initial 
IMF-imposed policy changes in 1998-9. In contrast, the Malaysian business community has 
largely supported, and in many cases driven, more fundamental liberalization of FDI policy. 
These findings point to micro-level evidence to support the central hypothesis of this dissertation 
that financial sector liberalization shifts policy preferences of politically important business 
interests toward favoring opening to FDI. 
Figure 6.1 shows Indonesia and Malaysia’s level of FDI restrictiveness starting in 1997 
onward. In early 1997, Indonesia and Malaysia had similar levels of openness to FDI. Both had 
centralized screening requirements, often required foreigners enter joint partnership with local 
firms, and heavily targeted export-oriented manufacturing while denying entry to other investors. 
However, their policies toward FDI have since diverged. Malaysia has experienced sustained 
movements toward more openness over time and now has an FDI policy that is at the average 
level of openness for a panel of 52 advanced and emerging economies. Indonesia, in contrast, 
experienced a small and immediate decrease in its restrictiveness score followed by a decade 
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without change to its level of openness. Since 2010, Indonesia has actually become slightly more 
restrictive of FDI. In 2012, its restrictiveness was one standard deviation above the average level 
of restrictiveness in 52 advanced and emerging economies. In other word, Indonesia and 
Malaysia’s level of openness was identical in 1997 and today shows substantial divergence with 
Malaysia being much more open than Indonesia. 
Figure 6.1 FDI Restrictiveness Index, 1997-2012 
 
Source: OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index: http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm 
 
The timing of this divergence follows a common, arguably exogenous, shock in 1997 
when a twin currency and banking crisis originating in Thailand spread throughout Southeast 
Asia. Subsequently, Malaysia and Indonesia each pursued different crisis response strategies. 
Indonesia accepted IMF loans and recapitalized ailing private banks through opening the banking 
sector to foreign ownership. At the same time, the Indonesian government refused to privatize its 
large state-owned banking sector and used the crisis to consolidate state-owned banking assets. 
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Malaysia eschewed IMF funding and instead self-financed banking sector recapitalization while 
also privatizing state owned banks and pursuing prudential regulatory reform. The difference in 
crisis response meant that the Indonesian government and powerful domestic industrial-financial 
conglomerates still retained an important degree of control over domestic credit allocation while 
the credit allocation process in Malaysia became more market-based.85 I argue below how these 
different outcomes affected key societal groups’ preferences over an alternative source of 
investment finance – FDI. 
The post-crisis experience of Indonesia and Malaysia is a hard test of my theory for 
several reasons. First, Indonesia experienced two political developments commonly associated 
with FDI liberalization – democratic transition and IMF conditionality – while Malaysia did not. 
Thus, if existing theories of FDI liberalization have more explanatory power than does my 
financing opportunity cost theory, we would expect Indonesia to have liberalized to a greater 
extent than Malaysia. Additionally, because Indonesia recapitalized banks by reducing 
restrictions on foreign ownership of banks while Malaysia retained its policies of protecting local 
banks, one might expect that Indonesia was more willing to open its economy to foreign 
investors either due to the political triumph of liberalizing technocrats or simply due to 
desperation in the midst of crisis. Finally, Indonesia and Malaysia are neighbor states with 
reasonably similar export potential. Previous research has found cross-border policy diffusion to 
have statistically significant effects on FDI policy (Vadlamannati and Cooray 2012).  Therefore, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 There is a large and growing literature on comparative financial systems that characterizes 
domestic systems as “bank-based” or “market-based” (See Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001), 
Hardie and Maxfield (2011), and Rajan and Zingales (2003) for reviews.)  My terminology 
above should not be construed as building upon this literature. Instead, I merely mean to 
distinguish between financial systems in which political relationships are important for obtaining 
credit and financial systems in which market mechanisms influence financing decisions, 
especially in terms of risk assessment.  
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given Indonesia and Malaysia’s geographic proximity and economic similarities, we should 
expect these countries to hold very similar policies toward FDI.  
Below we will see that, in both countries, political leaders made a conscious choice 
between protecting the banking sector or the real sector from foreign ownership. This tradeoff is 
documented in first hand accounts of policymaking as well as reporting on interest group 
lobbying during and after the crisis. When governments chose to protect the banking sector, state 
technocrats as well as industry leaders pushed for increased liberalization of FDI in the real 
sector in order to spur domestic capital formation. When governments instead allowed foreign 
banks to inject capital into ailing banks, they had the financing capability to retain state-owned 
banks. Credit allocation continued to be driven by political rather than market relationships, and 
this muted societal pressures for lifting restrictions on FDI into other sectors. 
The Asian Financial Crisis and Bank Recapitalization Strategies 
As detailed in Chapter 5, the 1980s and early 1990s were a time of rapid economic 
growth and financial expansion in Indonesia and Malaysia as well as the entire region. The 
causes and key events of the financial crisis that swept through east Asia in the summer of 1997 
are well documented elsewhere, and I will limit my focus here on crisis response strategies in 
Indonesia and Malaysia’s banking sectors subsequent reforms to FDI policy. Both countries 
experienced substantial pressure on their currency pegs; financial sectors highly leveraged in 
foreign currency quickly transformed currency crises into banking crises as foreign liabilities 
skyrocketed and banks struggled to remain solvent as their balance sheets quickly deteriorated. 
As their twin currency and banking crises worsened, the Indonesian and Malaysian governments 
experienced rapidly building technocratic and political pressures to deal with their collapsing 
banking sectors while managing popular and elite preferences over how to pay adjustment costs. 
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While Indonesia turned to the IMF, Malaysia managed its crisis response without conditional 
lending. Perhaps un-intuitively, the result was that Malaysia underwent a fundamental change to 
the way the domestic economy intermediated finance while Indonesia’s embrace of foreign 
banks actually provided the state space to consolidate and strengthen state-owned banks. 
Indonesia !
While the balance of payment crises in the late 1980s led to domestic financial 
liberalization, the external pressures were small enough and the regime strong enough, that the 
episode did not fundamentally weaken the alliance between the regime and domestic banks. The 
Asian financial crisis, however, placed much greater external pressure on the government and 
fatally weakened domestic banks. The crisis began in earnest in August of 1997 when the 
government gave up defending the rupiah’s peg and allowed it to freely float. The next two years 
consisted of a severe economic contraction as the money supply dwindled, the government faced 
severe fiscal constraints, financial intermediation halted, and negotiations with the IMF for 
emergency lending led to huge popular protests and social unrest. When the worst of the crisis 
was over, over 80 million Indonesians or 40 per cent of the population had fallen below the 
poverty line, Soeharto’s thirty-two year rule was over, foreign banks had mostly replaced private 
domestic institutions, and state-owned banks consolidated their substantial market share over 
domestic lending activities. 
The crisis of 1997-1998 decimated the domestic financial sector, which had experienced 
substantial overheating through the early 1990s due to poor regulations and politically connected 
lending decisions. At the time of crisis onset, the Indonesian banking sector comprised 90 
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percent of all domestic financial assets (Dobson and Jacquet 1998), the country had no system of 
deposit insurance, and local banks had the lowest capital adequacy ratios in the region (Sorsa 
1997). Lax regulations on domestic banks’ foreign borrowing contributed to the highest foreign 
debt to foreign reserves ratio in the region, high levels of public debt denominated in foreign 
currency, and comparatively low levels of foreign reserves (Cook 2008). Moreover, domestic 
lending was so concentrated and so politically driven that as the crisis took hold, the largest 21 
debtors were responsible for a third of the value of all non-performing loans (NPLs) in the 
banking sector and all of these large debtors had substantial political and business ties to the 
Soeharto regime (Asami 2000).  
When BI abandoned its commitment to maintain the rupiah’s value in August 1997, bank 
balance sheets quickly deteriorated as the value of foreign denominated liabilities grew 48 
percent in 1997. By the end of the year, NPLs topped 32 percent of outstanding debt (Cook 
2008). Facing increasing strains on BI resources as local banks drew on central bank overdrafts, 
the Soeharto regime announced the first of four IMF emergence assistance packages in October 
1997. The initial loan package was a result of negotiations in which the IMF conditioned 
assistance on closing politically connected insolvent banks. When the government closed 16 
small local banks that represented less than three percent of total domestic bank assets, investors 
responded with a run on private banks to shift their funds into state banks that were assumed to 
implicitly guarantee deposits (Chou 1999). As a result, the private domestic banks, many of 
which were affiliated with large conglomerates and tightly connected to the Soeharto regime, 
bore the brunt of the banking crisis.  
One of the banks subjected to closure, Bank Andromeda, was owned by one of 
Soeharto’s sons. In December 1997, the bank was permitted to remain open by purchasing 
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another bank license, which cemented IMF concern that conditions would not be followed and 
popular opinion that the cause of the crisis was not international financial markets but a deeply 
corrupt New Order regime that maintained power through its patrimonial control over domestic 
finance (Milner 2003).  The status of bank closures remained a constant source of friction 
between the Soeharto regime and the IMF during bailout negotiations. On 9 March 1998, the 
IMF refused to release a $3 billion tranche citing Soeharto’s unwillingness to abide by the loans 
conditions. At the same time, popular protest over rising food prices and IMF demands to end 
food and fuel subsidies placed additional pressure on the regime. Student protests over IMF 
conditions on subsidies erupted in January of 1998, preceded by a run on food supplies. The 
ensuing riots led the US to provide a $70 million food and medical aid package in an attempt to 
quell unrest. On 8 April 1998, only after the sustained popular protests, Soeharto conceded to 
IMF pressures and agrees to more bank closures in exchange for the IMF dropping conditions 
over food and fuel subsidies.  
 The shift in content in Letters of Intent between the government of Indonesia and the 
IMF during this time is particularly instructive. The 31 October 1997 letter emphasizes 
improving the government’s fiscal position by eliminating fuel subsidies, has a section on 
reducing equity restrictions on foreign direct investment, and in its section on social safety nets 
emphasizes the potential benefits of rupiah depreciation in increasing agriculture exports. 
Concerns about social spending are relegated to educational and medical spending: 
Indonesia has made significant progress in alleviating poverty over the past 30 
years. Yet, large numbers of poor still remain, and it is imperative that the 
adjustment program does not result in a worsening of their economic and social 
conditions. The depreciation should benefit the rural poor by raising output prices 
in the export-oriented agricultural sector. Measures necessary to achieve fiscal 
targets will protect expenditures on health and education.  
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The 10 April 1998 letter includes a lengthy section on the need to support the food and fuel 
needs of Indonesia’s poor through subsidies. The section on liberalizing foreign investment is 
replaced with a commitment to supporting the development of small and medium scale 
enterprise and cooperatives through preferential credit allocation. The social safety net section 
explicitly states:  
It is imperative that the adjustment program does not result in a worsening of the 
economic and social conditions of the poor. Our policies stated previously on 
providing a social safety net will be continued and strengthened. As noted above, 
budgetary subsidies on food, fuel and electricity have been increased. The 
Government also is broadening subsidized credit schemes for small- and medium-
size enterprises where most of the non-agricultural labor force is employed.  
 
 Increased popular pressures, coupled with IMF negotiations that forced the Soeharto 
regime to choose between popular demands and protecting its allies in the domestic financial 
sector, proved fatal. Soeharto resigned in May of 1998. The domestic banking elite no longer had 
privileged political access and many fled the country (Pepinsky 2009). Without Soeharto and the 
financial interests that supported his regime, the new government quickly lifted foreign 
ownership restrictions in the financial sector. The IMF and technocrats in the newly created 
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) were key actors in implementing this policy 
(Sato 2003).  
The IBRA was created in February 1998 as an asset management corporation tasked with 
socializing bank recapitalization by acquiring NPLs from distressed banks. It quickly acquired 
close to 500 trillion rupiah in bank assets, gained controlling stakes in 54 banks, and controlled 
close to 80 percent of bank assets by the end of its acquisitions (Claessens et al. 2000). In the 
process, the agency was repeatedly accused of political favoritism and many believed it bailed 
out insolvent banks alongside illiquid ones (Cook 2008). In May of 1999, the Bank of Indonesia 
issued a directive allowing up to 99 percent foreign ownership of local banks (from 49 
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percent).86 Additionally, conditions on foreign branching were eliminated (Tambunan 2011). 
Foreign banks were not eligible to sell NPLs to IBRA, but were the primary buyers of previously 
nationalized local private banks when IBRA initiated sales starting in 2002. Table 6.1 provides 
the details of these sales.   
The decision to liberalize foreign equity ceilings in the banking sector marked an 
important, but circumscribed, change in domestic banking market structure. The Habibie 
government was in large part forced to open the banking sector to further foreign participation 
due to the extent to which private local banks were unable to raise funds necessary to submit 
tender offers. Financial interests strongly opposed this move, but had lost their key ally when 
Soeharto resigned; many of them subsequently fled the country (Pepinsky 2013b). At the same 
time, IMF conditionality made substantial government borrowing to facilitate local control over 
private banks untenable. Democratization also made it difficult to provide public support of local 
private banks since public perception painted these banks as corrupt vestiges of Soeharto’s 
patrimonial practices. As a result of IBRA sales of previously nationalized private banks to 
foreign entities, by the end of 2002 foreign banks controlled more than 30 percent of total 
banking sector assets (Sato 2005). However, as table 6.1 suggests, ownership structures of banks 
with foreign participation remained far below legal limits; most foreign banks obtained equity 
positions just large enough to confer majority status. Moreover, the government retained 
centralized control over acquisitions by foreigners; all equity acquisitions over 25 percent 
required BI authorization (Robson and Loveless 2013).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!86!The Banking Law No. 7 of 1997, which was amended by Law No. 10 of 1998 began 
restructure the banking sector, but it was not until this 1999 decree that foreign equity 
participation was expanded. 
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While the government ceded market share from private local banks to foreign ones, it 
also used the financial crisis to consolidate its control over state-owned banking institutions. The 
original IMF lending agreement from October 1997 emphasized a need to consolidate and 
privatize state-owned banks. In October 1998, the government directed its three weakest state-
owned banks to merge into Bank Mandiri, which immediately became the largest bank in 
Indonesia (Cook 2008). However, the government never followed through with a comprehensive 
bank privatization program and to date no state-owned banks have sold off controlling shares to 
local or foreign private interests (Robson and Loveless 2013). In 2003, the government did sell a 
40 percent stake in state-owned Bank Rakyat Indonesia to multiple investors, but did so in a way 
to ensure continued state control over operating decisions (Cook 2008). Announced plans to 
pursue further bank privatizations including BI were permanently put on hold during the 2008 
global financial crisis. As a result, the banking sector in Indonesia has a strong state and foreign 
presence with an absence of significant private domestic bank holdings.  
The continued dominance of state-owned banks means that large and well connected 
domestic firms continue to receive preferential lending terms while small and medium 
enterprises are largely frozen out of credit markets (ADB 2005). The transfer of market share 
from private domestic to foreign banks has resulted in a decline in local private bank market 
share from 52 percent in 1996 to 35 percent in 2000 (Sato 2005) and a banking structure in 
which one third of all banks have some amount of foreign equity participation and 10 of the 15 
largest banks in the country have significant foreign ownership (Robson and Loveless 2012).  
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But, continued state presence in the sector as well as BI screening over significant foreign 
banking acquisitions mean that the Indonesian banking sector has undergone a far less radical 
transformation with respect to how credit allocation decisions are made than one might initially 
assume. The state’s continued fundamental control over credit allocation is also highlighted by 
several recent banking law decisions that are making the domestic banking sector less open to 
foreign equity. A 2012 decision to halt a foreign acquisition of Bank Danamon along with a new 
complex banking law that limits individual firms and individuals’ bank equity holdings has made 
it impossible for a foreign bank to take immediate majority ownership in an Indonesian bank 
(Robson and Loveless 2012). In other words, Indonesia’s banking sector reforms in the wake of 
the 1997 crisis introduced foreign equity participation in the sector without fundamentally 
weakening the state’s substantial control over credit allocation. Local banks linked to family-
owned conglomerates lost their ability to provide cheap leverage to their business partners, but 
state-owned banks are still large players in the domestic credit market and continue to provide 
substantial lending services to well-connected firms. 
Malaysia 
 Malaysia pursued a different response to its twin banking and currency crisis. Unlike 
Indonesia, it resisted IMF concessional lending in favor of a heterodox policy response aimed at 
protecting the domestic banking sector from foreign takeovers and preserving macroeconomic 
policy autonomy. Malaysia’s go-it-alone strategy in large part reflected its relatively strong fiscal 
position and the fact that its banks were not as deeply distressed as were Indonesia’s, primarily 
because prudential regulation prevented Malaysian banks from amassing the same level of 
foreign-asset denominated debt from abroad. It also reflected considerably more preference 
homogeneity among business elites. Most Malaysian firms preferred adjustment through 
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temporary capital controls and a re-pegged ringgit, primarily because the most politically 
important business interests had predominately fixed capital assets (Pepinsky 2012). Mobile 
asset holders who were disadvantaged by capital controls were mostly ethnic Chinese 
Malaysians and largely marginalized from politics (Pepinksy 2008a, 2012).  
The politics of rejecting IMF assistance clearly reflected a commitment to the NEP. In 
Prime Minister Mahathir’s 19 June 1998 address to the UMNO General Assembly, he stated: 
[I]f we have to resort to the International Monetary Fund assistance ..., the 
conditions imposed by the IMF will require us to open up our economy to 
foreigners. There will not be any Bumiputera quota as the New Economic Policy is 
an injustice, and unacceptable to their liberal democracy (as quoted in Athukorala 
2010, 16).87 
 
At the same time, the Malaysian government’s decision to protect local banks meant it did not 
have access to foreign bank assets. As a result, while the goals of local equity ownership were 
deepened in the financial sector, the ensuing credit crunch led to a relaxation of foreign equity 
restrictions in the real sector (Cook 2008). In other words, Malaysia did open its economy to 
foreign equity as a result of the crisis. However, the process of opening was deliberate and 
unfolded as credit conditions made Malaysian business groups embrace liberalization. 
 Indonesia chose to recapitalize banks through foreign acquisition. Malaysia, in contrast, 
used two state-owned special entities to facilitate consolidation and recapitalization. First, 
through a special act of parliament the government created Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional 
(Danaharta) in 1998 as a special vehicle owned by the Ministry of Finance and tasked with 
acquiring NPLs from local banks at a discount. This allowed banks to clean up their balance 
sheets and unload toxic assets. Danaharta acquired NPLs with a face value of 47.49 billion 
ringgit or 43 percent of all NPLs in Malaysia at an average discount of forty percent. BNM !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Dato’ Seri Bin Mohamad Mahathir, Currency Turmoil: Selected Speeches and Articles by 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Lomkokwing Integrated), 60-61. 
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subsequently established a special purpose vehicle, Danamodal, to provide liquidity to local 
banks. Over the course of the crisis, Danamodal injected close to 8 billion ringgit into ten of the 
largest Malaysian banks. Both entities were funded by state-guaranteed local bond issues that 
were mostly held by state pension and investment funds. In this way, the Malaysian government 
chose to socialize the cost of bank recapitalization rather than open the banking sector to foreign 
equity. The total cost of recapitalization reached 60 billion ringgit. Danamodal closed out its 
mandate in 2003; Danharta followed in 2005. 
 The government also intervened to guide bank consolidation. However, while Indonesia’s 
crisis response led to an increased importance of both foreign and state banks, consolidation in 
Malaysia did not fundamentally alter the distribution of bank equity among the state, local, and 
foreign investors. Instead, BNM issued a plan in July of 1999 in which small local banks would 
be required to merge quickly with six chosen “anchor” banks. Many banks balked at this plan 
both because the BNM mandate did not allow banks to negotiate their own mergers but also 
because the choice of anchors was seen as a way for the new Finance Minister Diam Zainuddin 
to punish political allies of the disgraced former Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister 
Anwar Ibrahim.88 Subsequently, BNM modified the plan to allow existing banks to choose 
which of a list of ten anchor banks they would merge with. Table 6.2 shows the results of the 
consolidation. 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Anwar led a coalition of neoliberal reformers from within the UMNO to challenge Prime 
Minister Mahathir’s response to the financial crisis. Central to his argument was the ruling party 
manipulated the NEP to further enrich well-connected bumiputeras while failing to lift ordinary 
citizens out of poverty. His orthodox economic preferences gained him vocal allies among 
foreign business communities and he was removed from his posts in September 1998. That 
October he was jailed after leading public rallies for reform. 
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Table 6.2 Final anchor bank groupings 
Anchor bank Merged banks Total assets (billion ringgit) 
Anchor bank 
asset growth 
Malayan Bank Pacific Bank, 117.5 16% 
 
Phileo-Allied Bank 
  Bumiputra-Commerce None 82 - 
Bank Utama RHB Bank 64.9 656% 
Public Bank Hock Hua Bank 50.9 13% 
Arab-Malaysian Bank None 41.1 - 
Multi-Purpose Bank Sabah Bank, 38.3 40% 
 
International Bank 
Malaysia 
  Perwira Affin Bank Bank Simpanan 33.1 34% 
Hong Leong Bank Wah Tat Bank 30.2 4% 
Southern Bank Ban Hin Lee Bank 25.1 77% 
EON Bank Oriental Bank 23.6 71% 
    Source: (Cook 2008, pg. 93) 
  Note: Asset growth calculation only includes commercial bank assets 
 
 Malaysia’s statist approach to banking sector recapitalization and restructuring, along 
with its continued commitment to preserving high local equity ownership requirements in the 
sector have lead some to argue the financial crisis amounts to a missed opportunity for banking 
sector reforms (Cook 2008). However, this interpretation is misguided. While Malaysia remained 
restrictive of foreign entry,89 crisis response led to greater banking sector reform in two key 
areas: privatization and prudential regulatory oversight. Both of these reforms led to increased 
competition and more market-based credit allocation decisions, which reflect in Malaysia’s 
lower net interest margins compared with Indonesia (See table 6.3). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 And, as will be describe in greater detail below, the Malaysian financial sector has 
subsequently undergone multiple reforms that have reduced, but not eliminated, restrictions to 
foreign bank entry. 
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 The first area of banking reform is privatization. Ownership structures of Malaysian 
banks are typically challenging to assess since banks are primarily owned through publically 
listed shares. Therefore, even though state investment vehicles frequently hold shares of banks, 
they do not hold majority positions. Before the crisis, the government of Malaysia held a 
significant equity stake in both Bank Bumiputra and Sime Bank. Both of these banks were 
heavily exposed to NPLs, and their size along with their quickly eroding balance sheets led the 
government to find local buyers for these institutions in 1998, before the creation of Danaharta 
and Danamodal. Bank of Commerce acquired Bank Bumiputra and RHB Bank acquired Sime 
Bank, each with generous terms from the government including a guaranteed ability to unload 
NPLs to Danaharta at face value (Cook 2008, 88-89). These mergers effectively diluted the 
government’s equity share in these banks to the point that the state owned less than 30 percent of 
each of these merged banks; RHB’s acquisition in 1999 by Utama Bank further reduced 
government’s ownership in the banking system.  
Some observers have emphasized the state’s continued equity stakes in these banks 
through GLIC holdings in bank parent companies. However, while government ownership of 
banking assets in 2011 was close to 23 percent when measured on an effective interest basis 
(OECD 2013, 32), the state no longer has a majority stake in any domestic bank.90 Furthermore, 
unlike typical models of state-owned banks, government ownership of banks in Malaysia is 
indirect; GLCs take equity participation through investment vehicles that make them primarily 
responsible to unit holders investing for profit rather than government officials (OECD 2013). 
Furthermore, unlike banks owned directly by state entities, banks in Malaysia with GLC equity 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!90!Databases that define state-ownership as 50 percent or greater record Malaysia as having no 
state-owned banks. See, for example, Hankins and Minhaljek (2001). 
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participation do not benefit from soft financing constraints.91 In other words, while the 
Malaysian government does retain passive equity holdings in several domestic banks through its 
GLICs, the state relinquished much of its control over banks in response to the 1997 financial 
crisis. Unlike Indonesia, the Malaysian government does not operate banks and no banks in 
Malaysia enjoy an implicit and open-ended funding guarantee from the central government. 
 Second, the Malaysian government increased prudential regulation after temporarily 
easing rules on classifying non-performing loans during the height of the crisis.92 In 1997, 
Malaysia already compiled with 23 of the 25 core principles of the Bank for International 
Settlements. However, the government responded to the financial crisis by deepening prudential 
regulations, particularly by shifting from a compliance-based to a risk-based approach to 
supervision. The government devised the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) and a series of 
Capital Market Master Plans in consultation with the private sector to develop a plan for 
strengthening regulatory framework while deepening access to bank-based and market-based 
finance and gradually increasing foreign participation in the financial sector (OECD 2013).  As a 
result, several programs aimed at increasing regulatory oversight were implemented in the 
following decade. In 2004, Malaysia adopted Basel II standards. In 2005, it created a deposit 
insurance system; Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia. The Central Bank Act of 2009 
increased BNM’s surveillance and supervisory capabilities. In 2010, the Credit Reporting 
Agencies Act created a centralized bureau for collecting information about creditworthiness. In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!91!See Gonzalez-Garcia and Grigoli (2013) for a detailed discussion of soft financing constraints 
and state-owned banks. See Ramírez and Hui Tan (2004) for econometric evidence GLCs do not 
have preferential credit access in the Singaporean context. 
 92!BNM temporarily allowed banks to extend the arrears window on loans from three to six 
months (Cook 2008). 
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January 2012, Malaysia became fully compliant with International Financial Reporting 
Standards. 
In particular, increased prudential regulation raises the cost of debt financing relative to 
equity sources of investment, at least for large firms that benefit from loose regulatory 
standards.93 Indeed, we can see the effect regulatory reforms had on reducing preferential access 
to finance of large, politically connected industries by the extent to which smaller firms, the 
traditional losers of financial repression,94 benefited from reforms. Interest rates for SMEs 
averaged below 5 percent from 1998 to 2005; as a result, their share of total corporate lending 
increased from 27 percent in 1998 to 40 percent in 2009 (OECD 2013).  
Finally, under the Financial Sector Master Plan, the Malaysian government is gradually 
opening the domestic banking sector to increased foreign competition. In 2003, the government 
ended its requirement that foreign firms raise 50 percent of their locally-required credit from 
local banks. As table 6.6 indicates, Malaysia has recently pursued a number of reforms aimed to 
increase the operational freedom of incumbent foreign banks. In 2006, BNM announced foreign 
incumbent banks would be eligible for up to four new licenses. In addition to relaxation of 
foreign equity requirements in Islamic banking, the government also began to issue new foreign 
bank licenses in 2009. The lifting of foreign bank ATM restrictions in 2011 removed a major 
barrier to foreign banks trying to compete for retail customers (OECD 2013).  
Post Crisis Banking Sectors Compared 
As detailed above, Indonesia and Malaysia pursued different crisis response strategies in 
the wake of the Asian financial crisis and these strategies affected banking sector structure and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 See Rosser (2004), Pepinsky (2013a).  
 
94 See Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Abiad & Mody (2005) for further discussion of why small 
firms are disadvantaged by financial sector repression. 
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competition. Table 6.3 reports key banking sector indicators in Indonesia and Malaysia from 
1990 to 2010. We see how key measures of banking sector performance have diverged post-
crisis. For example, both countries experienced a decline in the percentage of bank assets that are 
state owned, but in Indonesia the state owns more than half of all banking assets while the 
Government of Malaysia owns less than one percent of all banking assets in its country. Data on 
net interest margin, a common indicator of profitability, is not available pre-crisis, however we 
see that Indonesia has an average net interest margin twice as large as Malaysia; this indicates 
the Malaysian banking sector is more competitive than is Indonesia. Furthermore, net interest 
margin in Malaysia is comparable to averages in advanced industrial countries with more highly 
developed financial sectors.  
Table 6.3 Indonesia and Malaysia Banking Sector Indicators 1990-2010 
      Indonesia 1990 1995 1997 1998 2000 2005 2010 
 
Bank Credit to Deposits1 131 121.6 118.2 95.9 40.4 65.8 75.9 
 
Bank Deposits to GDP1 30 39.2 46 48.9 44.7 35.6 31.9 
 
% Bank Assets State Owned2 55 
 
72.8 
 
55.1 
 
45.2 
 
% Bank Assets Foreign3 4 
 
9 
 
31 32 46 
 
Concentration1 
 
72.8 43.4 40.2 64.3 42.9 44.8 
 
    Net Interest Margin1 
   
-3.86 2.47 5.81 6.64 
 
Return on Equity1 
   
408.3 5.59 16.3 20.2 
         Malaysia               
 
Bank Credit to Deposits1 126.5 120.2 140.5 134 112.3 97.36 89.1 
 
Bank Deposits to GDP1 80.6 94.99 102.1 113.1 107.6 105.9 119 
 
% Bank Assets State Owned2 
 
13.05 
  
0.45 
 
 
% Bank Assets Foreign3 24 18 18 18 18 17 18 
 
Concentration1 
  
43.95 41.26 50.27 49.56 54.2 
 
Net Interest Margin1 
   
3.17 3.37 3.5 2.99 
  Return on Equity1       0.16 12.29 18.77 15.7 
1) IMF Financial Development and Structure Dataset 
2) 2 Cornett, Guo, Khaksari, and Tehranian (2009); IMF (2012); State-owned defined as at 
least 20% stake 
3) Claessens and Van Horen (2012); Foreign-owned defined as at least 50% stake 
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The indicators in Table 6.3 as a whole suggest the financial sector in Indonesia, though it 
became less concentrated after 1997, retains several key characteristics of repression. The state 
directs a large share of credit allocation decisions due its ownership of close to half of all bank 
assets. Banks are relatively well protected from competition, as indicated by high net interest 
margin and return on equity. Financial development remains weak, as denoted by a bank credit 
to deposit ratio around 76 percent and a bank deposit to GDP ratio close to 30 percent.  
In contrast, Malaysia’s banking sector, as a result of its restructuring post-crisis, displays 
the hallmarks of financial sector development and liberalization. While bank credit to deposits is 
lower than its 1997 peak of 140 percent, it is close to 90 percent and bank deposits to GDP 
reached a peak in 2010 at 119 percent. While the percentage of bank assets owned by foreigners 
has remained steady at 18 percent, the state has largely divested its control of bank assets. While 
bank concentration has increased since 1997, this has not been through nationalization. As a 
result of these liberalizing measures, banks in Malaysia face similar levels of competition as do 
their counterparts in advanced industrial economies. This is illustrated by Malaysian banks’ 
relatively low net interest margin and return on equity averages post-crisis.  
Disparate crisis-response policies, therefore, resulted in quite different banking sector 
structures in Indonesia and Malaysia. The fundamentals of the Indonesian financial sector 
indicate a repressed system with credit rationing in which large and politically powerful firms 
receive preferential lending terms, banks are insulated from competition, and smaller and less 
politically connected firms are denied debt financing. Malaysia, in contrast, has continued to 
develop and deepen its financial sector by privatizing and liberalizing the sector. As we will see 
below, these developments have implications for societal support for liberal FDI policy. The 
Indonesian government is still able to leverage its financial system to provide preferential credit 
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to key supporters. Access to subsidized debt financing has encouraged the most important 
business groups in Indonesia to actively lobby to increase foreign equity restrictions; this has 
substantially stalled and even reversed FDI policy reforms. Debt finance in Malaysia is no longer 
driven by state preferences and bureaucratic favors. The decoupling of the state and the banking 
sector has led to increased competition among banks, increased access to debt finance for smaller 
and less politically powerful firms, and the decline of subsidized credit to politically important 
corporations and industries. As a result, business groups in Malaysia have substantially changed 
their lobbying strategy over FDI policy from one of advocating regulatory exclusion to one that 
champions liberalization. This strategic shift has motivated the Malaysian government to 
gradually reduce barriers to FDI even in the face of opposition from bumiputera workers who 
may not be well organized, but who form an important base of support for the ruling UMNO. 
Investment Policy Politics 
 In this section I outline the politics of investment policy in Indonesia and Malaysia from 
1997 to 2013, paying particular attention to lobbying efforts of business groups. As described 
below, Indonesia underwent immediate but partial FDI reform following 1997. After IMF 
pressure to liberalize foreign equity restriction subsided, however, reform efforts stalled and then 
backtracked significantly starting in 2009. These policy developments reflect the policy 
preferences of politically important business groups that have consistently lobbied to protect 
domestic firms from foreign entrants. Indonesian business interests have largely relied on state-
led credit allocation to finance investment and industrial expansion while eschewing FDI except 
in specific circumstances. Malaysia’s approach to FDI liberalization has been more gradual but 
consistent. Following a substantial change to the banking sector following the 1997 financial 
crisis, business leaders increasingly looked to foreign firms as sources of investment equity. 
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Malaysia’s long history of consulting closely with business groups has led to substantial opening 
of the economy to foreign entrants, and with increasingly less oversight. 
Indonesia 
As figure 6.1 indicates, Indonesia experienced a rather immediate but partial FDI 
liberalization following the 1997 crisis, mostly at the instance of the IMF. Afterward, however, 
reform stalled. A new investment law was passed in 2007, but did not result in substantial 
openness; Indonesia’s performance on the OECD FDI restrictiveness index did not change as a 
result of the new law. Moreover, in recent years Indonesia has seen an increase in FDI 
restriction, especially with respect to mining, agriculture, and processing these raw materials. 
The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) has used its influence in BKPM 
and PEPI to spearhead this protectionist push. As a result, in 2013, Indonesia had an FDI policy 
climate that was more liberal than it was in 1997, but substantially more restrictive than most 
countries for which the OECD monitors investment climate.  
Initial post-crisis FDI reform was driven by a decision to liberalize the banking sector to 
recapitalize failing domestic banks and IMF conditionality that demanded decreased foreign 
equity restrictions in several key sub-sectors including retail and wholesale trade and palm oil 
plantations.95 The IMF also initially demanded a revision of Indonesia’s negative list, which was 
originally scheduled to be completed by 30 June 1998. However, this condition was 
subsequently dropped in the 19 October Letter of Intent (LOI). The decision to eliminate this 
requirement and focus conditionality on bank restructuring and fiscal discipline was in part due 
to the more immediate needs of crisis response, but also reflected targeted push back by Soeharto 
with respect to FDI liberalization. According to J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, former Governor of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 IMF – Indonesia 10 April 1998 Letter of Intent Appendix, pg. 15 
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the Bank of Indonesia, Soeharto explicitly stated in a 21 January 1998 cabinet meeting that he 
was unprepared to comply with the LOI’s condition of eliminating foreign equity restrictions 
stating “the national development that was based on the development trilogy as stated in the state 
guidelines has been securely ingrained in our society” (Djiwandono 2005, 163).  
Unlike foreign equity restrictions in the banking sector, which were quickly eliminated 
after Soeharto’s departure from power, FDI policy toward the real sector was not fundamentally 
altered following regime change. Instead, the government of Indonesia has continued to pursue 
an FDI policy that is fundamentally targeted and conditional in nature, meaning it uses an array 
of fiscal and legal incentives to attract FDI into sectors it wishes to promote while maintaining 
high levels of restrictions on FDI in sectors it wishes to protect for indigenous firms. This 
guiding policy framework has been implemented through the 2007 Law on Investment, which 
mostly clarified rather than liberalized FDI policy, and increased efforts to implement targeted 
investment incentives. Investment policy has become more restrictive since 2009, with the 
passage of a protectionist mining law and a series of investment regulatory decisions that are 
widely seen as illiberal.  
Table 6.4 FDI liberalization in Indonesia 1997-2010 
1997 Presidential Decree removes 49% foreign equity limit on purchases of listed shares  
1998 Full foreign ownership allowed in banking 
1999 BKPM no longer requires Presidential signature for approvals 
  Local content program for motor vehicles phased out 
  Fully foreign ownership of holding companies allowed, including through 
acquisitions 
  Several sectors opened further to FDI, including retail, general importing, palm oil 
planations, broadcasting and downstream operation in the oil sector. 
2007 Investment Law does away with general divestiture requirements 
  New Negative List opens some sectors to greater foreign participation 
2009 Mining Law allows foreign ownership of concessions 
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  Electricity Law allows for private operators in areas not served by PLN 
2010 New Negative List opens some sectors to greater foreign participation  
Source: OECD 2010, 45 
 As table 6.4 indicates, Indonesia made no major alterations to its FDI law between 1999 
and 2007. In 1999, to comply with IMF loan conditions, several sectors were opened to FDI by 
presidential decree. The next notable change to investment law came in 2007 with the passage of 
the 2007 Law on Investment, which replaced the 1967 law and unified the investment code for 
foreign and domestic investors. The government engaged in extensive consultation with business 
groups as it prepared the law. BKPM held multiple advisory meetings with chambers of 
commerce and investor groups, both foreign and domestic in origin. But, as the primary lobbying 
group for domestic investors, KADIN was the most influential business group in pre-legislative 
discussions (OECD 2010). The law was applauded mainly for clarifying regulations and 
procedures that had previously been confusing. In particular, it provided guidance on investment 
licensing procedures and on restricted sectors. At the same time, it failed to reform land 
ownership restrictions and has been accused of fostering the impression that foreign equity 
restrictions are arbitrary and subject to capricious manipulation by bureaucrats.  
First, the 2007 Investment Law clarified and, in some ways, simplified investment 
licensing procedures. The BKPM is in charge of investment licensing; administering licenses 
now comprises 70 percent of its operating budget (OECD 2010, 90). Unlike in earlier years, the 
BKPM’s screening authority is limited to ensuring investment proposals comply with current 
laws, especially foreign equity restrictions. BKPM is not endowed with the power to reject 
investment applications for any other reason, including vague considerations of the “national 
interest.” Importantly, the 2007 law provides investors the right to sue if their proposals are 
rejected on grounds not stipulated in law. However, the investment licensing process is much 
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more complex than the 2007 reform suggests due to the 1999 Regional Autonomy Law (RAL). 
The RAL granted broad licensing authority to subnational governments, which has led to a 
fragmented and overlapping licensing and permitting environment.   
Investment approval from BKPM is just the start of a complex set of licenses and 
approvals investors must obtain from a variety of central and regional government agencies. 
Companies are required to obtain several different kinds of onerous permits before participating 
in government tenders or applying for bank loans. Local governments’ regulatory authority 
means BKPM cannot mandate streamlining of regulatory procedures nor require provinces to set 
up “one-stop-shops” for obtaining business licenses. As a result, there is a large regional 
disparity in ease of doing business; the Jakarta Special Capital Region is generally held as an 
example of a foreign investor-friendly regulatory environment while many more rural provinces 
rich in natural resources tend to have much more complex and onerous licensing requirements 
(OECD 2010). Foreign investors have repeatedly voiced their frustration with decentralization of 
business licenses and approval, arguing such policies create legal uncertainty and expose firms to 
the whims of local leaders.96 However, KADIN and its affiliates actively lobbied for 
decentralized licensing and permitting procedures because they view their local political ties as a 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis foreign firms (IBC 2007). Moreover, since domestic investors 
only require local approval, foreign firms complain the national level BKMP screening is 
discriminatory against FDI (U.S. State Department, 2013).  
In addition to a complex screening process that discriminates against foreign investment 
and was promoted by local business interests, the 2007 Investment Law also included a new and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Shoeb Kagda, “Jakarata Needs to Engage Provinces; It Must Work with Provinces in 
Reforming Cumbersome Regulations Imposed by Regional Governments,” The Business Times 
Singapore, 15 February, 2005. 
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expanded negative list of subsectors in which foreign investors face equity ceilings. The revised 
negative list included 338 subsectors subject to foreign investment limits, which was a large 
increase for the 83 subsectors included on the previous negative list.97 Energy, plantation 
agriculture, and mobile and fixed-line telecommunications all experienced increased restrictions; 
fixed-line telecom saw the most substantial closure from a 95 percent foreign equity cap to a 
required minority position (49 percent). Mari Pangestu, the Trade Minister at the time, 
maintained the new list was formulated to protect “national interests,” while regional news 
analysts argued the restrictive list reflected the government’s need to bolster support among 
indigenous business groups in the run up to the 2009 elections.98 The composition of the negative 
list reflects the government’s long-standing policy of protecting small and medium sized 
indigenous firms from foreign competition, and the 2007 investment reforms also included 
extensive state-led credit programs aimed at financing local companies (OECD 2010). 
Importantly, the 2007 Investment Law places authority over the negative list with the executive 
and does not require parliamentary approval.  
In tandem with the new investment law, the government of Indonesia also introduced a 
new incentive program. Foreign investment incentives have been contentious in Indonesia. 
Incentives were first introduced in 1967, canceled in 1984, reinstated in 1996, and again 
canceled in 2000. The 2007 re-introduction of incentives had several key features including an 
expanded role for BKPM. Under the new law, foreign investors wishing to qualify for incentives 
must apply to the BKPM, which evaluates applications based on a range of factors including: 
employment creation potential, whether the proposed investment would contribute to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Bill Guerin, “Indonesia Blacklists FDI,” Asia Times Online, 10 July, 2007. 
 
98 Bill Guerin, “Indonesia Blacklists FDI,” Asia Times Online, 10 July, 2007. 
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infrastructure construction or technology transfer, whether the proposed investment is a priority 
activity or a pioneer industry, whether the project would be located in a depressed area or 
promote environmental sustainability, and whether the project will contribute to local business 
development through research and development, local partnership, or by using local content. If 
BKPM thinks the project deserves fiscal incentives, it forwards a recommendation to the 
Ministry of Finance. If the Ministry of Finance concurs, it publishes individual decrees to 
authority incentives for specific projects.  
The framework of incentives and conditions for eligibility are controlled by the National 
Team on Export and Investment Promotion (PEPI), which was formed in 2003, is chaired by the 
president, and includes extensive involvement of BKPM and KADIN officials. The targeted 
nature of these incentives, combined with individual project eligibility screening requirements, 
further indicate the extent to which Indonesian FDI policy remains fundamentally conditionally 
open in construction. A 1999 review of ASEAN FDI policy review is particularly negative 
toward such screening boards: 
The screening agency serves a political purpose as well as an economic one. It 
demonstrates to a local population, which may be hostile to, or suspicious of, 
foreign investment, that such investments are actively monitored by the 
government. The principal aim of such an agency, however, is to further the 
development strategies of the host government. The agency will favour certain 
sectors on a priority list or those investors that fulfill pre-established criteria, 
usually related to exports. (Thomsen 1999, 19) 
 
KADIN’s influence in BKPM, especially since the two signed a memorandum of understanding 
in 2009, further ensures FDI incentives target projects that benefit local partners (OECD 2010, 
89). 
Despite tentative movements toward openness described above, Indonesia has 
experienced backtracking with respect to FDI policy since 2009. The 2009 Mining Law is a 
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prime example of such protectionism. Mining investments had previously been regulated through 
a 1967 law that had been widely seen as stable and transparent, but had become increasingly 
difficult to sustain after the 1999 RAL. The 2009 Law stipulates several conditions that 
discriminate against foreign investors. For example, foreign operators must transfer 20 percent of 
project equity to local private or public investors within nine years of the initial investment. 
Regional powers have created more uncertainty over foreign ownership, sometimes canceling 
mining licenses without warning or clear cause.99 Additionally, the law places restrictions on 
foreign-owned mining services companies, requiring all refining and processing to occur locally 
and phasing out foreign-owned service companies as local firms develop greater technical 
capabilities. KADIN officials stated publically in 2012 they were actively campaigning to further 
restrict foreign investment in mining through the elimination of profit-sharing and long-term 
mineral rights to foreign entities.100 
The backsliding in foreign mining rights is indicative of a broader pattern of policy 
slippages in Indonesia due to consistently positive economic performance. KADIN officials have 
argued Indonesia’s strong growth indicates, “it may be time to complete Sukarno’s 1958 
revolution, [and] kick out the foreigners.”101  This anti-FDI sentiment reflected in Bank 
Indonesia’s blockage of a domestic bank’s acquisition by a Singaporean holding company in 
April 2012, an announcement of new foreign equity restrictions in banking in the same month, 
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99 Eric Bellman, “Regional Powers Sting Firms in Indonesia,” The Wall Street Journal, 8 
October, 2013. 
 
100 John Berthelsen, “Indonesia Makes Tracks for Economic Nationalism,” The Nation, 12 June, 
2012. 
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and a series new regulations since October 2011 aimed at protecting the local palm oil refining 
industry.102 KADIN has been particularly vocal about increasing FDI restrictions in anticipation 
of the scheduled 2013 revision to the negative list, which had not been announce as of January 
2014. KADIN had successfully lobbied for further protection of domestic retail businesses in 
previous negative list revisions, and petitioned hard for restrictions in the wholesale distribution 
industry. A KADIN spokesman Fernando Hutahaean argued for a 30 percent equity cap on 
foreign investors in the subsector arguing, “The wholesale distribution business does not need 
huge capital or high-end technology to be developed. National players already have the skills. 
Foreign investment should be directed to a sector in which we lack capability.”103 This statement 
reflects a general sense among KADIN officials that the government of Indonesia should 
emulate China’s FDI policies that limit FDI to priority sectors and then guide domestic 
acquisition of foreign holdings after sufficient technology transfer has occurred.104 
Indeed, a close look at Indonesia FDI policy indicates the government’s focus on finding 
foreign equity partners to finance major infrastructure projects through public-private 
partnerships (PPPs).105 Local business leaders support such moves because inadequate roads, 
electricity, telephony, and internet connectivity are some of the largest impediments to growth in 
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the country.106 Lack of infrastructure has become even more problematic in the aftermath of the 
2004 tsunami and technological and financing constraints make many of these projects untenable 
through purely domestic input. Most liberalizing revisions to the negative list have been in 
infrastructure to accommodate this pressing need, but many in the domestic and foreign business 
communities view equity limits in these areas to be unstable and that the government will place 
increasing foreign equity restrictions on infrastructure once a sufficient number of high-priority 
projects are complete (OECD 2010, 135).  
As a result of these policy changes, Indonesia’s investment climate is best characterized 
as protectionist and unstable. An Asian Development Bank survey of firms in 2003 found 70 
percent of firm indicated policy uncertainty was a major obstacle to business (ADB 2005). The 
2007 Investment Law clarified equity restrictions, but also increased investor perception that the 
negative list is unstable and arbitrary.107 Moreover, the OECD measure of FDI restrictiveness 
finds protectionist backsliding since 2010. The restrictive stance of Indonesia’s FDI policy seems 
strange given severe long-term credit rationing. KADIN has identified long-term credit 
expansion as a primary need of the local business community.108 According to a 2009 World 
Bank Enterprise Survey, 47.9 percent of Indonesian firms identify access to finance as the most 
important constraint on business development (World Bank 2009). The same survey of 1044 
businesses found financing constraints were most severe for small and medium firms with 99 
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employees or less; large firms were more worried about the regulatory environment and 
inadequate infrastructure (World Bank 2009, 4).  
This divide between large and small firms is unsurprising; in a repressed financial 
system, smaller firms experience credit rationing while large and politically powerful firms 
receive preferential access to credit instruments. However, given the state’s dominance in the 
banking sector, with a 50 percent market share, lobbying efforts from the business community 
have focused on state-led credit expansion programs rather than further banking sector and FDI 
liberalization.109 The government has even pursued increasing equity restrictions in the banking 
sector in recent years. While the lack of sufficient long-term credit and an increasingly hostile 
policy environment toward FDI seems counter-intuitive, this dynamic is explained well by the 
overarching theory of this dissertation. When credit allocation decisions are largely driven by the 
state rather than by the market, the most politically connected firms will receive subsidized credit 
while their competitors are left out. Under these conditions, these politically connected firms will 
prefer to prevent foreign entry in order to capitalize on a larger slice of a smaller pie. 
Malaysia 
 Unlike Indonesia, Malaysia’s statutory restrictions on FDI did not change immediately 
following the financial crisis. This is largely due to the fact that Malaysia was not subject to IMF 
conditionality and it did not stabilize the banking sector through foreign acquisitions. However, 
the tenor of FDI policy did change substantially, if gradually, in the decade following the crisis 
with no major policy reversals; Table 6.6 outlines these changes. Before the crisis, Malaysia’s 
investment policy stance reflected partial openness to foreign investment that encouraged export-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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oriented investment under very specific conditions while greatly restricting domestic market-
oriented foreign investment activities. The government responded ad hoc to crisis by temporarily 
lifting equity restrictions in the manufacturing sector in 1998.110  
Table 6.5: Malaysia FDI Liberalization, 1998-2012 
1998 Temporary relaxation of foreign ownership and export requirements for 
manufacturing companies not directly competing with local producers (with certain 
sectoral exceptions). 
 Foreign equity allowed in wholesale and retail companies raised from 30% to 51% 
 Foreign equity allowed in telecommunications companies raised from 30% to 49% 
(61% on a case-by-case basis in mobile telephony), provided that the investor 
reduces the share to 30% within five years.  
2003 Removal of requirement that foreign-controlled companies obtain 50% of their local 
credit from Malaysian banks.  
 Insurers with FDI > 51% have greater operational flexibility to open up to two 
branch offices in one year.  
 Relaxation of guidelines for foreign equity participation in local firms which 
previously stipulated a 30% limit on foreign equity. 
 Indefinite extension of policy permitting 100% foreign ownership in new 
investment and expansion of existing investment in manufacturing and removal of 
sectoral exceptions. 
 New guidelines on employment of expatriates in manufacturing: companies with 
paid-up capital of at least USD 2 million receive automatic approval for up to 10 
expatriate posts.  
 Three new Islamic banking licenses offered to foreign players, with foreign equity 
participation up to 100%. 
 Four new Islamic insurance (takaful) licenses offered, with foreign participation up 
to 49% 
2005 Foreign equity participation in Islamic subsidiaries of domestic banks raised from 
30% to 49%.  
 Foreign equity participation in investment banks and takaful operators raised from 
30% to 49%.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!110!Because these equity restrictions were at first only temporarily repealed, the OECD measure 
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 March licenses for 5 foreign stock brokerage firms and 5 global fund management 
firms to operate in Malaysia. Venture capital firms can be 100% foreign-owned.  
 Foreign-controlled companies no longer face domestic borrowing requirement or 
require BNM approval for any amount of ringgit credits. 
2006 Locally-incorporated foreign banks are to be allowed to open up a 4 additional 
branches based on a distribution ratio of 1 (market center), 2 (semi-urban), and 1 
(non-urban). 
 Foreign equity participation in insurance sector raised from 30% to 49% for new 
foreign shareholders and up to 51% for the original foreign shareholders of locally 
incorporated insurance companies.  
 New licenses offered for international Islamic banks and international takaful 
operators. Foreign equity participation permitted up to 100% and both branches and 
subsidiaries allowed. 
 Government announces intention to allow spouses of foreign expatriates to work. 
2008 A further foreign stockbroking licenses announced. 
2009 Two new Islamic banking licenses offered, with a minimum paid-up capital of USD 
1 billion and with foreign equity participation for these new licenses permitted up to 
100%. 
 Two new family takaful licenses offered, with foreign equity participation permitted 
up to 70%. Foreign equity participation increased from 49% to 70% for investment 
banks, insurance companies and takaful operators and from 70% to 100% for fund 
management companies providing wholesale services. A foreign equity limit above 
70% for general insurance companies to be considered on a case-by-case basis to 
facilitate consolidation and rationalization of the general insurance industry.  
 Flexibility to increase foreign equity participation from 49% to 70% for existing 
domestic Islamic banks wishing to scale up operations by entering into strategic 
partnerships with foreign players, and maintaining a paid-up capital of at least 
USD1 billion.  
 Locally-incorporated foreign insurance companies and takaful operators allowed to 
establish branches nationwide, and to enter into bancassurance/ bancatakaful 
arrangements with banks, without restriction.  
 Locally-incorporated foreign banks allowed to establish up to four new branches in 
2010 based on a distribution ratio of 1 (market center): 2 (semi-urban): 1 (non-
urban) (additional to the four allowed in 2006 and up to ten microfinance branches).  
 Five new commercial banking licenses offered to foreign players bringing in 
specialized expertise and world-class banks offering significant value propositions.  
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 Elimination with immediate effect of foreign equity restrictions in 27 service sub-
sectors (incl. health and social services, tourism, transport, business and computer 
services).  
 Some relaxation of rules on foreign property ownership: property transactions over 
RM 500 000 for commercial, industrial and agricultural land no longer require FIC 
approval.  
 100% foreign equity allowed in some maritime services.  
 Deregulation of FIC guidelines: the FIC no longer processes any acquisitions, 
mergers or takeovers nor imposes equity conditions.  
 Foreign equity guidelines in air transport to be set by regulator and no longer fixed 
at 30%.  
2011 Flexibility from complying with the distribution ratio requirement for locally-
incorporated foreign banks that have fewer than eight branches and have yet to 
establish new branches.  
 Announcement that another 17 service sub-sectors would be liberalized in 2012. 
 Equity in stockbroking companies fully liberalized. 
Source: OECD 2013, pgs. 58-59 
Over the next decade, a long process of consultation with local business developed a 
coalition that supported major liberalizing reforms. These reforms were guided by the New 
Economic Model, which identified investment as most important component of Malaysia’s 
strategy to become an OECD country by 2020, and the Industrial Master Plan of 2006-2020, 
which focused its attention on attracting more FDI to the manufacturing and service industries 
(OECD 2013). A series of partial liberalizations of the financial sector starting in 2003 relaxed, 
but did not eliminate, equity caps on foreign equity in local banks and insurance firms. Issuance 
of additional traditional and takaful111 banking licenses followed. In 2009, the government made 
a major and permanent change to investment policy when it removed Foreign Investment 
Committee (FIC) screening for all foreign mergers and acquisitions excepting some large real 
estate transactions. In addition, the FIC was no longer authorized to place equity conditions on 
M&A activity.  The same year, the government opened 27 service sub-sectors to up to 100 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!111!Islamic banking.  
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percent foreign ownership. In 2011, the government announced a further round of investment 
liberalizations in 17 service sub-sectors and a further opening of the financial sector.  
The political process of FDI liberalization demonstrates a marked shift in the policy 
preferences of both government bureaucrats and industrial capitalists. Prior to the Asian financial 
crisis, the main policy objective of the government and supportive industrial capitalists was to 
maintain a regulatory approach of incentivizing targeted export-oriented manufacturing FDI 
while preventing foreign investors from meaningfully competing in the domestic market. This 
approach included a combination of equity restrictions on foreign participation in local business 
as well as strong centralized investment screening bureaucracy, the FIC, which was chaired by 
the Prime Minister. The FIC reviewed all applications for foreign acquisitions and approve or 
denied projects based on a set of criteria that emphasized contribution to the national interest and 
“more balanced” distribution of wealth, meaning distributing benefits to bumiputera.  
Before the financial crisis, local chambers of commerce universally supported this 
strategy of partial openness. In 1992, the Malaysian government scrapped a proposed 
liberalization measure due to local firm opposition.112 At that time, local business owners were 
particularly resistant to efforts to increase joint ventures between local and foreign firms.113 As 
late as November 1995, a coalition of Malaysian chambers of commerce including Malaysian 
Retailers’ Association, National Chamber of Commerce, Industry Malaysia, and International 
Chamber of Commerce, successfully lobbied the Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Ministry 
to implement new regulations that required wholesale and retail companies with foreign equity to 
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incorporate locally and comply with more onerous performance requirements.114 These new laws 
were widely seen as implemented to protect local business owners from foreign competition.115 
In early 1997, MITI head Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz further clarified the government’s prevailing 
policy of investment dualism in an address at the Malaysia-US Business Council Roundtable 
meeting, “We want to make sure that while welcoming foreign investors, we set a target on 
where exactly they can come in.”116 
In the aftermath of the crisis, local business groups along with key bureaucrats began to 
see investment screening, equity restrictions, and performance requirements as problematic 
barriers to foreign investors that needed to be removed in order to promote healthy economic 
growth. Reforming the FIC quickly became a focal point of negotiations around changes to 
foreign investment laws. The Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) began to publically 
lobby the Minister of Finance to review and limit the role of the investment screening body as 
early as July 1998.117 In a memorandum prepared for dialogues with the Finance Ministry over 
the 1999 Budget, the most prominent chamber of commerce for local manufacturers emphasized 
the need to push through a number of measures designed to improve access to credit including 
liberalizing reinvestment allowances and extending limits on foreign currency accounts.118 The 
FMM pointed to a need to finance expansion of production capacity, particularly since the 
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deprecation of the ringgit provided an opportunity to capitalize on cheaper production costs.119 
Foreign affiliates brought with them access to offshore sources of finance, which was crucial to 
overcoming credit rationing in the aftermath of the banking crisis (UNCTAD 1998).120 To 
facilitate the manufacturing sector’s financing needs, the FMM proposed reducing the 
investment screening role of the FIC, preferring that it only monitor foreign acquisitions in 
sectors deemed to be in the national interest, which it defined as utilities such as power 
generation and distribution, telecommunications, and water treatment; defense; air and seaports; 
and banking and financial institutions.121 
The government initially responded to the FMM’s demands by temporarily lifting equity 
restrictions in the manufacturing sector. But, this policy concession was not sufficient for local 
businesses, who saw FDI liberalization, particularly with respect to foreign mergers and 
acquisitions, as a solution to a financing gap. Chambers of commerce used the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry’s (MITI) annual dialogues with the business community to 
lobby jointly for liberalizing changes. In 2002, the Malaysian International Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (MICCI), the oldest trade association in the country, and the FMM 
renewed their repeated calls for eliminating foreign ownership restrictions in both manufacturing 
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and services, limiting the power of the FIC, and reforming immigration rules to allow more 
skilled workers permanent residency in the country.122 
Increased support of FDI liberalization was clearly linked to the governments’ decision to 
recapitalize the banks without allowing foreign bank takeovers. As one authority on Malaysia’s 
crisis response puts its: 
[State intervention] focused on narrowing the NEP in the real economy and 
deepening it in the banking sector through state-guided consolidation. The 
Malaysian state used this crisis to discipline the Malaysian economy in some 
sectors while protecting the NEP and its limits on competition in others (Cook 
2008, pg. 86). 
 
In other words, the governments’ decision to preserve foreign equity limitations on banks made 
continued equity ceilings in other sectors untenable. This is because constrained credit made 
industry look to alternatives over bank-based finance. Government appeals for banks to lend 
were ineffective as banks worked to clean their balance sheets.123 Raising foreign equity through 
stock offerings was unattractive due to both temporary restrictions on the capital account and 
because portfolio investment flows were considered a major contributor to the asset bubble and 
collapse in the first place. Unlike Indonesia, the Malaysian government did not directly control 
any local banks and therefore was unable to directly influence credit allocation decisions because 
they did not offer banks a soft financing constraint. The result of the government-guided banking 
sector restructuring actually reduced the government’s concentration of equity holdings in any 
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given bank.124 Under these conditions, FDI emerged as an attractive financing option for the 
largest and most powerful industry groups. 
As business support coalesced around liberalizing FDI and particularly merger and 
acquisition activity, the government of Malaysia announced its intention to remove the FIC 
approval requirement starting in August 2004.125 The news was met with substantial approval 
from local and international chambers of commerce including the MICCI,126 the FMM,127 the 
American Malaysian Chamber of Commerce,128 the British Malaysian Chamber of Commerce, 
and the European Union-Malaysia Chamber of Commerce.129 However, support was not 
universal, with local real estate moguls arguing FIC oversight over land sales was important to 
prevent foreigners from acquiring excessive amounts of real property.130 
Despite the strong support from the business community, the FIC screening requirement 
was not removed until 2009. The delay reflected an interrelated bureaucratic power struggle 
between the Prime Minister and the Executive Cabinet and the political economy of bumiputera 
redistributive policy. As a result of business sector feedback from annual MITI consultations, 
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Prime Minister Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi tried multiple times to overhaul the FIC, an action 
requiring Cabinet approval. The Cabinet twice rejected this proposal, both due to concerns 
dismantling the screening power of the FIC would be politically unpopular with bumiputera 
groups and because the senior civil servants comprising the committee were reluctant to 
relinquish their bureaucratic power.131 In a December 2007 business awards ceremony, Abdullah 
told industry groups that stalls to reforms were temporary and a reflection of the political 
business cycle, saying, “Whatever you hear, it’s because the elections are coming. I believe we 
will come back after the elections with a two-thirds majority.”132 The subtext was clear: 
bumiputera riots combined with an obstructionist cabinet were temporary obstacles reflective of 
pre-election politicking. Changes in the cabinet membership post-election would provide 
political space for reform. 
Indeed, the precise timing of the government’s major foreign investment policy overhaul 
corresponds with key political developments. The 2008 election was the most closely contested 
race since 1969. The BN lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament, and had a particularly poor 
showing in traditional wealthy urban strongholds including Kuala Lumpur and Penang. The main 
opposition parties, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), and 
the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), all campaigned on platforms to limit preferential 
treatment of bumiputeras. The poor electoral showing weakened Prime Minister Abdullah; he 
eventually announced in July of 2008 that he would relinquish his leadership position the 
following year.  
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Abdullah formally handed power to his Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak on 2 April 
2009. The same month, Razak announced the liberalization of foreign equity restrictions in 27 
service sub-sectors.133 On 30 June in the same year, Razak announced the overhaul of the FIC on 
the same day he reduced the percentage of equity publically listed stock reserves for bumiputera 
from 30 percent to 12.5 percent.134 The timing of these changes reflects changes within the 
executive cabinet associated with Razak’s ascension to Prime Minister. Razak appointed a 
smaller cabinet, with 39 fewer members than Abdullah’s second cabinet. Additionally, 
investment reformers like Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, who had formerly served 
as the head of MITI, were given more prominent positions in the cabinet and therefore were 
better positioned to successfully lobby for reform. Pressure from the unified opposition also 
motivated BN leaders to overcome strong bumiputera opposition to reform since no viable 
opposition parties lobbied to continue the affirmative action program unchanged and since 
failure to reform would only increase opposition support among those prominent in the business 
community. Even without a strong challenge from a bumiputera-focused opposition party, the 
BN was careful to announce a new bumiputera equity holding company program in conjunction 
with reformation of the FIC in order to counter indigenous complaints that such policies favored 
foreign investors over small local firms.135 
The Malaysian reform experience, therefore, illustrates three key points. First, business 
groups were quick to change their policy preferences over FDI policy post crisis. While 
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supporting a heavily-regulated, partially liberal investment policy was beneficial when debt 
finance and portfolio investment were readily available, the Malaysian government’s response to 
its banking crisis led to large changes in credit allocation decisions in which large powerful firms 
found it increasingly difficult to obtain sweetheart deals for their financing needs. In the absence 
of subsidized credit, business groups began to lobby for liberalization of FDI policy. These 
policy demands were not immediately acceded to, however, because the ruling coalition needed 
to appease bumiputera interests, which were traditional sources of electoral support. A history of 
racially motivated riots in response to policy actions perceived as antithetical to the spirit of the 
NEP made BN leaders particularly keen to avoid public confrontation that might create negative 
perceptions of Malaysia’s political climate among potential investors.  
It is important to note that while increased political contestation within Malaysia’s 
competitive authoritarian electoral system did indeed motivate eventual reforms, interest groups 
in the country had different policy preference structures than theories that place democratization 
at the center of FDI liberalization processes assume. Bumiputera laborers were among the 
domestic groups most opposed to liberalization while domestic business interests continually 
lobbied for liberalization in order to reap the benefits of easier access to foreign equity 
participation. The success of opposition parties in the 2008 help catalyze change because these 
groups gained support among urban capitalists. A labor-driven theory of FDI liberalization is not 
supported by this case. 
A final key point is that policy change lagged shifting policy strategies of industrial 
capitalists, as found in news reporting and chamber of commerce statetments, by a decade. A 
large reason for this delay was due to pressures from bumiputera groups to maintain equity 
restrictions and government screening authority over foreign acquisitions. Another significant 
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factor, however, was the intransience of elites on the FIC who were reluctant to cede their power. 
Successful reform of the screening authority was only achieved after a change in leadership of 
the ruling coalition and a subsequent cabinet reshuffle. Thus, it is important to note that while 
domestic business groups shifted their policy preferences over FDI policy after the government 
instituted important reforms to the banking sector post-1997 crisis, these changes are best 
understood as creating a set of conditions conducive to, but not necessarily sufficient for, reform.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter outlined the co-evolution of banking and FDI policy in Malaysia and 
Indonesia from 1997 to 2013, with an emphasis on how disparate policy responses to the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997 affected credit allocation practices and therefore business groups’ 
preferences over openness to FDI. Starting from a similar level of openness to FDI in 1997, the 
countries have diverged widely in their investment restrictiveness. While Indonesia experienced 
some investment liberalization directly following the crisis due to IMF conditionality, Malaysia 
has seen much more substantial and sustained policy liberalization. In 2012, Malaysia’s 
investment policy environment was at the average level of openness for a panel of 52 advanced 
and emerging economies. Indonesia, in contrast, was one standard deviation above the average 
level of restrictiveness in this same sample. Additionally, Indonesia has seen significant policy 
backtracking since 2010 when domestic business groups began a sustained lobbying effort to 
pursue additional restrictions on FDI.  
 I argue the divergent experiences with FDI policy in Indonesia and Malaysia post-crisis 
can be explained by development in each country’s bank sector that altered elite strategic 
assessment of FDI openness. Indonesia’s banking sector has become more state-dominated since 
1997 while Malaysia privatized its state-owned banks in the aftermath of the crisis and pursued 
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substantial prudential regulatory reform. Indonesian banking regulatory reform has not been as 
extensive as has Malaysia’s and credit allocation in the country has never fully recovered since 
the crisis. At the same time, Indonesian banks benefit greatly from repressive policies that push 
the cost of credit higher and that create strong incentives for the government to use preferential 
credit as a tool of coalition-building. As a result, the most politically important Indonesian firms 
received preferential access to credit while remaining firms are largely credit starved. 
 Documentation of prominent domestic business groups’ lobbying efforts over FDI policy 
indicate Malaysian firms experienced a sharp change in policy preferences over FDI in the wake 
of the crisis when preferential credit was non-existent and financing constraints were perceived 
as the largest impediments to business growth. Indonesian firms, however, became increasingly 
hostile to foreign direct equity, particularly after the banking sector re-stabilized post-crisis with 
a more prominent state-owned banking system. As a result, Indonesian FDI policy reform efforts 
have stagnated and even reversed after an initial round of IMF-instigated liberalizations. 
 Comparing these two cases offers several interesting conclusions about the process of 
FDI reform. First, policy reform is most likely to occur when elite policy preferences over 
foreign investment change. The Malaysian experience has been that elites have driven the 
process of FDI reform while the Indonesian experience indicates elites are powerful blocking 
mechanisms when they are opposed to foreign equity entry. This finding is counter to existing 
arguments about FDI liberalization that places great weight on the role of labor in a 
democratizing state at pushing reforms. Indeed, the UMNO, under the BN umbrella, has been 
able to maintain hegemonic party control in Malaysia while also gradually but substantially 
liberalizing the investment climate. Indonesia, on the other hand, has undergone a democratic 
transition, but anti-FDI elites have successfully impeded FDI policy reform. 
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 Second, other explanations for FDI liberalization place great emphasis on the capacity of 
the IMF to be an agent of change. Indeed, we see that Indonesia initially experienced movements 
toward openness under IMF conditionality. However, without elite support, reform efforts 
quickly stalled and eventually were partially reversed. Conversely, Malaysia underwent more 
gradual but sustained and substantial reform without the external pressure of IMF conditionally. 
Because elite interests undergird regulatory policies toward FDI, substantial policy liberalization 
cannot be forced through by external groups. For liberalization to take hold, business groups 
must believe policy openness will be in their interest. 
Thus, the comparison of Malaysian and Indonesian FDI policy reforms post 1997 crisis 
corroborate the central argument of this dissertation that banking sector reform leads to FDI 
policy reform. These cases more closely evaluate elite lobbying efforts over FDI policy as 
domestic credit allocation processes change, and indicate firms are more likely to view FDI 
positively when the state is less involved in the lending process. In conjunction with the previous 
chapter, these cases also show that FDI policy liberalization can experience reversal and that 
changes in the domestic credit allocation process can explain both levels of and changes to 
openness to FDI.  
! !
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION !
 
This dissertation argued policies toward FDI are best understood as the product of 
domestic political coalitions that are conditioned on the local financing environment. Local 
capitalists would most prefer to protect themselves against foreign direct entrants who create 
competition in local labor and product markets, force productivity gains that eat away at rents, 
and fracture lucrative political coalitions between business elite and governments. However, 
local firms also need access to capital in order to survive and grow. When the state pursues 
policies of financial repression, politically influential firms are able to capitalize on subsidized 
lending. When the domestic banking sector undergoes substantial reforms, local elites no longer 
have access to subsidized credit through political connections. The need to obtain finance 
outweighs firms’ preferences to exclude foreign direct investors. Under such conditions, 
industrial elites will support increasingly liberal FDI policy environments. 
Summary of Findings 
My analysis found evidence broadly consistent with this theory. Using statistical 
techniques that separate short and long-term effects, I find banking sector reforms lead to higher 
levels of FDI equity openness overtime, even when controlling for popular alternative 
explanations of investment policy liberalization such as regime type, IMF coercion, and diffusion 
effects. I also find countries that undergo banking reforms are more likely to liberalize from a 
closed equity policy environment and more likely to remain fully liberal. At the same time, 
increased access to alternative forms of investment are associated with partial reform. Short-term 
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capital account openness reduces a country’s propensity to switch from an intermediate level of 
policy openness to a fully liberalized FDI environment.  
While large N quantitative analysis did find policies toward equity restrictions respond in 
a manner consistent with my theory, there is little evidence that changes in investment screening 
policies follow a similar logic. This finding surprised me. It may be that decisions to abandon 
screening requirements are better explained by bureaucratic politics since screening imbues 
investment ministries with a great deal of authority that senior officials may be quite reluctant to 
relinquish. Since regime type was more consistently significant in screening models than in 
models of equity restrictions, it may also be the case that non-democracies are more likely to 
retain authoritative control over inward investment. Or, it may be the case that de jure measures 
of screening do a poor job identifying truly restrictive policy environments. While China’s 
screening processes are clearly exclusionary, some countries such as Canada have retained 
screening authority without actually using approval processes to block foreign investment 
projects. Clearly, more research is needed to understand the process through which screening 
requirements are relaxed. 
While my quantitative analysis establishes a statistical correlation between banking sector 
reforms and FDI liberalization, the comparative case study of Indonesia and Malaysia in 
Chapters 5 and 6 serve to trace the process of policy reform in two similar cases that differ in the 
extent to which they pursued meaningful banking sector reforms after a shared financial crisis. 
These case studies allow me to relax my assumption that FDI policies are typically an expression 
of elite interests and also provide a more direct examination of the lobbying activities of business 
elites with respect to FDI policy. I find that Malaysia’s more extensive banking sector reforms 
coincide with a shift in local economic elites’ attitudes toward FDI policy liberalization, and that 
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the pressures from these powerful interests lead to substantial investment regulatory reforms. 
Indonesia, in contrast, has a banking sector that continues to be largely protected and controlled 
by the state. Unlike industrial elite in Malaysia, Indonesia’s business class has become 
increasingly hostile to FDI and the process of investment policy reform has stalled. Indonesia 
also contains interesting within case variation; the state pursed limited banking sector reforms in 
the 1980s and subsequently also underwent limited FDI liberalization. However, these 
liberalizing movements were not sustained as the state re-asserted dominances in the banking 
sector in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
 These case comparisons support the quantitative analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 in several 
ways. First, they provide qualitative support for the argument that policy reform is most likely to 
occur when elite policy preferences over foreign investment change. The Malaysian experience 
has been on of elites driving the process of FDI reform while the Indonesian experience indicates 
elites are powerful blocking mechanisms when they are opposed to foreign equity entry. Second, 
these cases provide further evidence that democratic transitions do not drive FDI policy 
liberalization. The hegemonic ruling party in Malaysia has carefully managed movements toward 
increased openness to foreign investors in the context competitive authoritarianism. If anything, 
popular opinion is skeptical of foreign investors. Local chambers of commerce have used their 
policy influence to push through investment liberalization despite the objections of workers. 
Indonesia, on the other hand, has undergone a democratic transition, but anti-FDI elites have 
successfully impeded FDI policy reform. Third, these cases question the capacity of the IMF to 
be a meaningful agent of change with respect to FDI policies. Indonesia did undertake more open 
policies in the initial phases of IMF-required adjustment. However, without elite support, reform 
efforts quickly stalled and eventually were partially reversed. Conversely, Malaysia underwent 
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more gradual but sustained and substantial reform without the external pressure of IMF 
conditionally. Because elite interests undergird regulatory policies toward FDI, external groups 
cannot force through substantial policy liberalization. For liberalization to take hold, business 
groups must believe policy openness will be in their interest. 
Contribution 
 
This project represents a substantial contribution to the IPE literature for several reasons. 
First, my theory provides way of integrating the financing environment into an understanding of 
FDI policy. This helps to provide a more united theory of FDI policy in developed and 
developing countries that can also explain reversals in openness, especially in the mid 20th 
century and renewed reversals today. By connecting elite strategies over FDI to the financing 
environment, this theory helps to overcome prevalent idea that FDI policy, once open, is 
irreversible. As a result, this theory can both explain moves toward openness and moves toward 
increasingly restrictive policy environments.  
Placing the financing environment at the center of elites’ strategic calculus also suggests 
a way forward for IPE scholars who wish to explain how patterns of financial connectedness and 
regulation affect actors’ strategic interests, political actions, and governments’ policymaking. 
The global financial crisis inspired scholars to re-imagine how the global financial system 
undergirds the real economy, affects the ability of the state to engage in public goods provision, 
and expands or narrows the set of policy options to redistribute wealth domestically and 
internationally. The fact that typical treatments of FDI policy explanations ignored the role of the 
financial environment in affecting local industrialists’ willingness to exclude foreign investors 
from local establishment nicely illustrates the problem of divorcing finance from explanations of 
other economic behavior.   
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My theory also helps explains continued variation without assuming labor groups play a 
large role in pushing for openness. Not only do such theories have trouble explaining why some 
of the most visible protests against FDI occur through mass mobilization, but they also lead to 
the conclusion that FDI automatically redistributes gains toward workers. This is not necessarily 
true, especially since FDI often occurs through M&A that often leads to labor force reductions. 
As others have pointed out, FDI may also reduce the collective bargaining strength of labor since 
multinationals have greater threat of exit than do local firms. If FDI policy liberalization is 
driven by changes in elites strategies toward openness rather than through the expression of 
workers’ interests, then the question of workers’ industrial and political bargaining strength in a 
economically integrated world again becomes relevant. 
Extensions 
 
Of course, this project leaves many questions left unanswered and therefore creates new 
opportunities for further research. Two possible extensions address a central weakness of the 
current analysis. First, I highlight how this theory can better explain historical trends and 
variations in domestic regulation of foreign investor entry over time. However, the data I use in 
my quantitative analysis start in 1973 and my qualitative cases begin analysis in the late 1960s. I 
expect my theory to explain not only patterns of liberalization in the last quarter of the 20th 
century, but also patterns of regulatory closure that occurred earlier in the century. Moreover, my 
theory anticipates increased restriction on FDI policies in countries whose governments 
responded to the more recently global financial crisis by exerting increased control over 
domestic financial systems. To test the applicability of this theory beyond the liberalizing trends 
during the late 20th century we need more data.  Future research could extend measures of FDI 
regulation to include a longer time series in both directions. 
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Second, this research is best seen as a first attempt to establish the relationship between 
banking sector regulations and the formation, maintenance, and change in domestic coalitions 
advocating for protection from or openness to FDI. As such, most of the evidence I present is 
broadly consistent with the expectations that derive from my theory, but tested almost entirely 
from macro-level policy outcomes. Future work can more closely measure and test the policy 
positions of domestic firms and use these data to more closely test all parts of the causal chain. 
As the IPE literature increasingly looks toward firm-level analysis, exploring the precise ways in 
which local firms pressure their governments over policies related to FDI will add to a more 
robust understanding of the political role of business elite in different domestic contexts. 
 This research project also establishes a new beachhead from which to explore the 
implications of a financing opportunities cost theory in a more nuanced way. IPE scholars are 
increasingly taking seriously the assertion that firms exhibit heterogeneous preferences. While 
this project treated domestic industrial elites as a united group, future research could test 
industry-level variation in FDI regulation. Such research could provide a further test of my 
theory since more capital-intensive activities should be  
more responsive to changes in the financing environment if elite strategies over FDI policy are 
driven by the cost of alternative sources of capital. Perhaps more interesting than variation at the 
sub-sector level is studying how firm size and organizational structure informs variation in 
strategies over FDI. Drawing on insights from the Melitz model, domestic firm size, exporting 
capacity, and status as conglomerate should affect firms’ interests in regulating FDI. Of course, 
such a research project would entail overcoming significant problems of measurement and data 
availability with respect to industry-specific FDI policies and the policy influence of individual 
firms or industries. 
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 Another question that this current research project leaves largely unanswered is under 
what conditions will governments pursue policies of financial repression and financial reforms. 
Clearly, these policies, once established, affect the strategic environment in which firms make 
decisions about how to respond to global financial flows. Less understood is why powerful 
vested interests would allow governments to enact policies that erode their political influence. 
Throughout this dissertation I draw on analysis that largely sees financial reforms as the product 
of exogenous shocks that limit the range of options available to governments. As the 
comparative cases of Malaysia and Indonesia demonstrate, however, reform in the face of crisis 
is not a given. What makes some governments more likely to respond to crisis with substantial 
financial reform? To what extend does this choice depend upon the strength of industrial 
capitalists? 
 Finally, almost all IPE research related to FDI is ultimately interested in how cross border 
flows of direct investment change the nature of domestic political coalitions. In particular, when 
do foreign firms become important social interests in host states? Under what conditions do 
foreign firms and domestic firms become partners in their activities aimed at changing or 
maintaining government policies? Thinking seriously about the conditions under which local 
firms will view multinational entry as vital to their own bottom line further complicates the 
essential question of the role of foreign firms in domestic politics. Rather that asking whether 
mobility makes a firm powerful or indifferent, the question most relevant to integrated 
economies is under what conditions do the interests of foreign and domestic firms become 
indistinguishable.
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